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Preface
This dissertation was the result of a long journey, in both the literal and figurative
senses of that word. Growing up in Bengal meant that, for me, Rabindranath Tagore
was a towering presence both intellectually and affectively. It is hard to put a proper
analytical distance between oneself and a writer one admires if the presence of that
writer looms too large. Writing about Tagore as a doctoral student in a U.S. univer-
sity made me able to approach him, I think, in an oblique and distanced way, which
then afforded the possibility of reading him with and through tropes that otherwise
would not have occurred to me to read him with. The “reading dialectically” in
the title of my dissertation has, then, a private meaning in addition to its public
signification. There is a dialectic between the way I have been accustomed to read
Tagore, and the way I have, over time, learned to read him anew. Both of these, and
their dialectical interplay, informs this dissertation.
I am greatly indebted to my dissertation supervisor, Vassilios Lambropoulos, for
having suggested to me, at the early stage of the project, that I counterpose C.L.R.
James to Tagore. With his uncanny ability to discern very quickly the pivot points
of ideas in my mind even as they were still in development, Prof. Lambropoulos
presciently anticipated that I would find C.L.R. James to be a kindred soul to Tagore
within the terms of the framework that I was still in the process of sketching out at
that point. Over the duration of this project, I came to recognize my own growing
intellectual as well as affective affinity with James, an affinity which provided a
tantalizing counterpoint to my similar affiliations with Tagore. In particular, coming
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to acquire, during the course of this project, a sense of James’ life as a Marxist man
of color from another country living in the United States during his American years,
has provided me, who am in a not wholly unlike situation, with signposts for my
own, much more modest, goals and endeavors.
Strands from both my past and present interests have found their way into the
project. Although in a completely different field, John Laird first taught me how to
do research. Special thanks are due to Timothy Bahti and the late Gregory Lucente,
whose encouragements were key to my turn to comparative literature. Javier Sanjinés
and Andreas Kalyvas, members of my dissertation committee during its early stages,
helped spark ideas that left their traces throughout the project. My interest in
Antonio Negri and his reading of Spinoza started with a serendipitious engagement
with Spinoza’s philosophy during an excursion into research at the Center for the
Study of Complex Systems at the University of Michigan, where I had been struck
by how ideas of autopoiesis and emergence seemed to resemble aspects of Spinoza’s
philosophy. Prof. Santiago Colás steered my interest in this in useful directions, and
also provided me with a helpful models of how non-literary theory and philosophy can
be brought to bear on literary analysis. Prof. Christi Merrill, who has been a mentor
to this project from its inception, steered me towards thinking about questions of
writerliness and form and genre, not only with regard to James and Tagore but
also, reflexively, my own writing in this project as well. Studying with Prof. Jennifer
Wenzel attuned me to the temporal tropes which later came to be important framing
devices for my project. Prof. Daniel Herwitz suggested productive directions for me
to pursue and provided invaluable guidance regarding the logical structure of the
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project as a whole. Prof. Lambropoulos has been a very generous mentor to this
project, modeling, in his own way, a dialectical approach that helped me to not
lose sight of the central ideas of the dissertation as they emerged while at the same
time encouraging me to explore and pursue ideas farther afield when they looked
promising. I am indebted to him for his constant encouragement and always excellent
advice. Last but not the least, during the final stages of the project, Timothy
Brennan’s seminar at the 2010 Cornell School of Criticism and Theory helped me
greatly by suggesting new ideas and organizing my ideas in new ways.
Several of the biweekly discussions organized as Marxist study groups with mem-
bers of the Washtenaw Reds in Ann Arbor provided an apportunity to me to clar-
ify and develop my ideas and to discuss them with people outside the academy.
My friends Pepa Maŕın, Manishita Dass, Sudipto Chatterjee, Hemanth Kadambi,
Mandira Bhaduri, Elizabeth Cowan and Beth Solberg have brought me great joy at
various stages of this project through their generous friendship; the conversations I
have had with them about many of the ideas in this dissertation have helped me to
move my thought forward.
This research was partially funded (at different stages in the process) by fellowships
and grants from the Rackham School of Graduate Studies at the University of Michi-
gan, the Sweetland Writing Center at the University of Michigan, and the University
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Can always be reimagined, however four-square,
Plank-thick, hull-stupid and out of its time
It happens to be.
– from the poem ’The Settle Bed’, in Seeing Things,
by Seamus Heaney
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. . . the most fruitful way of approaching a . . . text or
project lies not in judging its positive elements, its
overt representations, but rather in seeking to grasp
what it cannot (yet) think, what lies in it beyond the
very limits of its own social system and of the
empirical being it seeks to transcend.
– Fredric Jameson, in Valences of the Dialectica
aJameson, Fredric. Valences of the Dialectic. London:
Verso. 2009. p. 361.
This dissertation is a project of reading politically. On the face of it, such a statement
may appear vacuous and meaninglessly bland, given that it is usually taken to be a
truism that everything, after all, is political in one sense or the other. It stands to
reason, then, that I ought to begin by explaining what specific valence “the political”
has for my project, and also what it does not.
In his recent book Philosophy and Real Politics, the political philosopher Raymond
Geuss comments that a strong Kantian trend in contemporary academia has led to
the widespread popularity of the view that “politics is applied ethics” (Geuss 2008,
1). Geuss points out that a claim to universality – a claim that he considers to be
false – inheres in this view. Kantian ethics, Geuss notes, lays claim to universal
applicability in all situations, based on Kant’s view that there exists a universally
shared common sense. This has had the consequence, Geuss believes, that ethics
has come to be seen as an “ideal theory,” and politics as merely an applied ethics,
that is, an application of a pure ethics which is presumed to be ideal and universal.
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As my dissertation will make clear, I am sympathetic to the idea of universality,
but I argue that it makes the most sense to approach the question of universalism
from historically specific starting points. I argue, further, that Rabindranath Tagore
and C.L.R. James, the writers that I focus on in my dissertation, were themselves
engaged in such a project. As a student of literature, a large part of my approach
to this problematic lies through questions of textuality and language. The nature of
the question of the relationship of universality to specificity is, in fact, such that it
is particularly suitable for textual and linguistic modes of inquiry. All claims to, as
well as dissensus from, the idea of universality, as well as any decentering, or defense
against such decentering, of accepted and received ideas about a canonical univerality,
are necessarily argued in language, which has its own specificity and historicity. More
than to other political questions, then, an approach through literary study to this
particular political question is likely to be particularly productive – on account of
the very nature of this question.
Rabindranath Tagore (1861-1941) and C.L.R. James (1901-1989) were not exact
contemporaries, although their life spans did overlap to a considerable extent. Even
though they were quite different, both in terms of personalities and interests and as
writers, some of their concerns, as writers from British colonies that were negotiating
a complex entry into modernity, also overlapped. Both were thrust, as a result of
historical forces in the midst of which they found themselves (and which, in turn,
they helped to shape), into the role of public intellectuals. Arguably, both subscribed,
after a fashion, and in a qualified way, to a universalist humanism. Both also were,
however, deeply embedded, in distinct ways, in their own historical specificities of
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time and place. I have found no evidence that they ever wrote about each other,
although it is likely that they would have known about each other in the 1920s and
1930s.
In this dissertation, it is the axis of my political reading of Tagore and James that
brings the two of them together. I am using the word “political” here in two senses.
Firstly, I am interested in what lessons Tagore and James might offer for a politics
(in the everyday sense of the word) today. Secondly, I am also using the word
“political” in the sense of the political philosopher Carl Schmitt – that is, the political
as denoting the existential basis that constitutes the essence of life itself (Schmitt
2007).
The political conceived as following from an “ideal theory” of unproblematized ethics
is, thus, emphatically not my preferred view of what the political is. With regard
to the positive sense of “political”, I am, again, substantially in agreement with
Geuss, Politics, Geuss argues, “is in the first instance about action and contexts of
action,” (Geuss 2008, 11) rather than about beliefs or propositions. Politics, in
other words, is always situational – and this is true, also, for a political reading.
The reading of Tagore and James that I have undertaken in this project is, after
all, taking place at a certain moment in time in the early twenty-first century, and
in a specific historical context. This, of course, raises the question as to what the
payoff is for reading Tagore and James politically today – a question that I attempt
to answer towards the end of this dissertation. Geuss also convincingly makes an
additional argument that politics is closer to “the exercise of a craft or art” than it
is to the mere application of an intellectually formulated theory (Geuss 2008, 15).
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This constitutes an additional reason as to why it makes sense to approach political
questions through the methods of literary and textual analysis and exegesis of the
work of particular writers, as I have attempted to do in this dissertation.
This framing of what it means to read politically in the sense that I have undertaken
to do in this dissertation requires an additional comment, one of a meta-theoretical
nature, to complete it. A project of reading politically, like mine, ought to be self-
reflective about the politics of the theorization that it is itself engaged in while
performing that reading. My intellectual sympathies, as will be clear from reading
this dissertation, are with the dialectical strand within the Marxist tradition. Given
James’ own Marxist politics, such an approach does not, of course, need much justifi-
cation in relation to James, but more explanation is called for in relation to following
such an approach towards a writer like Tagore. What I have attempted to do is to
show that a productive and rich reading of Tagore is possible through identifying
what I call dialectical “moments” in his work. My commitment is not towards any
putative demonstration that Tagore himself was a dialectician, nor towards estab-
lishing that the only legitimate way to read him would be to read him dialectically.
Rather, it is my contention that a dialectical approach, with its emphasis on pro-
cesses, its systematic attempt to explain how the new may arise, and its preference
for causal explanation over mere revelation, shares strong commonalities with what
I see as Tagore’s own project, which, I argue, was to find a way to conceive of a new
way of thinking about universality, one which decenters the European Enlightenment
from its traditionally assigned locus in the narrative of human freedom.
A recurring trope in this dissertation is the dialectical relationship between necessity
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and contingency. The repeated occurrence of this trope elevates it somewhat to the
level of a framing device or organizing principle for my project. Another way to
think of this dialectic may be to reformulate it as a dialectic of structure and agency.
I use the the words “structure” and “agency” in the same the philosopher of critical-
realism, Roy Bhaskar, uses them. Bhaskar associates “structure” with a logic of
causation: “the structure of a thing is constituted by its causal powers, which, when
exercised, manifest themselves as tendencies,” he writes (Bhaskar 1993, 404), while
“agency,” for him, is “intentional transformative praxis” (Bhaskar 1993, 393). In
Bhaskar’s model causes (generated by the causal powers, that is, the structure, of a
“thing”) produce tendencies as consequences, but the actualization of these tenden-
cies is contingent upon the interaction of an unpredictable world and the thing. Two
results follow from this model. Firstly, since subjects have agency, this means that
they are irreducible to mere structure (Bhaskar 1998). The causal logic associated
with structure is a logic of necessity, since causes have determinate consequences. If,
however, within the context of this model, we think of subjects as things with agency,
that is as invested, in Bhaskar’s words, with “intentional transformative praxis”, then
we can see that the necessity implied by the causal logic associated with structure is
in dialectical interplay with other causalities that also unfold simultaneously (since
the world is an open system), making the resulting activity not a determinate but
a contingent manifestation of the tendencies set in motion. “When their initial con-
ditions are satisfied,” Bhaskar writes, law-like formulations that hew to the logic of
necessity “make a claim about the activity of a tendency, i.e. about the operation
of the generative mechanism that would, if undisturbed, result in the tendency’s
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manifestation, but not about the conditions in which the tendency is exercised, and
hence not about whether it will be realized or prevented” (Bhaskar 1978). What
actually occurs in the world is, then, in Bhaskar’s model, produced by the dialectic
of necessity and contingency.
I will be arguing in this thesis that – admittedly within the terms of rather expan-
sive definitions of these rubrics – it is possible to read both Tagore and James in
relation to a dialectic of necessity and contingency, and that such a reading is rich
and interesting, even possibly offering important lessons about the horizons of, and
opportunities presented by, politics today. At a time like the present, emancipatory
politics finds itself in a standstill, and no political alternative any more daring than
the mere fine-tuning of regulatory mechanisms within neoliberal capitalism is viewed
as a serious contender for staking a claim on the collective political imagination. In
such a situation, the formulation of new conceptual paradigms can represent one
possible strategy for overcoming the impasse created by this aporia of the political
imaginary. But so can, simply, the recuperation and rediscovery of old conceptual
paradigms that have fallen out of fashion. In the contemporary academy, however,
theoretical novelty often comes to be valued for its own sake, leading to a compulsion
for perpetual novelty-seeking and a reflexive rejection of the old. My choice to work
on Tagore, James and dialectics, working with texts that are close to a century old,
is motivated at least partly by a sense that there is much of value to be learned and
rediscovered from the past that can speak to our contemporary problems.
It is inescapable that a willingness to take a theoretical stance and to defend the
stance taken, as I have done in this project in defense of reading dialectically, nec-
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essarily implies taking a position, however implicitly, against other positions. As I
already mentioned, my position situates me in a relationship of opposition to the
“ethical turn” in contemporary political theory. In addition, it also situates me in
a position of opposition to powerful currents in contemporary poststructuralist and
postcolonial theory that advocate, variously and to different degrees, for the rejec-
tion of metanarrative, for a framework of analysis that has scant place for human
agency as a transformative force, and for a politics of hybridity and voluntaristic
self-expression in contradistinction to a politics of antagonism. Vilashini Cooppan
points out the prevailing dominance of these currents in contemporary postcolonial
theory, drawing our attention to a much older countervailing tradition: “[t]he post-
colonial studies that speak in the language of discursive analysis and through such
concepts as hybridity, cultural fusion, and cross- ethnic, transnational intermixture
have been subject to substantially greater academic reproduction than those which
speak, and indeed have spoken for over a century now, in the languages of . . . strate-
gic political identification and . . . armed resistance” (Cooppan 2000, 12). Cooppan
acknowledges several other possible counter-tendencies in postcolonial studies to the
notion of a generic colonial hybridity based on enunciative instability: Benita Parry
(Parry 1987, 27) and Abdul JanMohamed’s (JanMohamed 1985, 59) advocacy of
conceiving the colonizer and colonized in terms of sharply delineated dichotomies
and liberation struggle, and Ania Loomba’s suggestion to be attentive to more var-
iegated hybridities which allow for agency, and to recognize the specificities of such
hybridities (Loomba 1991, 172-173). Cooppan herself makes a case for a renewed
emphasis on race and nation within postcolonial studies (Cooppan 2000, 23). All of
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these approaches can be thought of as attempts to recover a sense of agency for the
postcolonial subject – an agency that had been strikingly absent from most of the
poststructuralist approaches to postcolonial theory. However, rather than empha-
sizing conceptual categories such as liberation, race, or nation, or the specificity of
hybridity, a more straightforward way to recuperate agency for the postcolonial sub-
ject may be to rethink postcolonial theory not merely statically, in relation to fixed
conceptual categories, but to rethink the dynamics of the process of subjectivization
itself. Such a rethinking is precisely what this dissertation, which calls for reading
dialectically, is about.
My choice of Tagore and James as writers to work with in this project has been mo-
tivated, in no small part, by the sense that both of them can be thought of (although
in different ways) as exemplary counter-thinkers who stand in an oppositional rela-
tion to the dominant trend in postcolonial thought that tends to leave little room
for agency. We can perhaps characterize this trend as consisting of a twinned anti-
humanism and anti-foundationalism. The origin of this trend can arguably be traced
to the influence of such poststructuralist thinkers as Derrida, Deleuze and Foucault.
If we are to try to seek the genealogy of this anti-humanist, anti-foundationalist mo-
tif, it can be traced back, in turn, to Heidegger and ultimately to Nietzsche. This
tradition, in spite of some of its exponents’ occasional gestures of affiliation with the
Marxist tradition, is more or less uniformly hostile to the dialectical tradition affil-
iated with Hegel in which Marxism has by and large been embedded. As Timothy
Brennan notes:
The new sciences of [the interwar] years formed the core thinking of Der-
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rida, Foucault and Lacan by way of a return to Heidegger, Freud and
Bataille . These precursors were the continental thinkers from the inter-
war period who worked within a tradition consciously at war with Marx
– a war that took place in an act of modernizing and updating Nietzsche
for interwar conditions, when that still relatively obscure German thinker
was catapaulted into prominence as the riposte to Marxism’ s history, its
human perfectability, and its mob (Brennan 2002, 192).
There are, of course, legitimate reasons as to why the dialectical Hegelian-Marxist
tradition has tended to be unappealing and unfashionable in recent decades. This
tradition has come to be associated with a deterministic teleology that seems unap-
petizingly rigid and dogmatic. Thinkers who have continued to affiliate themselves
with the Marxist tradition have by and large tended to follow two main trajectories:
they have either rejected the notion of the Marxist dialectic by seeking a different
intellectual affiliation with which to replace it (analytical philosophy for G.A. Cohen,
Spinozian monism for Antonio Negri, and commitment to a non-dialectical notion of
“event”, which has antecedents in both Maoism and Pauline Christianity, for Alain
Badiou), or they have expanded the notion of the dialectic enough to enable them
to reach an accommodation with poststructuralism (as, for example, in the case of
Fredric Jameson , who has attempted to make the case that “dialectics and decon-
struction are consonant with each other” at least up to a point (Jameson 2009, 27).
Both these trajectories involve a gesture of disavowal, even if partial, of classical
Marxism. Slavoj Z̆iz̆ek, on the contrary, appears to be steadfastly committed to a
Hegelian-Marxist dialectics, but even he, if somewhat theatrically, acknowledges the
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unpopularity of his stance by labeling his commitment to the dialectic as a “lost
cause” (Z̆iz̆ek 2008). Even though I am partial to a dialectical reading of Tagore,
I have, in this dissertation, perhaps at the risk of letting interpretive ecumenicism
slide into an overly profligate methodological eclecticism , read Tagore with pleasure
through the lens of Negri and Badiou too, in spite of the latters’ disavowal of dialec-
tics. This is because Negri and Badiou do have interesting perspectives that help to
open up, as I have tried to show, Tagore ’s work in unexpected ways. As, I hope, my
engagement with Negri and Badiou in reading Tagore will demonstrate, the phrase
“reading dialectically” in the framework of my dissertation is not intended in any
dogmatic or exclusionary way that would foreclose every way of reading that happens
to be non-dialectical.
In his recent study of Brecht and critical theory, Sean Carney points out that it
was Brecht’s aesthetic which supplied Walter Benjamin and, through him, Theodor
Adorno, with the intellectual wherewithal to conceive of the dialectic as “a contradic-
tion between stasis and dynamism” rather than as a process or succession of events
(Carney 2005, 49). It is not a coincidence that the idea of the dialectic formulated,
in this way, as a contradiction between fixity and changeability, should have such a
close connection with the theater, especially with tragedy. Terry Eagleton makes the
case that “major bodies of tragedy spring up at times of crucial socio -political for-
mation, as with the birth -pangs of the ancient polis or the Renaissance nation-state”
(Eagleton 2003, 144). Arguably, the years between the beginning of the First World
War and Tagore’s death in 1941, which was also the period during which he wrote all
the plays that I engage with in this dissertation, were a similarly crucial transitional
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period in the history of the Indian subcontinent. It is, of course, subject to debate
whether any of these plays by Tagore can necessarily be called “tragic.” I would
argue, however , that his plays like Raktakarabi, Raja and Muktadhara (all of which
I treat in this dissertation) are tragic in their sensibility at least in the sense that,
as Eagleton perceptively points out, a tragic protagonist is one who both fails in the
face of destiny, and in so failing glimpses “a higher order of freedom and justice,”
so that “the infinite is made negatively present by throwing the limits of finitude
into exposure.” Tragedy, Eagleton says, encodes this dialectical exposition of the
limits of human freedom and intimates the inklings of a “higher order of freedom”
whose sublimity can be dimly grasped only when it is lit up “by the flames which
consume the protagonist” (Eagleton 2003, 121). The negation of human freedom by
the machinery of fate is thus itself negated, making tragedy itself a dialectical genre,
insofar as tragedy enacts this negation of a negation.
A few words are in order regarding the role of Tagore and James, and of the re-
lationship between the two, in my dissertation project. Tagore is more central to
this dissertation than James is, with the latter providing something of a counter-
point to Tagore. While Tagore and James share some general characteristics as
colonial intellectuals, they were also obviously vastly disparate in terms of their po-
litical orientation, intellectual commitments, and priorities, which makes a project
of “comparing” the two in any straightforward sense of the term unlikely to be par-
ticularly productive. Instead, I endeavor in this dissertation to generate what is
perhaps best described as “variations on themes”: instead of dedicating separate
sections of the dissertation to Tagore and to James, I have organized the dissertation
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thematically, juxtaposing Tagore and James together, showing how particular prob-
lematics that I address in connection with Tagore occur also in James’ work, often in
a quite different context but for that very reason extending our understanding of the
problematic. Each chapter of the dissertation can be considered to constitute a tri-
angular relationship, with Tagore and James constituting two vertices of the triangle
and an array of thinkers drawn from political philosophy and theory with whom I
read Tagore and James constituting the remaining vertex. All of the thinkers that I
read Tagore and James with come from the Marxian tradition. What makes James’
presence as one of the poles of this triangle particularly useful in approaching Tagore
is that, since James is a Marxist himself as well as an explicitly and self -professedly
dialectical thinker, refracting a problematic through James’ texts more adequately
enables a better-motivated reading of Tagore in terms of that particular constellation
of thinkers and problematic.
Some reflection is also in order here about the adequacy of approaching Tagore
using a Marxist or Hegelian analytical framework. First of all , let me make it
clear at the outset that it is certainly not my intention to argue that Tagore was
an incipient Marxist or that he was a Marxist without knowing it. While Tagore
visited the Soviet Union and wrote an admiring account, Russia-r chithi [“Letter
from Russia”] of the social progress he discerned there, he does not seem to have
attempted to engage in his writings with Marxism as a philosophy. Nevertheless, it
is of course true that, as Timothy Brennan has pointed out, “the organized Marxism
of the Third International had both prompted, in Europe, “a reconsideration of the
colonial question” during the inter-war years, as well as provided “a more radical
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formulation of it” (Brennan 2002, 188). As an intellectual from colonial India
who was, moreover, in contact with leading European intellectuals, this would not
have failed to have had an impact on Tagore, even if in a mediated fashion, and
even though he was not directly interested in political philosophy; it is probably
not anachronistic or inappropriate, therefore, to attempt to situate Tagore within
the interpretive framework of a dialectical Marxism/Hegelianism . In any case, my
attempt to read Tagore dialectically is not a project of historicization, but rather
a hermeneutic essay – and, as such, the choice of interpretive framework is not
contingent upon Tagore’ s own political commitments. The real danger in such a
project would probably be to lapse into a facile and vulgar schematicism that would
formulaically and reductively read dialectics into Tagore’s texts – a possibility that
I have attempted to guard against.
My study focuses on the “symbolist” plays written by Tagore in the later, more
mature part of his career, rather than his other work, and in the case of James, too,
I pay particular attention to the play titled The Black Jacobins that James wrote
(in addition to his well-known historical work about the same events, also titled The
Black Jacobins.) As I explain in course of this dissertation, I decided to focus on
plays based on the supposition that, in a genre like drama which is both textual and
performative, the dialectic of necessity and contingency in the tracing of which I am
invested is going to have its most interesting manifestations. The privileged place
of the theater in foregrounding the indeterminacy of the literary text as opposed to
the determinate narrative logic that also underlies it, has often been remarked upon.
Janelle Reinelt and Joseph Roach observe that “drama is experienced differently
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from other works of literature because of the implied contingencies of performance
invested in its language in its structure” (Reinelt and Roach 1992, 354). Roman
Ingarden points out that each performance of a play affords choices to “concretize”
the indeterminacies in the text of the play.1 My intuition was that, since Tagore and
James were both (as I argue in this study) trying in their own ways to heterogenize the
master narrative of modernity by displacing its received genealogy, their theatrical
work was going to be a particularly interesting place to look at the unfolding of this
process, as it is in drama that, perhaps more than in other genres of works of art,
the concretization of indeterminacies affords the possibility of such heterogenization
of the logic of the text. There is a close parallel, I think, between this process of
filling in indeterminacies in course of the performance of the play, thus creating the
conditions of possibility of different possible concretizations of its text, with how
history itself can be narrated from different perspectives. In an insightful essay on
history, hermeneutics and narrativity, Thomas Postlewait writes:
. . . [O]ur historical understanding, as Hans-Georg Gadamer argues,
is from a specific perspective: history is seen and understood through a
consciousness in the present. This consciousness, which [Paul] Ricoeur
calls “historical intentionality,” functions like point of view in narrative:
it is a filter, a perspective, a mediator. We reflect backwards, giving to
successive events an order, a selective process of alignment by means of
our retrospective judgement. . . . [W]e cannot comprehend or represent
1Reinelt, Janelle and Joseph Roach. ’Introduction’ to the section ’Hermeneutics and Phe-
nomenology’. In Reinelt, Janelle and Joseph Roach (ed.), Critical Theory and Performance. Ann
Arbor: The University of Michigan Press. 1992. p. 354.
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[history] fully, in its totality, not even in a master narrative of necessity.
. . . Only by moving around, shifting our perspectives, can we see the
heterogeneous aspects of it (Postlewait 1992, pp. 362-65).
To the extent that Tagore and James were both trying to do the latter – to shift the
perspective on the received history of modernity – would they not have naturally
found the theater a congenial venue?
A second reason why I chose to focus on plays was simply the unfortunate fact that
they seem to have been neglected, comparatively speaking, by James and Tagore
scholars. The towering reputation and lasting influence of James’ prose history, The
Black Jacobins, have tended to overshadow the theatrical version. In the case of
Tagore, while his plays continue to be performed regularly in the Bengali theater,
the critical literature on his plays, both in India and in the West, has been surpris-
ingly meager. The first major study of Tagore in English which was based on a
reading of Tagore’s works in Bengali, Rabindranath Tagore: Poet and Dramatist, by
Edward Thompson, published in 1926, Thompson decried the plays as wrapped in
a “mist of symbolism” and criticized them for “monotony” and “deadening same-
ness” (Thompson 1926, 220). Writing in 1987, Ananda Lal observed that these
“damaging verdicts” by Thompson continued to have an “unfortunate ricochet of
influencing the reactions” of subsequent critics (Lal 1987a, 20). Lal remarks on the
surprising fact that the sole work of literary criticism on Tagore published in the
English-speaking world between 1926 and 1987, Rabindranath Tagore by Mary Lago
(1976), devoted a mere four pages to a discussion of all of Tagore’s plays (Lago 1976).
More recently, while there has been some degree of a revival of interest in Tagore in
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the English-speaking world, on account of Bengali intellectuals who are also part of
the Anglophone academy, such as Dipesh Chakrabarty, Ashish Nandy and Partha
Chatterjee having published on Tagore, none of them have turned their attention
very much on Tagore’s plays. Thus, Tagore’s later plays have seemingly appeared to
the Western academy, for a very long time, as lacking in relevance or interest.
I try to show in this study that reading these plays in engagement with certain cur-
rents in post-Marxist thought is productive and insightful. However, such a reading
is not, at least on the surface, an intuitive way to read either Tagore or James.
James was most certainly a committed Marxist, but the Marxist tradition that he
came from was that of Lenin and Trotsky. While, by the late years of his life, aca-
demic post-Marxism was already fashionable in the English-speaking world, James
is not known to have engaged with it. Any relationship between Tagore and post-
Marxist theory might appear to be even more tenuous. Neither Negri, nor Z̆iz̆ek,
nor Badiou – the three main post-Marxist thinkers that I engage with in this study
– has ever, to my knowledge, written about Tagore. Nor, for that matter, have any
of them engaged with postcolonial studies in any sustained way. In fact, Z̆iz̆ek’s
attitude towards postcolonial studies in the anglophone academy is quite skeptical
and dismissive. Z̆iz̆ek has written:
The problem of postcolonialism is undoubtedly crucial; however, post-
colonial studies tends to translate it into the multiculturalist problematic
of the colonized minorities’ right to narrate their victimizing experience
. . . Thus the politico-economic struggle is thus imperceptibly transformed
into a pseudopsychoanalytic drama of the subject unable to confront its
17
inner traumas. The true corruption of American academia is not pri-
marily financial, it is not only that they are able to buy many European
critical intellectuals (myself included, up to a point), but conceptual: no-
tions of European critical theory are imperceptibly translated into the
benign universe of cultural studies chic” (Z̆iz̆ek 2002b).
This is a critique of postcolonial theory that I am quite sympathetic to. For students
of colonialism and postcoloniality to productively engage with post-Marxist critical
theory, the notions of critical theory need to to engaged with as such, that is, without
displacing them into merely cultural categories. This is what I have attempted to do
in this study. This kind of attempt is not without its dangers. Bengali intellectuals,
after all, have a reputation, deserved or not, for an europhilia that often verges
on ridiculousness,2 and so it might appear that this study is a project to somehow
retroactively validate or rehabilitate Tagore by means of an winning for him an
imprimatur from fashionable contemporary theory. In reality, however, the shoe is
on the other foot: that someone like Tagore can be brought into a productive dialog
with post-Marxist theory helps to validate the claim to universal applicability that
post-Marxist theory would like to claim for itself. E. San Juan, for example, has
recently raised the question:
2Ian Buruma narrates the following amusing story: ‘On a visit to Calcutta I . . . [met] a young
and very successful newspaper editor called Aveek Sarkar. We met in his office, housed in an
old building in the center of a commercial district where beggars and rickshaw-wallahs dodged in
and out of the hopeless traffic jams, while entire families, the children naked, the adults in flimsy
clothes, washed themselves by burst waterpipes. . . . “We don’t look to the rest of India, which is
intellectually inferior,” he said. “Our literature is related to French literature, not Hindi. I don’t
even read Hindi. Calcutta is like Paris.”’ [Buruma, Ian. ’The Last Bengali Renaissance Man’, The
New York Review of Books. Nov 19, 1987.]
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Armed with Z̆iz̆ek’s aperçus disseminated in numerous books and articles
circulated all over the world, are we any wiser or more fully informed of
the total picture of the world today . . . ? Are we more adequately
mobilized to confront Obama’s imperial mission in Afghanistan and all
over the world, including the Philippines, via the subservient neocolonial
Arroyo regime?3
While this study obviously does not address this specific question, I have attempted
to make a modest contribution towards showing how “a total picture of the world”
can emerge from the post-Marxist theory of Z̆iz̆ek (and other post-Marxists), by
bringing them into engagement with Tagore who, although writing from a very dif-
ferent time and place, laid a claim to a universality on his own terms.
Tagore had published his first verse-play in rhymed verse as well as his first musical-
drama in 1881, and started working on his first prose play in 1884, but during this
initial part of his career he does not seem to have considered prose to be a medium
for any but the lightest of works. Between 1889 and 1890, he wrote three plays in
blank verse, clearly modeled after Shakespeare. Ananda Lal has noted how Tagore
gradually started to use prose in progressively more ambitious endeavors (Lal 1987a,
20). He seemed to have abandoned blank verse around 1896-97, Between 1901 and
1908, however, he did not publish any dramatic works at all, and resumed writ-
ing plays in 1908, marking a clear turn in direction. He wrote his first significant
prose play, Sarodotsav, in 1908, shortly after establishing his own school at San-
3San Juan, Jr., E. ’Who is Afraid of Z̆iz̆ek?’ in The E. San Juan, Jr. Archive, April 5, 2009.
Retrieved on May 15, 2010.
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tiniketan. Between the period of 1910 and 1934, he wrote the plays of his most
mature period, including the “symbolical plays” (as Edward Thompson referred to
them in his biography of Tagore) (Thompson 1926, 64). At the very end of his life
Tagore’s dramatic work shifted in yet another direction, when he composed several
“dance-dramas” based on his earlier plays, drawing upon the traditions of Indian
dance genres as well as Sri Lankan, Javanese and Balinese dance forms. Ananda Lal
attributes Tagore’s turn towards dance at this late stage of his character to his dis-
enchantment by “the limitations of the spoken word” (Lal 1987a, 25). Thus, we see
Tagore experimenting with different genres of plays (prose, verse, dance and music)
througout his life. In this thesis, I have chosen to focus only on his “symbolical”
plays – in particular, on Achalayatan (“The Immobile Space”), Muktadhara (“The
Free-Flowing Stream”), Raktakarabi (“Red Oleander”) and Taser Desh (“The Land
of Cards”). It is significant that the “symbolical plays” of Tagore were written and
staged by him not in Calcutta but in the comparative isolation of Shantiniketan,
with the actors staging the plays being students at the school and his own intimate
circle of friends. In the contemporary descriptions of the process through which the
plays were developed, rehearsed and staged, spontaneity and conversation seem to
be dominant tropes. Tagore’s son, Rathindranath, speaks of the “spontaneity and
joie de vivre that characterized the acting” in the production of Sarodatsav in 1908
(Tagore 1958, 99). William Pearson, Tagore’s guest at Shantiniketan, reports: “The
poet coaches the actors himself, first reading the play aloud, and then reading it
over with those who are to take part” (Pearson 1916, 61). It is interesting to think
about what impact this dialogical style of developing the play, through conversations
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with the actors, might have had on the content of the plays. It is not my intention
to make a simplistic “form determines content” argument. Nevertheless, I argue
in this study that form does influence content, and, more specifically, that the cir-
cumstances of the provenance of these plays as well as the conditions of free-flowing
and conversational interaction and improvisation within which Tagore developed the
productions of them, played a part in foregrounding the aspect of contingency in the
overall dialectic of necessity and contingency that gets enacted in these plays. I turn
to Walter Benjamin for insight into what might be entailed by thinking of processes
as if they were conversations. Benjamin had famously attempted to reorient the
customary way of thinking about history, by applying to history the model of an
argument or conversation rather than that of a narrative. An argument proceeds by
montage and juxtaposition, rather than by means of a steady linear flow. By way of
contrast to a narrative, a conversation, especially if it is open-ended, is not inherently
directed towards a teleological end. The accidental and the conjunctural predom-
inate in a conversation and conversations typically are punctuated and nonlinear.
Nonlinearities tend to favor digressions, branchings and, sometimes, culs-de-sac. A
deviation can become a whole new trajectory – Benjamin writes, in his fragmentary
style: “Comparison of other people’s attempts to the undertaking of a sea voyage
in which the ships are drawn off course by the magnetic North Pole. Discover this
North Pole. What for others are deviations are, for me, the data which determine
my course” (Benjamin 1999, 456). For Benjamin, history was on the one hand a
conversation initiated by the present between the past and the present, in the form
of the substance of history and the historian’s own situatedness in time. But it was
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also, equally, for him, a conversation between the present and the past, initiated
– counter-intuitively, proleptically – by the past by awakening the present: “Every
epoch not only dreams the one to follow, but in dreaming, precipitates its awakening
(Benjamin 1999, 13). History is, thus, for Benjamin, “not ’life as it was,’ nor even
life remembered, but life as it has been ’forgotten”’ (Buck-Morss 1989, 39). What
would it mean to record “life as it has been “forgotten”? In his characteristically
aphoristic manner, Benjamin suggests an answer when he remarks that “the past can
be seized only as an image which flashes up at an instant when it can be recognized
and is never seen again.” But, does not to be never seen again signify a waste, a
loss – a failure? If we privilege open-ended-ness as the favored mode of historical
understanding, then, however, the culs-de-sac of history might look less like failures
than as that which “determines [the] course.” Such a course cannot be a course
directed towards a preset or predefined telos, for it is subject to the constant and
ongoing “determinations” made by the fragmentary images flashing up momentarily
from the past. The angel of history from Paul Klee’s painting that so fascinated
Benjamin does not, perhaps, follow a predictable path in its retreat towards the
future. Perhaps, as it hurtles backwards into the future, its trajectory is constantly
changing from moment to moment, influenced by what image from the assemblage
of catastrophes and losses that constitute the past has “flashed up” at that partic-
ular moment at the angel of history. In the theater, and especially when a play is
developed though improvisation and conversation, we likewise do not know precisely
which indeterminacies, concretized in what way in course of the play’s performance,
will “flash up” and turn out to be the most affective, arresting and, eventually, if we
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can tolerate this seeming oxymoron, contingently determinative, or determinatively
contingent. To the extent that content is influenced by form, the stories that these
plays would tell would also articulate a notion of history which is informed by this
dialectic of necessity and contingency.
I have left until the very end of this prolegomena another important issue that
requires to be addressed: What is the point of configuring this constellation (that I
earlier described as a “triangle”) out of the constellated triad of James, Tagore and
strands of dialectical theory? The first step to addressing this question is to recognize
that this project of configuration is, of course, itself dialectical. How can it not be
so, given my stated preference for the dialectical? But then, at this juncture, it may
seem that I have led myself into a trap; for, if it is simply a matter of subjective
methodological preference, then have I not just been led into a hopelessly circular
logic, in which the seduction of dialectics as methodology steers me into forms of
reading that are themselves dialectical? And conversely , in what Sean Carney has
described as a “Benjaminean gesture,” does not the configurational activity of the
dialectic “in its rhetoric, [yearn] to stage the dialectic for us itself,” producing, in
the case of my project, a Benjaminean “dialectical image” – the “narrative picture”
of “the dialectic at a standstill”’ – that consists of the constellated triad James-
Tagore-theory? (Carney 2005, 49). Benjamin had written of the “dialectical image”
that this “dialectic at a standstill” is “the rock from which we gaze down” into
the “stream of real life.” The dialectic at a standstill is, Benjamin says, the “real
object” of the “astonishment” as which “the damming of the stream of real life”
“makes itself felt” (Benjamin 1988, 13). If it is merely a matter of the form of
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my project assuming the quality of a Benjaminean “dialectical image” reflecting my
methodological predilection in its yearning to stage the dialectic of real life, then
a sense of circularity becomes inescapable. Nor can I escape the circular logic of
this trap by recourse to a determinate telos to the dialectic, because, as will become
clear in the course of the dissertation, I am strongly committed to the notion of
non-teleological dialectics – a logic of dialectical moments without a determinate
end point.
So, the conclusion seems indeed irrefutable that there is a circularity to the logic
of my project. This circular quality of my project’s underlying logic expresses itself
in the different chapters of this dissertation, in which I circle again and again back
to the same texts to which I address myself, but with different theoretical referents
activated and with different sets of analytical concepts mobilized in each such pass.
Rather than embodying a linear argument, this dissertation, thus, itself consists of
moments that stand with respect to each other in relations of prolepsis, analepsis
and repetition. Reflecting on the movement of my own thought as it generated
those moments, I can now see that this movement has been dialectical – a mediation
between the aleatory and the determinate. Edward Said remarks in Beginnings,
in connection with Giambattista Vico’s New Science, that “theoretically, repetition
implies sameness; but practically, as one looks around, one sees difference. . .”– “the
mind can reexperience its making power by forging novel connections. . . again and
again. . .”. Said identifies “adjacency, complementarity, parallelism, and correlation”
as the operative tropes driving Vico’s endeavor in forging such connections (Said
1975, 352-54). Akeel Bilgrami argues that this activity of the mind recreating
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novel connections that Said found to be important in Vico constitutes a dialectical
mediation or resolution.4 We can only understand things, Vico believed, that we
ourselves make, and the activity of forging novel connections again and again is a
process of understanding history through traversing and retracing it in ever new
ways, that is by the re-making of history in our minds – and thus the creative
and productive freedom of human agency to make and to connect gets dialectically
resolved with the fixity of how history actually unfolds in time and how things are and
how they came to be. By reconfiguring its objects of study again and again in new
ways and in new constellations, my dissertation, unbeknownst to me, has itself come
to have this dialectical quality – which became clear to me only in hindsight.
4Bilgrami, Akil. ’Edward Said: A Personal and Intellectual Tribute’ [Speech at memorial
service for Edward Said on September 29, 2003.] Reproduced in Three Quarks Daily, February
20, 2006. Url: http://www.3quarksdaily.com/3quarksdaily/2006/02/akeel_bilgrami_.html.
Retrieved on: August 8, 2010.
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Chapter 2
Time, subjects and dialectics
“Essential being is not Been-ness; on the contrary:
the essential being of the world lies itself on the
Front.”
Ernst Blocha
aBloch, Ernst. The Principle of Hope. (Trans.) Neville
Plaice, Stephen Plaice and Paul Knight. MIT Press; Cam-
bridge. 1995. p. 18.
In the preface to their book Labor of Dionysus: A Critique of the State-Form, Michael
Hardt and Antonio Negri mine a suggestive phrase from a celebrated passage in
The Communist Manifesto in which Marx refers to as “the nether world”; “Modern
bourgeois society,” they quote Marx, “with its relations of production, of exchange
and of property,” “is like the sorcerer who is no longer able to control the powers of
the nether world whom he has called up by his spells” (Marx 1965, 39). Hardt and
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Negri then proceed to dedicate their work “to the creative, Dionysian powers of the
netherworld.” 5 The nether world is a place of darkness and invisibility. And yet,
Walter Benjamin tells us, retrievable images of the past “flash up” within the pall
of darkness and obscurity. It is in these images which “flash up” from the past that
the present, Benjamin says, can recognize itself as intended:
The past can be seized only as an image which flashes up at the moment
of its recognizability and is never seen again. . . . For it is an irretrievable
image of the past which threatens to disappear in any present that does
not recognize itself as intended in that image.6
This recognition is a moment of light – a moment of clarification and brightness –
in short, a moment of enlightenment, but an enlightenment which has a contingent
basis only. By way of contrast, a notion of enlightenment which is premised on a logic
of necessity and not of contingency – such as the notion of Enlightenment that we
find in Kant’s Critique of Judgement, consists in the independence, substitutability
and the consistency/consecutiveness of thought:
The following Maxims of common human Understanding are: 1 deg to
think for oneself; 2 deg to put ourselves in thought in the place of every
one else; 3 deg always to think consistently. The first is the maxim of
unprejudiced thought; the second of enlarged thought; the third of con-
secutive thought. The first is the maxim of a Reason never passive. The
5Hardt, Michael and Negri, Antonio. Labor of Dionysus: A Critique of the State-Form. Univer-
sity of Minnesota Press. 1994. p. xiv.
6Benjamin, Walter. ’Thesis V’, Theses on the Concept of History. quoted in: Löwy, Michael.
Fire Alarm: Reading Walter Benjamin’s ’On the Concept of History’. London: Verso. 2005. p. 40.
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tendency to such passivity, and therefore to heteronomy of the Reason,
is called prejudice; and the greatest prejudice of all is... superstition.
Deliverance from superstition is called enlightenment ....7
Marx, in The German Ideology, sublates this Kantian idea by emphasizing the depen-
dence of thought to negate Kant’s valorization of the independence of thought (“to
think for oneself”) in Maxim 1. Marx’s sublation involves the use of Kant’s Maxim
2, “to put ourselves in thought in the place of every one else”. Marx extends the idea
in Maxim 2 to emphasize the links of mutual dependencies in the connections that
need to exist for subjects to be enabled to think intersubjectively, putting themselves
“in thought in the place of every one else.” Marx writes:
the real intellectual wealth of the individual depends entirely on the
wealth of his real connections. Only then [after “the communist revolu-
tion”] will the separate individuals be liberated from the various national
and local barriers, be brought into practical connection with the material
and intellectual production of the whole world and be put in a position
to acquire the capacity to enjoy this all-sided production of the whole
earth (the creations of man). Allround dependence [emphasis added],
this natural form of the world-historical co-operation of individuals, will
be transformed by this communist revolution into the control and con-
scious mastery of these powers, which, born of the action of men on one
another, have till now overawed and governed men as powers completely
7Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Judgement, trans. with Introduction and Notes by J.H. Bernard
(2nd ed. revised). London: Macmillan. 1914. §40.
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alien to them.8
For Negri, the “nether world,” with its “relations of exchange”, embodiesthe concept
of social cooperation and interdependence, consisting of complex networks of inter-
subjectivity which, for all its Dionysian darkness, is a cradle of communist creativity
and true enlightenment: “Co-operation is life itself, to the extent that it produces
and reproduces itself,” (Negri 1997, 435). Negri writes, and “social cooperation. . .
is cosubstantial with living labor, as the interpretation of its productivity or better
of its creativity. . . . It is in the immediacy, in the creative spontaneity of living
labor that constituent power finds how to realize its creativity in the masses.” (Negri
1997, 428). The privileging of human subjectivity, for Negri, is the ground for his
preference of Marx’s Grundrisse over Marx’s Capital, because the Grundrisse, Ne-
gri believes, is marked by an emphasis on “the capacity of the proletariat” whereas
Capital reduces “critique to [mere] economic theory” and annihilates “subjectivity
in objectivity” (Negri 1984, 154).
Two cardinal metaphors that characterize Negri’s thought here are decentralized
networks of power (which have mutual dependencies based on intersubjective co-
operation), and the smooth, deterritorialized space of Empire in which there is “no
place of power – it is both everywhere and nowhere” (Hardt and Negri 2000, 190).
Common to both these metaphors is Negri’s sense that there is no longer an outside
– any exteriority to capital has already been obliterated because the rule of capital
has penetrated all aspects of life, so that there is no longer any possibility of an
8Marx, Karl. The German Ideology. Part I (“Feuerbach: Opposition of the Materialist and
Idealist Outlook”). 1845.
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external Archimedean point from which to leverage resistance against capital. Ne-
gri, borrowing a phrase from Marx, calls this “the real subsumption of society under
capital”, as opposed to the merely formal subsumption of labor by capital.9 This
obliteration of an outside to capital, however, does not mean, for Negri, the cessation
of the struggle against capital. Rather, for Negri, this means that the antagonism
between capital and the multitude has become more intense as the latter’s “biopolit-
ical social organization begins to appear absolutely immanent”, with all its elements
“interact[ing] on the same plane” (?, 337).
Tagore’s Raktakarabi [‘Red Oleander’] is a play that unfolds, quite literally, in a
“nether world” too: the yaksha-puri [yaksha-land]. Tagore explains in the preface to
the play that
. . . [t]his play is not at all from mythical times, nor can it be called
metaphorical. The place which is being described is one where the wealth
of yakshas is buried underground. This having become known, the carving
[khodai] of tunnels into the nether world [patal] is in progress, which is
why people have lovingly named it yaksha-puri (Tagore 1961b, 649). [my
translation]
Tagore’s claim that the play cannot “be called metaphorical” is rather debatable. It
is possible that Tagore wanted to emphasize that, rather than cardboard characters
bearing solely allegorical interpretations, the characters in the play were intended
to be people to whom viewers could relate at a human level rather than as mere
9Marx, Karl. A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, 472, ’The Real Subsumption
of Labour under Capital or the Specifically Capitalist Mode of Production’. 1861.
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abstractions. Tagore’s proclamation about the non-metaphorical nature of the play
may even have been a slyly ironic invitation reminding the reader that the play
can, in fact, be read metaphorically. In any case, the proclamation should not
prevent us from reading the play allegorically. We will come to know in the course
of the play that the King of this nether land, the yaksha-puri, hankers not only
for the buried gold (whose worth is measured in the abstract labor of the miners)
but is also engaged in a parallel quest for knowledge (which could remind us of the
Foucauldian power/knowledge equation). The latter – that is, knowledge – counts
for the King, again, as a pure abstraction. Immersed in the abstraction of both
labor and knowledge, it is the concrete that forever escapes the King. The King’s
awareness of this lack is the source of his fascinated desire for Nandini, the young
woman whose vivacity, beauty and joy in life represents a rupture in the bleak world
of the yaksha-puri. Some of the miners profess their suspicion of and incomprehension
about Nandini, wonder aloud as to what possessed the King to have Nandini brought
to the yaksha-puri, and mutter that she is a harbinger of bad luck – while others find
her presence to be an inspiration which elevates them from the dreariness of their
quotidian existence (Tagore 1961b, 660). It is interesting to note that just as the
excavation of the gold is a project that has been undertaken at the King’s initiative,
and proceeds under the latter’s supervision, it was also the King who is stated in
the play to have been responsible for having Nandini brought to his kingdom. It
is instructive to read the play in a Benjaminean way: Like the shiny gold “flashing
up” from the depths of the mine, but whose wealth represents congealed dead labor,
Nandini too is a presence that has “flashed up” unexpectedly, and in whose image
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some of the miners recognize themselves as “intended” – that is, as how they were
intended to be. In other words, Nandini embodies a concrete actualization of the
vision of non-alienated, non-abstract being.
At a particularly fraught moment in the play, the King professes to Nandini that he
wants to know everything and everyone, including Nandini, by taking them apart –
which, of course, would end up destroying them. Nandini responds by singing the
King a song. It would be tempting to read “Nandini’s Song” as an immanentist
response in opposition to the King’s cartesian stance, which is based on a subject-
object distinction, in which a knowing subject in the form of a cogito can come to
know other subjects merely as objects, without recognizing their subjectivities.
Nandini sings:
“I love, I love,”
In this tune, far and near,
Plays the flute on land and in water.
In the sky, in whose heart
Sounds pain,
Whose dark eye, at the horizon,
Floods with teardrops? (Tagore 1961b, 672)
[my translation]
There is a peculiarly ungrammatical Bengali construction in the first sentence, in
which the subject of the sentence is curiously missing. In the first sentence of the
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song, the verb-form that Tagore has used is bajay [plays], not bajé [sounds], although
bajé does occur in the second sentence. The form bajay [plays] requires a subject
in the nominative case, which is absent in this sentence. The flute is an object of
the verb and is in the accusative case. The sentence, as constructed, is, accordingly,
not grammatically well-formed in Bengali, and its use is therefore highly suggestive.
A lazy reading of these verses would suggest that Nandini is here invoking what
Gilles Deleuze and Feliz Guattari describe as a “substantive multiplicity”. Deleuze
and Guattari explain the concept of multiplicity in the following way: the concept
“was created in order to escape the abstract opposition between the multiple and the
one, to escape dialectics, to succeed in conceiving the multiple in the pure state, to
cease treating it as an organic element of a Unity or Totality yet to come” (?, 32).
Nandini’s Song, from this point of view, could be thought to betoken an immanent
consciousness in which land, water, sky and horizon represent modes of the same
substantive multiplicity. Such an interpretation, however, is undermined by the
odd (and incorrect) grammatical construction which implies a subject who, although
playing the flute, is unnamed and strangely absent. What are we to make of this
construction? Is it merely a solecism or, perhaps, a parapraxis? We should read it,
perhaps, as an instance of enallage, instead. The substitution of bajay [plays] for baj
[sounds] is setting up an expectation for a subject of the sentence, a subject who plays
the tune – an expectation that is not fulfilled by the sentence. The subject is missing,
but expected – just as Nandini is expecting Ranjan to arrive any moment.
In Negri’s ontology, productive force is “inexplicable” – it is “a non-dialectical tautol-
33
ogy.”10 In such an immanentist ontology (which Negri has borrowed from Spinoza),
it would not be surprising for the entire universe to be producing the same “tune”
simply as an expression of its being. We know that for Hardt and Negri “ontology .
. . is a theory about our immersion in being and being’s continuous construction”
(Hardt and Negri 1994, 287). Such an expectation would be entirely in conso-
nance with both the poststructuralist dispositif of the death of the subject and the
Spinozian-Negrian dispositif of there being no exteriority. The enallage in “Nandini’s
Song,” however, by setting up the expectation for a subject of the sentence, suggests
that that in the Tagorean universe in which Nandini’s Song is sung, the death of the
subject has certinly not taken place. This is a universe in which a dialectic operates:
the subject whose absence is made salient by the enallage is awaiting its constitution,
which is to be achieved through a dialectical sublation. The narrative of Raktakarabi
does, indeed, bear this out, as the play ends with the King learning to leave behind
his futile practice of relating to everything and everyone as if they were objects. At
the end of the play, the King learns to recognize the subjectivities of those that he
is relating to. The King’s journey involves a step into non-identity – the King for-
goes his so-long-assumed identity as King (a negation), and through his joining the
insurgent miners who are rebelling against his own authority (the negation of the
negation), a sublation into a richer totality is arrived at.
This particular dialectical move makes its appearance in several places in Tagore’s
writings – most notably in his conception of paoa,the Bengali word for “to get” or
“to receive”. There is an interesting song by him which begins: “Forgoing hope,
10Negri, Antonio. Time for Revolution. trans. Matteo Mandarini, New York, Continuum, 2003.
p. 12.
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still guard hope in your heart-jewel” [asha chhere tobu asha rekhe dao hrdoy-ratan
majhe]. On an initial reading not attuned to its dialectical nuance, this sentence can
appear quite mystifying and contradictory, even incoherent. Another song by Tagore
that conveys a similar sentiment starts with: “That which can be received when not
desired, and comes near when renounced . . .” [na chahite jar paoa jay, tyeagil
kachhe ase]. Although there is no evidence that Tagore was familiar with Hegel, the
idea conveyed in these songs in terms of a Hegelian dialectic. Hegel annotates the
dialectic in the following way in his Lectures on the History of Philosophy:
The soul must commence by bathing in this ether of the One Substance,
in which all that man has held true has disappeared; this negation of all
that is particular, to which every philosopher must come, is the liberation
of the mind and its absolute foundation (Hegel 1955, 257-58).
For Hegel, the way to the “absolute” (what he calls elsewhere “absolute spirit”)
involves, first, a negation of the “particular”. The actualization of the absolute
spirit is arrived at only by way of negation of “all that is particular”. In these
examples drawn from Tagore’s songs, Tagore seems to describe quite such a dialectical
movement in which, as in the Hegelian move, the forward movement (of what Hegel
would call “spirit”) towards actualization proceeds, paradoxically though it might
appear, by way of a negation. To obtain the treasure or “heart-jewel” that is desired
– the actualization of “absolute spirit”, if we borrow that Hegelian term – it will be
necessary, first, Tagore seems to suggest, to let go of particular desires. The road
to affirmation (of the absolute) in Tagore’s dialectic lies, then, through negation (of
the particular). This kind of dialectical move occurs in quite similar ways in several
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other songs by Tagore. We can consider, for example, the song which begins “The
day my doors were broken by the storm, I had not known that you had come into
my room” [je raate mor duar-guli...], in which the “you” [tumi] can be taken to refer,
with a characteristic ambiguity that one often encounters in Tagore, to either God or
an earthly beloved. Here, the road to actualization of the absolute (“you had come
into my room”) lies through the negation of the particular (“my doors were broken
by the storm”). Another example is the poem “Dui Bigha Jomi” [“Two Acres of
Land”] in which Tagore speaks in the narrative voice of a man who had been cheated
out of his meager two acres of land by a local landowner, and consequently had to
leave his village and make his way in the wider world. Tagore writes in the poem,
“I was written a deed for the entire world in return for two acres of land” [tai likhi
dilo bishwo-nikhil du’bighar poriborte] – here, too, the road to the actualization of
the absolute (bishwo-nikhil – literally: “the world-entire”) lies through the negation
of the particular (the “two acres”).
It is important to note that these dialectical moves whose occurrences in Tagore
I have been describing involve a non-identity or negation, but not a contradiction.
While there is no evidence that Tagore had read Hegel or had been interested in
Hegel’s philosophy, Tagore does seem to think dialectically in these instances fron
his writing. Let us consider again the line “Forgoing hope, still guard hope in your
heart-jewel”. The two occurrences of the word “hope” in that line do not refer to
the same referent. (There would, indeed, have been a contradiction if they did.) The
second occurrence of the word “hope” (the hope for the “heart-jewel”) is a “hope”
for an absolute and universal ideal, different from the “hope” which the reader is
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being advised to give up. Tagore is here clearly influenced by the tradition of the
Sufi-inspired bauls (wandering singers) of Bengal. He is known to have been familiar
with the baul Gagan Harkara, in one of whose songs, “Where will I find him, who is
the man of my heart” [ami kothay pabo taré, amar moner manush jéré] – the baul
actively looks for the “man of the heart”, and certainly hopes to find him. If we think
of the “man of the heart” as an absolute universal whose actualization through the
searcher’s quest involves a practice of openness based on intersubjective recognition,
then that process is a dialectical one and must involve nonidentity and negation of
particulars.
Identifying these moments of dialectical thought in Tagore in this way, however,
should give us pause. Firstly, it should make us reflect on the question of the appli-
cability of concepts to contexts, when the concepts and contexts belong to disparate
intellectual traditions – a question that, of course, lies at the heart of any comparative
project. To read Tagore by identifying moments of dialectical thought in him may
seem odd. After all, dialectics, in the Hegelian tradition, is associated with totality:
concrete and total processes, in the dialectical tradition as commonly understood,
constitute, as Lukács observes, “the only point of view from which understanding
becomes possible” (Lukács 1971, 145). I am, instead, approaching Tagore as a di-
alectical thinker in the more pluralistic sense that, for example, a thinker like Fredric
Jameson advocates: “the notion of a local dialectic, or of many dialectics” (Jameson
2009, 16). Jameson asserts that it is “possible to abstract an emptier mechanism
from the stages of Hegelian logic,” (Jameson 2009, 16) in which it is assumed that
“any opposition can be the starting point for a dialectic in its own right [empha-
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sis added]” (Jameson 2009, 17). Jameson associates dialectics of this kind to the
“dilemma of incommensurability,” wagering that something approximating dialectics
of this kind will begin to appear whenever thinking reaches the impasse of incom-
mensurability. However, incommensurabilities that can be resolved only by external
negations should not be considered dialectical, Jameson argues, because, if they
were to be so considered, all kinds of merely heterogeneous multiplicity would then
need to be considered dialectical and the rubric “dialectical” would lose all meaning.
Rather, Jameson argues, only those kinds of incommensurabilities should properly
be considered dialectical in which some kind of relationship of internal negation be-
tween the two incommensurable poles can be theorized (Jameson 2009, 25). In the
examples I enumerated, the relationship of negation is entirely internal, as the partic-
ular is sublated, through the intervention of the negative, into a universal absolute.
The incommensurability in these situations is between the particularness of specific
situations and the aspiration to universality, and not between specific, different par-
ticularities. As I will argue more elaborately in the latter part of this dissertation,
these local dialectics mimetically enact Tagore’s own sublation of nationalist partic-
ularity into a universality in which India stands for the organizing principle of the
universality, as an alternative to the organizing principle that the European enlight-
enment tradition has typically historically represented in universalist projects of this
kind.
The second question worth reflecting on here (and to which I will return in course
of this dissertation) is the relation of the dialectics that we discern in Tagore to
questions of form and genre. The examples that I just presented, were, notably,
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drawn from poems and songs by Tagore, and from a play. Later in this dissertation,
I will show in more detail how the workings of dialectics of this kind are particularly
salient in some of Tagore’s plays, while (as I also argue later in the dissertation),
they are not so salient or discernible in his novels. What can be the explanation
for this? Does the dialectic of form mimetically enact, then, in some sense, the
dialectical drama that the content seeks to represent, making (by the reverse logic
of this postulate) certain forms better suited for expressing certain kinds of content?
This seems to me a crucial question raised by Tagore’s work (and, as I will argue
later in the dissertatin, by C.L.R. James’ attempt to write the story of the Haitian
revolution twice, once as a play and once as a historical narrative). While I obviously
do not presume to give any definitive answer to this question, I would like to suggest
that Edward Said’s reading of Georg Lukács can possibly help us to approach this
question in a certain fashion. Said observes of Lukács that, for Lukács, art was always
about reflection (Said 2000). At various points in his career, Lukács variously came
to see man, or society, or art itself, as the object of art’s reflection. Said interprets
Lukács as arguing that aesthetic behavior can represent human totality, even if as
only one aspect of the whole. Said reads Lukács as saying that the process by which
it does so is itself a dialectical process: “the dialectic between the artwork and its
circumstances.” On the one hand, contingency tends to take the making of the work
of art in the direction of indeterminacy and chance; on the other hand, however,
determinative forces countervail and oppose this tendency. The ensuing dialectic of
necessity and contingency shapes the work of art through the tensions of its working.
Lukács, Said points out, is therefore neither a theorist of vulgar causation nor one of
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immediate, direct mimesis when it comes to delineating the relation between form
and content. Instead, it is the totality of the artwork that dialectically parallels both
the totality of the circumstances in which it is produced and which circumstances
the artwork, in turn, simultaneously reflects. It follows from this Saidean reading of
Lukács that certain kinds of forms (which skew, in certain more or less predictable
ways, the forces of necessity and contingency which dialectically engage each other)
will thus be better reflections of certain kinds of truth present in the content that
the artwork as a whole, abstractly mediated by totality, will come to reflect. This
suggests, I would argue, the beginnings of an explanation as to why certain kinds
of forms used by Tagore seem to be more expressive, and others less so, of certain
kinds of dialectical unfoldings at the level of content.
A somewhat more general reflection is probably also in order about what the impli-
cations are of focusing on separate “moments of dialectical thought” rather than on
all-encompassing totalities, given the traditional association between the idea of the
dialectic – at least in the Hegelian/Marxian tradition – and the notion of totality.
The emphasis it has traditionally placed on totality exposes Hegelian or Marxist
critique to the charge of circularity, since, arguably, if all there is to phenomena is
merely the dialectical expression of a totality, then dialectical thinking, in its total-
izing form, would seem to preclude any possibility of the new or any account for the
emergence of novelty. Such a system may seem to be incapable of being anything but
depressingly teleological a prospect particularly dispiriting at a time when history
appears to have roundly discredited teleological modes of theorizing. Jameson, how-
ever, suggests a promisingly different reading of Hegel in which the Hegelian system
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is neither closed nor circular, nor teleological. He also even calls into question the
very idea of closed versus open systems, describing it as a false dichotomy (Jameson
2009, 9). Focusing on dialectical moments as opposed to a single dialectical total-
ity, as I do in this dissertation with regard to Tagore, belongs in the realm of this
alternative, non-teleological perspective on dialectics.
One can, of course, then question why it should be necessary to hold on to dialectics
at all. Would not such non-teleological approaches as Spinozian immanentism (of
which Negri is a recent exemplar) be more productive for reading Tagore than read-
ing Tagore dialectically? This is a serious objection and deserves careful refutation,
and the objection is made even more complicated by the fact that Negri himself
does not reject dialectics altogether: He does recognize that there is a dialectic that
governs capital. What Negri purports to show, however, is that the development
of the subjectivity of the working class (and, in his later works, of the multitude)
is a development with its own autonomous and nondialectical logic. According to
Negri, there is, in addition, a tension between the dialectic that governs capital,
and the antagonistic logic of separation from capital that governs the development
of working-class subjectivity. This leads Negri to an autonomist perspective, in
which the working class is viewed as developing its own autonomous logic, and as
resisting the imposition of the dialectical logic of capital. As a result, the working
class, for Negri, develops its own autonomous subjectivity, which is different from
the subjectivity of capital, and, hence, anti-dialectical. Negri’s autonomist vision,
thus, contrives to see the spontaneity of the working-class as central to the devel-
opment of its subjectivity, such that necessity – viewed as a logic that focuses on
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determination as opposed to contingency and spontaneity, to which it is undialecti-
cally opposed – appears, to Negri, merely as a constraint and not as a constitutive
element. Missing in Negri, in other words, is the productive capacity that the nega-
tive is charged with in Hegelian/Marxist dialectics. In Negri’s rendering of the logic
of resistance to capital, then, there is indeed open-endedness and a non-teleological
conception; however, a crucial failure of Negri’s approach is that, dismissive of the
power and capacity of the negative, he is hard put to explain how, exactly, working-
class subjectivity will come to be formed. As a result, Negri is compelled to turn to
a Foucauldian, biopolitical vision of social co-operation as life itself, and resistance
as the expression of this life. This emphasis on expression as opposed to organization
lacks the ability, as Ernesto Laclau has pointed out, to explain how the singularities
that constitute the multitude could actually be articulated. Laclau observes: “. .
. for them [Negri and Michael Hardt] the unity of the multitude results from the
spontaneous aggregation of a plurality of actions that do not need to be articulated
among themselves ... What is totally lacking in Empire is a theory of articulation,
without which politics is unthinkable” (Ernesto 2003). Alex Callinicos points out
that this implies that, in Negri’s approach, there is no possible way to explain how,
precisely, “the promise expressed by the plenitude of Being,” which in Negri’s view,
will produce the “event” that “will thrust us like an arrow into the living future” (?,
358) will come to be actualized (Calinicos 2006, 151). Thus, Negri’s project, in spite
of the undoubtedly original insights that it purveys, cannot, then, move beyond an
ascription of qualities to the multitude that are both mysterious and mystical, and,
in the final instance, exposes itself to the charge of promising precious little beyond
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mere enthusiastic utopianism. In the domain of the political, much more productive
and useful, therefore, would be an approach that retains the transformative power
of the dialectic but is not a hostage to teleological commitments. To think in terms
of dialectical moments, that is to say, not teleologically and not in terms of a closed
and potentially circular system of overarching totality, is to think in terms of what
Jameson describes as “a multiplicity of local dialectics,” (Jameson 2009, 11). and
also in terms of the recognition of the notion of “moment” in mathematics or physics.
In mathematics, “moment” is a quantitative measure of the shape of a set of points.
“Moment” describes, of a distribution of a set of numbers, how the distribution is
skewed from its mean. For physicists, “moment” is the tendency of a force to twist or
rotate (that is, skew or transform) an object to which the force is applied. To think in
terms of dialectical moments, then, implies thinking in terms of the transformative
and creative capacity of dialectic movements (and this creative capacity includes,
of course, the creative potential of negation – the “labor of the negative”11 – that
inheres in dialectical movements), whenever and wherever such movement occurs,
rather than thinking in terms of any grand, overarching single dialectic affiliated
always already with a prior totality.
At this point, however, we face a potential problem. If we think of the entirety of
the life’s work of a writer as an extended text expressing a philosophy, then favoring
the non-teleological in reading such an extended text can pose a serious cognitive
difficulty. As David Kolb remarks, “philosophy essentially involves argument, and
argument essentially involves a beginning, middle, and end, so that a truly philosoph-
11Hegel, Georg F. W. ’Preface’ to The Phenomenology of Spirit. Art. 19.
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ical text needs a line... Philosophy’s line cannot be dissolved in the way some have
dreamed of dissolving the narrative line” (Kolb 1997, 326). However, Kolb sees the
dialectic, with its “complex relations of mutual constitution and interdependence”
that do not follow a straightforward linear progression, as providing an alternative:
evidence that the philosophical text need not necessarily argue in a linear fashion
(Kolb 1997, 332). A traditional way to think of writers like C.L.R. James and Tagore
is that they were writers who “progressed” in their thinking over time – that is to
say, their views changed over time, and that there was a definite direction to this
change (even if that direction could be discerned only in retrospect). In such a view,
James could be said to have started out as a vanguardist revolutionary committed
to the idea of a revolutionary party leading the masses – but who later arrived at
a much more autonomist/spontaneist position as his thinking evolved, so that he
came to support wildcat strikes in US factories and came to be regarded as one of
the intellectual antecedents for the Italian autonomia movement (that Negri himself
was associated with). Likewise, since Tagore wrote his allegorical plays in later life,
conventional thinking would tend to attribute thematic changes that we may discern
as having taken place from his earlier work to his late allegorical plays, to a temporal
progression in his thought. However, what if we refuse to take this facile view, and,
instead, read both James and Tagore as dialectical thinkers, in whose thought there
is an ongoing dialectical interplay of opposites, with, at certain moments of their
trajectories as intellectuals, one pole or other of the dialectic coming into particular
salience? To take this view would be to acknowledge that thought itself is not linear
but dialectical. To read Tagore with this acknowledgment is to read him dialecti-
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cally. For instance, we will then be able to read him as inscribing the nationalist,
ethnic and linguistic particularity from which he emerges within the horizon of a
universality, as well as inscribing a universality within the horizon of his situational
particularity. To inscribe particularity within the horizon of a universality is to con-
textualize particularity by positioning it on the canvas of a wider world where many
other particularities obtain. And to inscribe a universality within the horizon of
particularity – perhaps a more counterintuitive move – is to see a particularity as a
particular expression of a universality which, paradoxically, is also constitutive of it.
It is notable that these twin inscriptionary moves constitute a dialectically related
pair, that each is incommensurable with the other, and that it is precisely and only
a dialectical reading which can lead to the understanding that both the terms of
this dialectic are necessary as well as incomplete. Such an understanding encom-
passes the knowledge that it is the two of them together, when apprehended with
full cognizance of their individual inadequacies, and therefore understood as merely
representations and not as an unmediated real, that offer us the closest proximity to
the real that can ever be achieved. Such a dialectical understanding is precisely what
Slavoj Z̆iz̆ek has recently characterized as a “parallax view” (Z̆iz̆ek 2009). Reading
Tagore dialectically enables us to do see him doing both, as I will show later in the
dissertation: both inscribing a universality within a particularity and a particularity
within a universality. Thus, reading Tagore dialectically, by adopting the parallax
view as our own perspective when we read, makes us ourselves aligned with, and
hence able to follow, Tagore’s own dialectical move.
A passage from Tagore’s 1892 epistolary essay Manabprakash [‘Human Expression’]
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illustrates how Tagore himself performs this dialectical move. In this essay, Tagore
propounds the thesis that a separate consciousness [swatantra chetana] arises in hu-
mans only through the mutual clash [parasparik sanghat] created by the antagonism
between internal nature [antarer prakrti], external knowledge [bahirer gnan] and ac-
quired habitus [sanskar]. It is only after such a clash arises in human history, Tagore
asserts, that the “human species-family cognized as unified” [ekannoborti manas-
paribar] fractures into the phenomenological experience [upalabdhi] of separate indi-
vidual subjectivities [swa swa pradhanya] (Tagore 1961a, 673). It is only after this
fracture takes place that the necessity for literature arises in a human society, as a
substitute for the unified totality that has now been lost. Using words that quite
resonate with Said’s reading of Lukács on totality, Tagore writes: “When literature
broaches some part [angsha] of human nature, then it presents it as a representa-
tive [pratinidhi] of a greater entity, of a totality [samagra].[my translation] (Tagore
1961a, 853). The particular, thus, for Tagore – literature, we may note, is always
particular because it is written in language and a product of specific historical and
social circumstances – is nevertheless the expression of a “greater” totality that lies
at its core. And yet, precisely because this totality can never be directly grasped
adequately, it is also, then, for Tagore, the particularity of literature, itself, which
seems to express this totality (although in reality it merely represents this totality).
Totality and particularity are incommensurable; and yet the (quite inadequate) rep-
resentations (to use Tagore’s own word here) or reflections (to use Lukács’ word)
that totality and parts of the totality produce of each other, are the closest one can
come to an apprehension of either of them.
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It should not come as a surprise that the relation of particularity to totality, for
Tagore, turns out to be a dialectical moment, as we have just seen. As Jameson
convincingly argues, “something like the dialectic will always begin to appear when
thinking approaches the dilemma of incommensurability” (Jameson 2009, 24). To
discern these dialectical moments requires, however, a practice of reading with our
antennae receptive to incommensurabilities, as well as the willingness to see where
the opposition between such incommensurabilities, when they occur, can lead to – we
must start, as Jameson says, with “the assumption that any opposition can be the
starting point for a dialectic in its own right” (Jameson 2009, 19). Finally, if when
we read Tagore we take seriously his own contention that a literary text is both an
expression of a human totality as well as an (always partial) representation of it, then
we cannot but read his own texts themselves as always partial representations as well
as expressions of the totality of his thought. Such a dialectical practice of reading
will, then, accomplish two goals: On the one hand, it will enable us to see dialectical
moments in the texts, and, on the other hand, it will also enable us to break out of the
habit of conceiving of his texts as constituting a developmental trajectory leading up,
in time, to a determinate telos embodied by his late works. Once this habit is broken,
we will be able to dissociate the relative salience of certain elements in his work in
certain texts and not in others, from a purely temporal logic of his “development” as
a writer, and be able to associate such changes and fluctuations with matters other
than those of temporal or biographical progression – such as questions of form and
the modes and processes through which form facilitates and impedes the expression
of certain kinds of elements within certain kinds of content.
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Just as it follows from Tagore’s writing, as we saw, that he implicitly understood
literary texts to be produced by dialectical processes, we can also see in C.L.R.
James’ writing a similar understanding of how neither the political decisions that a
revolutionary intellectual or statesman makes, nor how such decisions change, is the
result of any biographical teleology associated with that individual’s political growth
(as if such growth were a fact of nature); instead, they are best explained as the result
of dialectical moments produced by the opposition of incommensurables. James’ 1964
essay ’Lenin and the Problem’ is an absorbing case study in how James implicitly
recognizes (and also recognizes Lenin as himself recognizing) dialectical moments
as driving change in tactics of governance that Lenin proposed over the course of
his career as the leader of the new Soviet state. It is noteworthy that James is
emphatic that what some historians consider as moments of rupture or discontinuity
in Lenin’s political thought, that is, as abrupt breaks, were not novel surprises at
all, but are, instead, expressions of the totality of Lenin’s thinking, made salient at
particular conjunctures – due, to be sure, to the dialectical pressure generated by
the pressing opposition of incommensurables at those conjunctures, but having been
present always as an integral part of the totality of Lenin’s approach (which, mutatis
mutandis, insofar as Lenin himself is a master interpreter of revolutionary strategy,
means that they are inherent in the totality of capitalism itself, to which Lenin’s
strategy is in oppositional response). James writes:
Contrary to what is now popularly (and even learnedly) believed, to Lenin
this economic policy [the New Economic Policy of 1921] was not in any
sense of the world new. As far back as May 1918, he had urged on the
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party and the population the necessity and validity of what he called
state capitalism (James 1992d, 334).
If the New Economic Policy was not really “new” in the sense of a novel rupture, why
then did it emerge at the precise moment that it did? Even more interestingly, why
did Lenin (as James points out in ’Lenin and the Problem’), in the last three articles
written towards the very end of his active political life (the articles of 4-6 January
(’On Cooperation’), 23 January, and 2 March (’Better Fewer, but Better’) of 1923),
appear to provide (to quote James on the first of these articles) a “distinctively
different appreciation” (James 1992d, 339) from what he seemed to have said in
the past? James points out that in the first of these articles (’On Cooperation’),
Lenin appears to revise his views regarding co-operatives, implying that “the only
task that remains to be done is to organise the population in cooperative societies”
(James 1992d, 338). The (apparently) “new ideas” contained in it, James says,“seem
to elude, to baffle all commentators” (James 1992d, 338). In the second of the
articles, James points out, Lenin states that “our state apparatus is very largely a
survival of the old [tsarist] one” (James 1992d, 340) – again, an apparently new
and unexpected thing for Lenin to say. Finally, James draws our attention to how
Lenin, in the third of the three articles (’Better Fewer, but Better’), signals an ’utter
dependence on the subjective element, on the personal qualities of the individuals’
– which, James says, appears to be “something new” (James 1992d, 345) in Lenin.
(Lenin’s exact words in this article are: “. . . the workers who are absorbed in the
struggle for socialism . . . have not yet developed the culture that is required for this,
and it is precisely culture that is required for this” (James 1992d, 344). In a tour
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de force of exposition, James shows that none of these three apparently unexpected
moments, however, represent any abrupt turn in Lenin’s thought.
Although James does not use the term “dialectical” in this instance, I would suggest
that what James is performing is, precisely, a dialectical reading, showing how these
three apparently novel turns in Lenin’s thought at the end of his life (the celebration
of co-operatives, the avowal that the Soviet state apparatus has failed to transcend
its inherited tsarist character, and the emphasis on the subjective element in the
struggle for socialism) are really neither new nor discontinuous from Lenin’s previ-
ous political writings even though they appear to be so. Instead, they are dialectical
moments in which, Timothy Brennan notes, these specific aspects of Lenin’s thought,
which had in fact always been part of the totality of his politics, came to be expressed
as salient in response to the particular opposition of incommensurables that charac-
terized these particular moments. James was astute enough to recognize this and he
implicitly understood, through his own grasp of dialectics, the underlying movement
of Lenin’s thought. If we try to recuperate the dialectical logic implicit in James’
analysis, it appears that, to James’ mind, the two incommensurables involved at this
conjuncture and precipitating the opposition that set off this dialectical movement
in Lenin, were the fact of the backwardness of Russia and the fact that a revolution
by socialists had actually succeeded in taking state power there. Brennan further
speculates that what probably sharpened James’ apprehension of the underlying di-
alectics of this conjuncture was that, somewhat like Lenin, who was involved in an
emancipatory project in a backward country, James himself, as a Caribbean intel-
lectual, was involved in a somewhat comparable (although vastly different in scale)
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emancipatory political project in the Caribbean.12
Now that we have shown how reading dialectically provides a rich and productive
interpretation of Tagore and James, we shall now return to Negri’s theoretical posi-
tion of undialectical immanentism which, as we saw at the beginning of this chapter,
did seem to lead to an interesting enough reading of Tagore’s Raktakarabi. I will now
show both that a Negrian reading of this play is quite productive up to a point, and
that it is, however, not fully satisfactory a way to interpret the play in the ultimate
analysis – and that the dialectical reading of the play that I sketched in the pre-
ceding paragraphs probably leads to a richer interpretation. Paradigmatic of Negri’s
immanentism is his unremitting hostility to, and rejection of, the concept of measure.
For example, in his re-interpretation of the Book of Job, written during the early
1980s, Negri flags as a “crucial point” his contention that “value, labor and justice
cannot be apportioned according to a common measure.” (Negri 2009, 36). This is,
of course, related to the familiar Marxist critique of alienated and abstract labor, in
which labor-power comes to be subsumed under the commodity form and reduced
to a transcendental “common measure” of value, thus rendering it alienable. Negri
sees Job’s protests at, and pleas for explanation of, the inexplicable suffering meted
out to him by God, as “pos[ing] not only the problem of a new foundation of the
norms of measure but also that of the materialist character of this new foundation –
against, therefore, every transcendental definition. . . (Negri 2009, 51). Negri then
mounts a forthright anti-dialectical attack on the traditional dialectical readings of
the Job story, with regard to the crucial passages in the story when God appears to
12Brennan, Timothy. Personal communication.
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Job. He writes:
Common to all the religious critics is a reading that refers Job’s ability
to see the divinity to the reflection of his own intuited wretchedness.
The paradox of Job is turned into a dialectical movement, his ascesis
into mystical illumination. But this reading is semantically and logically
wrong because it supposes, in the “upward passage” from Job to God,
the distinction between the experience of self and that of God. . . (Negri
2009, 96).
To this (accorrding to him) mistakenly dialectical interpretation, Negri counterposes
his immanentist “materialist reading,” which departs from the traditional interpre-
tation of the Job story that God’s appearing to Job signals the transcendence of
God; Negri argues that it is quite the opposite, in fact – that it signals the death
of God as transcendence, and expresses, instead, the immanent oneness of God and
man as a singular as well as universal ontological creative power:
God justifies himself, thus God is dead. He saw God, hence Job can speak
of him, and he – Job himself – can in turn participate in divinity, in the
function of redemption that man constructs within life – the instrument of
the death of God that is human constitution and the creation of the world.
The materialist reading of this vision of God has, thus, the capacity to
capture the creative moment of. . . linking ontologically . . . the singular
in the universal (Negri 2009, 97).
Elsewhere, Negri has made similar moves to link the singular “inside” and universal
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“outside” of life, “the soul and the body [emphases in the original],” into the one
and the same “collective power,” (Negri 2003, 125) which for Negri is the Spinozian
conatus pulsing through all susbstance. Thus, measure, which imposes alienability
and discretization, is eventually dissipated, as capital subsumes all society and leaves
no outside to itself. This has its parallel in the Job story, as discontinuous time
distinguished by the “common measure” of suffering and protest gives way, with
God’s appearance to Job, to continuous universal and unified immanent substance.
In a crucial step, Negri relates this progression to a change in the quality of time itself
(not the phenomenological experience of time, but time, ontologically speaking): time
changes from the analytic time of “measure” to the “constitutive” time of immanent
substance – from the time of capital to proletarian time. He writes:
So the paradigm is ontological [emphasis in the original]. In Marx, time
begins to come into view as the measure of labor (a Hegelian step forward
with respect to the deficiencies of modern science), but, step by step, as
the course of the class struggle and the abstraction of labor asserts itself,
time increasingly becomes interior to class composition [emphasis in the
original], to the point of being the motor of its very existence and of its
specific configuration (Negri 2009, 35).
Although the story of Job and Negri’s highly original and innovative reading of it,
linking it to the change of time itself from determinative “measure” to constitutive
“motor” may initially seem remote from the world of Tagore’s plays, there are two
important thematic parallels between plays like Raktakarabi and Arup Ratan and
Negri’s exegesis of the Book of Job. First of all, in both Raktakarabi and Arup Ratan,
53
much hinges on the figure of the King and the different kinds of absences which mark
the King-figure. The King speaks from behind a screen in Raktakarabi for much of
the time (that is, he is heard but not seen), and we come to know that no one in
Yaksha-puri had ever seen him. In Arup Ratan, the King is never seen at all, and it
is not even clear until the end of the play whether he actually exists: the entire play
is about Sudarshana’s (whose name literally means, not coincidentally, “she who is
beautiful to look at”) quest to see the King. In Raktakarabi, it is the King’s goal to see,
know and analytically understand everything. Sudarshana in Arup Ratan progresses
from frustration at the King never showing himself, to her frightening glimpse of the
King as a “terrible . . . black shape” and finally to an understanding that the King is
an immanent presence, so that union with him is nothing other than union with the
world. “Sudarshana’s Song,” which concludes the play, talks about “difference [bhed]
becoming obliterated between far and distant”and “separation and union [biraha
milan] both uniting in the rasa of music. It is tempting, therefore, to read into these
plays a manifesto for immanence. Secondly, both of these plays involve a movement
in time from “measure,” clarity (even literally, that is in a visual sense) and analytical
knowing (or seeking to know/see) based on the subject-object distinction, towards the
blurring of that distinction and non-mensurable, immanent being. In the language
of Negri’s conceptual framework, we could call this a movement from the time/logic
of capital to “proletarian” time/logic.
Seductive as this Negrian conceptual framework is, it is deficient in a crucial respect,
which, as I will now show, detrimentally impacts its productive capacity for inter-
pretive richness in connection with Tagore’s play. As Georgy Katsiaficas points out,
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Negri “has no notion of changing human beings or of cultural revolution” – he only
has “a schematic productionist model” (Katsiaficas 2006, 45). Indeed, as Negri has
stated, he believes that “. . .[t]here exists no consciousness apart from militancy and
organization” (Negri 1989, 148). The productive capacity of living labor which is
marshaled in capitalism for capital’s own ends, acquires a logic – “proletarian logic”
– of its own, subtracts itself from capital, and spontaneously comes to signal the vic-
tory of life over capital, its immanent presence extending everywhere concurrently as
the real subsumption of life by capital keeps taking place: “It is in the immediacy, in
the creative spontaneity of living labor that constituent power finds how to realize its
creativity in the masses” (Negri 1984, 49). This is a novel interpretation of Marx’s
well-known observation that capitalism is its own grave-digger: the subsumption of
life by capital paradoxically becomes, in this Negrian narrative, simultaneously also
the subsumption of capital by life. This interpretation is also, it should be noted,
one that rejects dialectics – as evinced especially in Negri’s later writings. While in
Marx Beyond Marx, originally published in Italian in 1978, Negri had at least still
retained an idea of antagonism, stating that “every constitution of a new structure”
by the productive capacity of living labor in the form of constituting power “is the
constitution of a new antagonism,” (Negri 1984, 56). by the time he writes his later
works, such as Multitude, for him “labor and value have become biopolitical,” “living
and producing” have ceased to be distinguishable, and “life itself has become a pro-
ductive machine,” (?, 148). so that dialectical negation and antagonism may well
be said to have come to be replaced in the Negrian ontology by the Deleuzian sense
that “all is affirmation in immanence” (Deleuze 1990, 157). Katsiaficas reaches the
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conclusion that Negri’s “workerism”fetishizes production through his assertion that
the system of production has an “omnipresent character,” and “reifies Marx’s notion
of the working class as the transcendent subject-object of history,” and consequently
ends up constricting “human beings and liberation within the process of production”
(Katsiaficas 2006, 45). Thus, although Negri’s framework is attractive because of its
open-endedness and its avoidance of deterministic teleology, it hypostatizes freedom
as mere creative capacity (in the form of forces of production) and fails to recognize
the Hegelian “labor of the negative” that is implicated by the constraint imposed by
determinate relations of necessity (such as relations of production obtaining at any
given conjuncture) with which creative and productive capacity forms an anatag-
onistic relation and of which it is mutually and dialectically constitutive. Oddly,
however, Katsiaficas seems to believe that this erroneous disavowal of dialectics on
the part of Negri has as its primary or sole consequence merely the result that Negri,
focused overly on workerism and on productivity, would fail to adequately recog-
nize the revolutionary subjectivity of such revolutionary subjects other than workers
as women’s movements or youth movements or other new social movements. This
conclusion on the part of Katsiaficas is strange, because, from within the terms of
Negri’s own framework, which posits the notion of the “social worker”, one could
well argue that these alternate revolutionary subjectivities in society are, after all,
all subsumed under the rubric of productive capacity, since, as a result of the real
subsumption of life by capital, the logic of capital that disseminates and expands
productive-creative capacity is, after all, omnipresent. Thus, while Katsiaficas’ iden-
tification of the nature of Negri’s analytical error seems accurate enough, Katsiaficas
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is probably incorrect as to what the most salient consequences of this error are likely
to be. Negri’s error leads to the prediction that productive capacity will always in-
crease smoothly, continuously and monotonically, until this non-dialectical creative
power, which is an expression of the plenitude of life itself, becomes hegemonic over
capital – at which point its logic will eventually replace the dialectical logic of capital.
The evacuation of dialectics from Negri’s ontology of emancipation means that, in
his understanding, this process will proceed continuously rather than express itself
in discrete moments. In Negri’s ontology, time as discrete moments – time expressed
through “measure” – is forever associated with, and only with, the dialectical logic of
capital – which is the logic of difference and the logic of mensuration. In contradis-
tinction to it, time that is associated with proletarian logic is time as “constitutive”–
smooth, non-discrete, undifferentiated time, neither conceived ontologically, nor ex-
perienced phenomenologically, as differentiated moments. This is where, I believe,
Negri’s framework runs into an insurmountable problem. I will now show how trying
to read Raktakarabi from within a Negrian framework can help us to see the problem
with the Negrian framework.
To approach the problem, we will first turn to a scene in the play in which, in a
long paragraph, in course of a long conversation with one of the miners, Bishu the
Madman, Nandini paints a sequence of vivid verbal images:
Nandini: Let me tell you something, Madman. Before, I had not heard
about the sorrow of whose song you sing.
Bishu: You didn’t hear about it from Ranjan?
Nandini: No, he rows me across the storm-swept river, holding an oar in
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each hand; he gallops me across the forest, holding the mane of a wild
horse; he laughs out aloud, sweeping away my fear, by shooting an arrow
between the brows of the leaping tiger. He plays and tumbles with me
just as he tumbles and splashes with the current of our Nagai river by
jumping into it. He wagers everything, with his life, in the game of losing
and winning. It is in that game that he won me. But you – you too were
in that game one day. . . [my translation] (Tagore 1961a, 852).
Shambhu Mitra, the director of the Bohurupee theater group in Calcutta, published
in 1992 an account in Bengali titled Natak Raktakarabi [The play Raktakarabi], de-
scribing the directorial thinking and interpretation that had gone into his direction
of the 1956 production of Raktakarabi by Bohurupee – a production that later came
to acquire a legendary reputation. In his commentary about this particular passage
from the play, Mitra writes:
It is as if these images are from bygone days of old. These images are not
contemporary. In today’s world, racing with a broken-down automobile
would seem more right than a wild horse (even if the color of physical
or mental valor might have seemed a bit paler that way). Besides, one
can imagine that “car-owner” would have introduced the association of a
particular financially well-off class. That way, the bird’s-eye view which
is used in the play would have become cluttered with many irrelevant
details. This is why the images that have been used are ones that express
youth, not the economic class Ranjan belongs to by birth. But we can
well imagine splashing into the river as a contemporary event, whether
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we are from the city or from the village...
But what about the rest of the images? Are they acquired from Sanskrit
literarure? Or from the ancient puranas? We will note that, rather, their
affiliation is with our folk memories [loka-kahini]. The myths and stories
that have been current in many parts of India through folk tales from
time immemorial in many languages – and not counting out the ancient
tales [pura-kahini] of such primitive communities as the Kols, Bheels and
Santhals – these images are mined from their feeling [anubhav]. [my
translation] (Mitra 1992, 47-48)
Mitra then observes that “archetypal”characters (he used the word “archetype” in
the Bengali) like Nandini, the King and Ranjan “very easily intermingle” in the play
with “individual characters” [byakti-charitra] like the miners – in a way which is rem-
iniscent of the way in which the traditional folk theater form of jatra, characters with
names like “Conscience” or “Fate” would intermingle with “individual characters”
Mitra then goes on to suggest that Tagore thus succeeded in Raktakarabi in creat-
ing a modern form of Indian theater, in which “a specifically Indian idiom” reflects
“the deepest and most complex thoughts of today.” It is not one which “follows or
imitates the framework of a Sanskrit play,” nor does it “lift the framework of a folk
play and simply apply some modern veneers to it.” Those would not be ways, Mitra
says, in which “today’s complexity” could possibly be expressed in an “artistically
adequate” [shilpa-sangata] manner (Mitra 1992, 48). Mitra suggests that Tagore
created, instead, a multi-layered theatrical form capable of engaging the modern In-
dian audience at “multiple levels” [ekadhik star] of “cognition [bodh].” Mitra then
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states that there are two different kinds of work that a work of art does:
In art, whenever one centers one’s work around a form [rup], it is done,
on the one hand, to explain the artist’s realization to the contemporary
mind; on the other hand, the form is a response to the hidden, underlying
[antarnihita] demands of the content. The greatness of the work of art
depends on the quality of the resolution of the tension which is created by
these two attractive forces. And it is through this, that all the subtlety
and complexity of the content discloses itself in a well-closed [sambaddha]
form. [my translation] (Mitra 1992, 48)
The two levels of cognition, Mitra says, relate to these two forces that concern the
work of art. “At one level, our concepts have clarity.” This is the level where thought
works as logical syllogisms. But, Mitra says, there is another widely-spreadlevel in
which concepts are unclear and “smoky,” – even though there are “sharply defined
mountains” there, they are always “covered in the darkness of smoke,” with subter-
ranean “roots” that “penetrate every level of our existence,” and “tug even at the
realm of the logic of sharp light.” The greater the powers of an artist, the more effec-
tive he will be, Mitra writes, in playing these two levels as if there were two strings
of an instrument, “such that even the finest taraf strings will keep sounding in our
conscious and unconscious minds.” That is why, Mitra concludes, artists like Tagore
invoke images and sounds “from our communal memory which are embodiments of
our deepest imagination” (Mitra 1992, 49). What Mitra says here is, of course, not
anything novel. In fact, he excuses himself, stating “However, all this is old news.”
But then he goes on to warn: “Still, perhaps it is necessary to remind ourselves of
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old news from time to time. This is because, in certain reckless eras, efforts are
made to make us forget some very important old news (Mitra 1992, 49). If we heed
Mitra’s warning, we should, perhaps, think of “old news” in two different ways. Is
it not “very important old news” that the movement of history is dialectical, even
if it is not eschatological? And is it not also true, as Mitra brings to our attention,
that to properly understand that movement we must draw on resources from non-
contemporaneous pasts? Mitra correctly suggests, I think, that there is in fact an
intimate connection between the dialectical quality of historical movement and our
need, at the level of the affective, for invocations of communal memories of the past.
The unconventional and heterodox Marxist thinker Ernst Bloch’s writings can help
us to trace a connection between the dialectical world-view and selective invocation
and recuperation of resources from the past, is the writings of Bloch discussed, in
his book with the same name, published in 1930, the notion of Spuren, figural traces
from the past of what Bloch called “the not-yet”. In his 1954-1959 magnum opus,
Das Prinzip Hoffnung [The Principle of Hope], Bloch demonstrated how such fig-
ural traces, from a wide variety of sources such as myths, fairy tales, stories and
musical compositions, express anticipations of the future in the form of daydreams.
Martin Jay points out that “for Bloch, the present totality, the latitudinal whole,
was irreducible to a homologous set of relationships and functions with one center of
gravity, such as the mode of production. . . . Bloch’s appreciation of the persistence
of the past in the present means that he rejected the simplistic longitudinal view of
totality as a succession of discrete wholes.” (Jay 1984, 187,189) Thus, while Bloch
agrees with Lukács on the normativity of human history as a totality, he rejected
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the notion that totality was an expressive concept and the notion that there was
a genetic center to that totality. By asserting that “needs and resources of olden
times. . . break through the relativism of the general weariness like magma from
a thin crust,” (?, 107) Bloch found a way to theorize the arrival of the new on the
basis of the prefiguration of the new by non-rationalist resources recuperable from
the human past that were outside of the domain of political economy, and, in so
doing, Bloch articulated dialectical Marxism with a culturalist humanism. In the
light of Mitra’s account of what Tagore was doing in Raktakarabi, Bloch is a thinker
whose companionship is well-suited to reading Tagore dialectically. Bloch’s view of
dialectic totality, unlike that of Lukács, allows for the sudden appearance of the new
(and it is in this sense that it is not determinately teleological), but also underscores
that the new, when it arrives, will be recognized by virtue of its familiarity from the
figural traces from the past which have prefigured it.
We can now see how close in spirit Bloch’s vision of time, with its non-synchronicity
and noncontemporaneity as distinguishing features, is to Tagore, not only with re-
spect to the formal devices in Raktakarabi (such as the invocation of communal
images from collectively shared myths), but also with respect to the play’s content
itself (in particular, the crucial event of the arrival of Ranjan to Yaksha-puri). Nan-
dini tells Bishu the Madman: “The news has arrived to my mind that Ranjan will
certainly arrive today” (Tagore 1961b, 673) Ranjan is the novum, the new whose
arrival shakes up everything. But he is also recognizable and familiar to those who,
like Nandini and Bishu the Madman, live their lives in a state of openness to intersub-
jective encounter and who allow their own subjectivities to be constituted through
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mutual recognition of others’ subjectivities. It is the King – who (until shortly before
the very end of the play) cannot overcome his habit of relating to everything and
everyone as if they were objects to be known (or sought to be known) analytically
and not subjects in their own right – who fails to recognize Ranjan when he arrives.
And it is on account of this inability to recognize Ranjan, to recognize the novum,
that the King kills Ranjan when Ranjan refuses to reveal his identity to the King
and, instead, challenges the King. But, paradoxically and also dialectically, it is this
failure to recognize which is, for the King, also the moment of anagnorisis, when “the
labor of the negative” commences for the King, as he himself, along with Nandini,
joins the insurrection – the negation of the negation – that breaks out against him.
The King, to all intents and purposes, becomes Ranjan. Does not the last paragraph
of the ‘Introduction’ to Bloch’s The Principle of Hope enact a similar drama? “In
the problem area of the Novum inherently lies the profusion of even whiter fields
of knowledge where worldly wisdom becomes young and original again.” Nandini
and the King walk out of the stage and out of the view of the audience. Where
to? To their death at the hands of the King’s followers? To a life-in-death as the
insurrection redeems the past? We do not know. It is not disclosed. Bloch had once
remarked: “If Being is understood out of its Where From then it is so only as an
equally tendential, still unclosed Where to” (Bloch 1995, 18) After Nandini and the
King have made their exit, one can, perhaps, imagine this remark as continuing to
resonate upon the empty stage.
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Chapter 3
The play of contingency: The
dramatic narrative in James and
Tagore
For the political re-reading of Tagore and James that we have undertaken, the un-
orthodox reading of Fanon by Ato Sekyi-Otu provides an interesting reading lens,
for several reasons. In Fanon’s Dialectic of Experience, Ato Sekyi-Otu proposes to
read Fanon as if his texts form “one dramatic dialectical narrative” (Sekyi-Otu 1996,
4). In a departure from the conventionally literal reading of Fanon as a theoreti-
cian of anticolonial violence, Sekyi-Otu chooses, instead, to read Fanon’s language
as performing an analogical and metaphorical function (Sekyi-Otu 1996, 8). In this
reading, Fanon, rather than articulate an existential violence generated by the clash
of colonized and colonizer, engaged, rather, in a narrative enterprise which involves
staging a representation of an ontological paradox. The paradox is that the specificity
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or particularity of the colonial condition is also an exemplar of a universal human
predicament of domination and subjugation (Sekyi-Otu 1996, 17). The dialectic of
universal and particular, then, encapsulates the paradox foregrounded by this reading
of Fanon: it suggests that the violence that Fanon wrote about – usually assumed, in
a conventional reading of Fanon, to be an ontological violence – may be understood,
rather, as the violence of representation itself: the imposition of specific form to a
universal condition – the imposition of artifice over nature. Sekyi-Otu’s suggestion
about the dramatic or staged quality of Fanon’s project is interesting in the light
of the work that James and Tagore produced for the theater. I argue that Tagore’s
and James’ works for the theater emphasize contingency over necessity, and that this
is facilitated by the dramatic form in a way not quite possible in prose history or
prose fiction. The theater, which is the realm of contingency, of the fleeting spoken
word and the equally fleeting performed gesture, reminds us of the importance of
the specific and the grounded – which are specific and grounded only contingently.
Even when a text is not formally performative, the quality of an implied dramaticity
or stagedness – as Sekyi-Otu seems to discern in Fanon – nevertheless reinforces this
particularly interesting perspective that the theatrical provides into life.
In Conscripts of Modernity, his recent re-reading of James’ The Black Jacobins,
David Scott sets out to explore the tragic dimensions of James’ work, suggesting that
structures that are integral to modernity simultaneously offered as well as curtailed
possibilities for Toussaint L’Ouverture. Tragedy, rather than furnish the redemptive
end which is promised by the genre of romance, engages, instead, in selfquestion-
ing; it encourages its reader, in a gesture paradigmatic of modernity, to give up on
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the consoling and comforting “idea that past, present, and future can be plotted
in a determinate causal sequence” (Scott 2004, 167). Just as Scott emphasizes
the disturbing and discomfort-producing quality of tragedy, present above all in its
refusal to provide definitive or simplistic answers, Sekyi-Otu attributes to Fanon’s
dramatic narrative a similar power to achieve “a corrosive destruction of the rigidity
and simplicity” to which the reductive narrative of racialization had submitted the
colonized. Just as the negative dialectic of tragedy excoriates the banally simplistic
romantic-redemptive narrative, the violence of Fanon’s dramatic narrative, likewise,
sears the reductive binaries of racialized logic, bringing into existence the conditions
of possibility for a reconfiguration of identity. This reconfiguration or reconstitu-
tion is always going to be a journey without familiar signposts, and the violence of
the anticolonial project resides in the wrenching contingency of this self-remaking.13
Scott believes that a tragic sensibility is the one most suited for our own times at the
present postcolonial conjuncture, in which the older “horizon of expectation” (Scott
2004, 45) that had animated thinkers like James must give way to more reflective
and open-ended self-questioning. This self-questioning is associated with a tragic
sensibility – and self-questioning, anagnorisis and recognition is, of course, the stuff
of tragedy. What is important to note here is that the recognition of tragedy is not
an emplotted recognition, that is to say, in tragedy thus conceived there is no generic
narrative arc leading to a determinate end: there is a dialectic, but there is no telos
to it. This dialectic-without-telos leading to this open-ended self-questioning and
13See, for example, Amilcar Cabral’s exhortation to the “petty-bourgeoisie” to “commit suicide
as a class in order to be reborn as revolutionary workers.” [Cabral, Amilcar, Revolution in Guinea,
p. 89.]
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self-remaking that Scott discovers in his hermeneutically adventurous and expansive
interpretation of the tragic modality of James’ The Black Jacobins has obvious echoes
and resonances in several parts of our larger argument. We can see an echo of this in
the idea of ever-self-remaking constitutive power which refuses to be congealed into
constituted power in Negri’s Spinoza-inspired conception of the multitude, which, as
we saw, provided us with an useful (though not fully satisfying) lens through which
to look at some of Tagore’s plays. In Tagore’s plays like Achalayatan and Taser
Desh, characters are unpredictably chameleon-like, shedding and taking on disguises
and escaping the fixity of categorizations in a play of pure contingency, as well as
making and remaking institutions and refusing their rigidity. This work of unmaking
and remaking, as we will see, is associated in the plays by Tagore, quite explicitly,
with the dances of destruction and creation by Shiva, with their accompanying sub-
text, in Indian myth, of violence and terror. This in turn is quite similar to the
performance of representational violence that Sekyi-Otu reads into Fanon’s project.
Somewhat similarly to Sekyi-Otu’s reading of violence in Fanon as the violence of
representation, Lewis Gordon relates the violence that Fanon describes in his text
to the violence that underlies mediation itself (Gordon 1996a, 298). Gordon con-
siders this violence to be a sort of tragic violence – because it is the same species of
violence which, in tragedy, is implicated in the violent intervention that realigns the
community “by presenting actions to the community that elicit communal suffering
even as that realignment takes place. For Fanon, according to Gordon, the violence
of the colonized against the colonizer, “a form of taking that which has been or will
be refused”, redistributes the balance of power (Gordon 1996a, 298). Significantly,
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however, for Gordon, the tragic dimension of this violence has a teleological import,
in that it is goal-directed, aimed as it is at bringing about a realignment (Gordon
1996a, 304). Interestingly, Gordon approvingly cites, in this context, a passage
from The Black Jacobins in which C.L.R. James seems to justify the violence that
the insurrectionary slaves perpetrated on their one-time colonial masters (Gordon
1996a, 307). Gordon describes The Black Jacobins as a tragic text also because this
narrative of violence, he believes, cleanses out its readers. Gordon’s use of the term
“tragic” here, in harkening back to the Aristotelian notion of tragedy as catharsis,
is a less expansive conception of tragedy than David Scott’s more sophisticated and
nuanced explanation of why The Black Jacobins is a tragic text. What is important
to note here is that for Scott The Black Jacobins is tragic precisely because it privi-
leges selfquestioning over the certain knowledge of determinate truths. This quality
of The Black Jacobins is, for Scott, related to its non-totalizing and non-teleological
openness; for Gordon, however, the tragic quality of The Black Jacobins is bound up
precisely with the telos that it gestures towards – the telos of a redemptive cathar-
sis. Gordon’s argument is that Fanon’s text (and, as he signals, by extension The
Black Jacobins) is tragic on the grounds of its relation to violence. This argument
is somewhat unconvincing. The argument seems to be based merely on an analogy
rather than on any homology: that Fanon advocates violent intervention, and that
tragedy, too, implies a violent intervention, does not in any way necessarily indicate,
on simply this basis, that Fanon’s text has a tragic dimension of its own. So, his
characterization of The Black Jacobins as a tragedy with a Fanon-like teleology of
violence fails to resonate, while David Scott’s argument that The Black Jacobins is
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a tragic narrative because of its openness to uncertainty and indeterminacy is much
more convincing and meaningful. Scott’s reading of The Black Jacobins clearly has
parallels with my own reading of this text as dialectical and as open rather than to-
talizing. Somewhat puzzlingly, however, Gordon is silent about the play The Black
Jacobins that James had also written, even though, given his interest in interpret-
ing The Black Jacobins. as a tragedy, one would have expected the play to have
aroused his interest. Much more interesting (and relevant to James’ play The Black
Jacobins), though, is Gordon’s discussion of the anonymity of the body and Fanon’s
orientation towards it. The anonymity of the body, Gordon says, gestures on the
one hand towards a form of empathic universality of the human presence, (Gordon
1996b, 78) and on the other hand towards the anonymity of the black body in a
racist society, in particular. In the latter case, Gordon suggests, because of racism
the “empathetic dimension of anonymity” disappears, and the black body becomes
universalized as an “economic” commodity-form instead, perceived not at a sym-
bolic/empathic level but only at the level of the biological real (Gordon 1996b, 79).
– a realization that made Fanon conclude that “the Negro represents the biological
danger” (Fanon 1970). Fanon’s project, Gordon thinks, was to counter this com-
modified universalism of the black body through making “visible the extraordinary
dimensions of mundane racist life by showing that the black’s ordinary life is in fact
extraordinary” (Gordon 1996b, 83). I would suggest that we can hear an echo of
this sentiment in James’ assertion (while discussing his plans to write a second play
several years after he had written The Black Jacobins14), that “the job [of the play-
14In 1944, while James was planning to write a play on the life of Harriet Tubman.
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wright] is to translate the economic and political forces into living human beings,
so that one gets interested in them for what they are as people.”15 For James, just
as the plantation system of San Domingo, with its intense, factory-like, fast-paced
production sytem represented an anticipatory proto-capitalism, and just as the fate
of the Haitian revolution anticipated the destiny of the Russian revolution, the chain
that continued to hold Toussaint in thrall right until his death was the domination of
his thought by the abstraction of Enlightenment liberalism – a form of domination
which, again, was anticipatory: it anticipated the abstract domination – in the sense
of the domination of individuals by abstraction – that, according to Marx, we see in
full-fledged capitalism.16 This may be one reason why James might have felt drawn
to write a dramatic representation of the story of The Black Jacobins, for it is in
the theater that living human beings literally make their entrance and biopolitically
enact “what they are as people” – whereas the representational language of narrative
history that is meant to be read and not seen, imposes its own mediate abstractions
on the reader. On the other hand, because it is itself mediate and abstract, narrative
history is apposite for the representation of “the economic and political forces”. Can
we surmise that the dialectic between the abstract – the economic and political forces
– and the particular – living human beings – is reflected in the dual modalities (play
to be performed and narrative history to be read) in which James felt called upon
to tell the story of the Haitian revolution? And is this doubling not homologous to
15James, C.L.R., Letter to Constance Webb. February 4, 1944. In Grimshaw, Anna (ed.), The
C.L.R. James Reader, Blackwell: Oxford. 1992, pp. 6-7.
16As Marx states in the Grundrisse: “...individuals are now ruled by abstractions, whereas earlier
they depended on each other.” Marx, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy,
trans. Martin Nicolaus, Penguin: London. 1973, p. 164.
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the dual character of the commodity form itself in the form of the duality of use and
exchange values, and thus a structural principle of capitalist society itself?17 How
appropriate is it that James’ account of the Haitian revolution, which he sees almost
as the emblematic, if not the originary, moment of the rise of world capitalism, is
itself fraught with a dialectic of genres, much as capitalism itself is fraught with the
dialectic of use value and exchange value? And is not a theatrical production, which,
unlike a printed book, does not circulate and is apprehended as use value alone, one
of the poles of this dialectic of genres whose other pole is constituted by the mobile,
circulating and exchangeable printed book?
Such a dialectical relationship is even more salient between Tagore’s plays on the one
hand and his novels/essays on the other. Tagore’s plays, at least at the outset, were
not even meant for public, ticketed performances, and hence did not enter the circuit
of exchange value circulation at all. Written originally to be performed privately by
his students at Shantiniketan, with himself playing an active role in the productions,
most of the plays by Tagore belong, then, to the domain of pure use value. Ananda
Lal writes of the relative state of isolation during this period of Tagore’s theatrical
experiments:
After his return from the England-America trip of 1913, Tagore contin-
ued producing new plays at Shantiniketan. However, the distance from
Calcutta delimited the possibilities of gaining a wider audience . . . .
17“On the one hand, all labour is an expenditure of human labour-power in the physiological
sense, and it is in this quality of being equal, or abstract, human labour that it forms the value of
commodities. On the other hand, all labour is an expenditure of human labour-power in a particular
form and with a definite aim, and it is in this quality of being concrete useful labor that it produces
use-values.” [Marx, Capital, Vol. 1, Trans. Ben Fowkes, London, 1976. p. 137.]
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[P]eople outside the small school community [Tagore’s school at Shan-
tiniketan] remained blissfully ignorant of Tagore’s theatrical advances
(Lal 1987b, 32-33).
Several of these plays read like fables or allegories not associated with a determi-
nate historical time, but located in a vaguely distant past.18 Much as the Haiti
described by James on the eve of the revolution anticipated industrial capitalism
in its plantation system, the universe of these plays by Tagore, too, while set in
a pre-capitalist past, seems to anachronistically anticipate, at least on occasions, a
world run by the logic of capital, especially in Muktadhara and Raktakarabi, in which
accumulation, labor and technology play central roles, and the question of freedom
is a lurking background theme. What can we make of this anticipatory, proleptic
presence of capitalism in plays ostensibly set in a pre-capitalist epoch? Moishe Po-
stone’s reinterpretation of Marx’s critical theory can be of help in reading Tagore
here. Postone suggests that while neither the category of labor, nor the law of value,
is transhistorical – both, he thinks, are historically specific to capitalism – and that
the domination that Marx analyzes as characteristic of capitalism is not merely a
class relation concealed by the appearance of universalism, but, rather, “a histori-
cally constituted form of universalism itself” (Postone 1993, 163). Under the rule
of capital, the domination that is exercised is not merely that of a class, nor is it
merely social; rather, class domination under the logic of capital is, Postone argues,
itself “a function of a superordinate, ‘abstract’ form of domination” (Postone 1993,
126). A full realization of general human freedom, Postone then argues, must involve
18On a few occasions, however, actual real-life historical figures do make an appearance, such as
King Pratapaditya of Jessore in Paritran [’The Rescue’].
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overcoming both forms of overtly social, personal domination and structures of ab-
stract domination (Postone 1993, 127). Inasmuch as a play like Tagore’sMuktadhara
seeks to speak for a general human freedom, it has to be, then, both particular and
general, and to present domination as both specific in a contingent sociality as well
as an abstraction. Viewed in this light, the peculiarly proleptic temporal situation
of a play like Muktadhara, located as it is in a grounded time and place which is,
nevertheless, only vaguely situated somewhere within the time of pre-capitalism, and
working through problems that are recognizably of the time of capitalism (such as
technological domination over nature and the dispossession and accumulation en-
abled by this technolgy – as exemplified by the “monstrous” dam (described as a
yantra or machine) that seeks to divert the flow of the free-flowing stream of the
play’s title) gestures towards a truly general freedom. Also, the compassionate por-
trayal of the king (the crown prince Abhijit’s adoptive father), who is the instigator of
the river’s damming but not personally malfeasant, emphasizes that the domination
that Abhijit’s act of sabotage overcomes (by breaking it at the secret spot where it is
vulnerable) is not an overt, personal domination but rather an abstract domination.
At a particular moment in Muktadhara when Abhijit contemplates sabotaging the
dam (although no one knows this yet), he and the prince Sanjay have a remarkable
conversation. The conversation is fraught with references that have a peculiarly dual
nature, suggesting motion that can go in any of two possible directions. Abhijit
remarks: “Look, there is a bird sitting on the top of the debdaru tree; will it fly to
its nest, or will it begin a journey through darkness towards a forest of far exile,
we do not know. [my translation]” When Sanjay expresses his desire to join Abhijit
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as his traveling companion, Abhijit remarks: “You will have to find your way by
yourself. If you walk behind me, I will obstruct the view of the path. [my transla-
tion]” (Tagore 1961b, 614-15). Abhijit embraces a dialectic of contingency rather
than a determinate solution. The figure of Dhananjay Bairagi – one of the itinerant
singers who always show up in these plays by Tagore, and who were played by Tagore
himself when the plays were performed – is another such figure in Muktadhara who,
from his position of populist saintliness, preaches through his songs an embrace of
contingency – a gospel of giving up on seeking determinate goals and routes: “(S)he
who wants me, that person will show me the road. My only duty [daay] is just to
launch the boat.” [my translation] (Tagore 1961b, 619).
The renunciatory gestures on the part of Dhananjay and Abhijit in Muktadhara
can be read as a forgoing of certainty and predictability. This theme finds itself
reflected in the fact that the entire action of the play takes place on a day desig-
nated for worship of Shiva as Bhairava, and a group of people labeled in the play
as “Bhairavites” (Bhairava’s followers) make their appearance on several occasions,
singing a song in praise of Bhairava which, incidentally, contains the following line
in praise of Bhairava: “Glory to the shackle-breaker” [jai bandhan-chhedan]. While
this line prefigures the act of “shackle-breaking” that Abhijit will perform in course
of the play when he would break open the dam on the Muktadhara river, thereby
unshackling the river, we can also read this line as a symbolic disavowal of the con-
straints – “shackles” – of determinism and predictability, articulating a preference
for contingency and uncertainty. The choice of Shiva as Bhairava is particularly apt
in this context: in Indian myth, Shiva had beheaded Brahma in a fit of rage, for
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which Shiva was condemned to wander through scenes of death and destruction as a
destitute beggar, begging for alms with the skull of Brahma as his begging-bowl. In
sculptures, he is usually depicted with emaciated ghosts representing the kingdom
of the dead around him. The curious feature of the iconograpy of Shiva as Bhairava,
however, is the serenity, even levity and sensuous grace, that one can discern in the
pose of Shiva-Bhairava.19 What is it about an intimate acquaintance with death
and devastation that, paradoxically, makes Shiva-Bhairava achieve a sublime grace
and serenity, if not the cathartic cleansing caused by the pity and fear occasioned by
the witnessing of death and devastation? In the framing device that Tagore uses for
this play, then, tragedy can be said to be already present as an undertone. Abhijit
in Muktadhara (like Ranjan in Raktakarabi) are, also, sacrificial Christ-like figures
– one can recall here Tagore’s attendance at the passion-play in Oberammergau in
Germany in 1930 and the poem, ‘The Child’ (later rewritten by him in Bengali as
Sisutirtha), that he subsequently wrote based on that experience (Tagore 2007, xiv),
as a testament to his interest in the concept of Christ’s passion. Like Christ’s, the
deaths of Abhijit and Ranjan are redemptive and transformative – and, one may
say, cathartic. The figure of Shiva as Bhairava in Muktadhara, I would like to sug-
gest, serves, with its association in iconography with a redemptive and cathartic
transformation, performs a similar function. Unlike Christian teleology, however,
Shiva-as-Bhairava does not embody a determinate transformation or redemption,
but rather a serendipitious one (and here one may note that Shiva-as-Bhairava is
nothing if not a wanderer). Through the invocation of Bhairava, then, contingency
19See, for example, the 12th century sculpture, ‘Shiva as Bhairava’, in the South Asia Gallery of
the University of Michigan Museum of Art.
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again makes its appearance.
A similar kind of contingency can be discerned in Fanon’s work. Sekyi-Otu draws
our attention to a puzzling assertion by Fanon in The Wretched of the Earth, which
he considers to be of seminal importance: “To the lie of the colonial situation the
colonized reply with an equal falsehood” (Fanon 1963, 50). Sekyi-Otu relates this to
what he describes as the “tragic irony” of the colonial subject’s struggles – insofar as,
as Fanon seems to tell us, the colonized subject engages in “struggles not so much to
abolish the hierarchical order but rather to attain the valued term” (Sekyi-Otu 1996,
97). I suggest, however, a different kind of reading of this assertion by Fanon. What
if we think of “falsehood” in Fanon’s sentence, not as the determinate negation of
truth, that is, not as a fixed opposite of truth, but rather as a disavowal of the notion
of truth itself, that is, as a disavowal of the very notion of a truth-claim? What if we
are prepared to replace the specificity of truth (and also of its antithesis, that is, of
falsity) with the contingency and provisionality of choosing contingency over fixity,
or (as Negri might put it) of choosing constituting power, which is everchangeable
and always-in-flux, over constituted power, which is fixed, congealed and determi-
nate? The indeterminacy and contingency that we saw David Scott identifying as
the truly distinguishing mark of tragedy, and as imparting to James’ The Black Ja-
cobins its tragic quality (much more so than the emplotment of that narrative as a
conventionally tragic biographical arc of its protagonist Toussaint), is the same in-
determinacy and contingency that Tagore’s plays like Muktadhara and Achalayatan
seem to emphasize. However, this indeterminacy and contingency is very different
from postmodernist relativism and celebration of ambiguity, because for thinkers like
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Tagore, James and Fanon, power relations and the struggle against those relations
do impose an underlying, constraining frame that interposes the realm of necessity
as the dual to this play of contingency. Contingency, then, is in play in Tagore,
James and Fanon in a dialectical relationship to necessity. All three of them seem to
express this idea, or rather this idea seems to express itself, implicitly, in the writing
of all three of them, as we have shown above. While James is the most explicitly
Marxist of the three, Fanon is something of a sui generis Marxist, and Tagore is not
someone that one would normally associate with the Marxist tradition, it is interest-
ing to observe that we can trace the idea of this dialectical interplay of contingency
and necessity back to Marx. Perhaps the most explicit articulation of this dialec-
tic in Marx occurs in his 1877 letter to the editor of the Otecestvenniye Zapisky,
in which Marx, emphasizing the role of contingency and rejecting the schematicism
of any one-size-fits-all “general historico-philosophical theory,” makes the following
observation:
“[E]vents strikingly analogous but taking place in different historic sur-
roundings [. . . can lead] to totally different results. By studying each
of these forms of evolution separately and then comparing them one can
easily find the clue to this phenomenon, but one will never arrive there
by the universal passport of a general historico-philosophical theory, the
supreme virtue of which consists in being super-historical” (Marx 1968,
163).
While in the above passage Marx emphasizes contingency and does not elucidate
on necessity, in an 1881 letter to Vera Zasulich, he elaborates on a similar idea,
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when he develops further what the necessity imposed by history would consist of.
He observes that Russia might be able to move directly to socialism without passing
through capitalism if conditions in the Russian peasant commune were consistent
with those required to develop the necessary degree of “enlightenment,” the nec-
essary degree being that required to enable Russian peasants to “appropriate” the
degree of “universality” of the development of mind embodied in the productive
forces of social labor developed in capitalism outside Russia. 20 In another exam-
ple of this articulation of the dialectic of necessity and contingency, Marx claims
in the Eighteenth Brumaire that, in mid-nineteenth century France, the conditions
of masses of French peasants were inconsistent with those required for development
of the necessary degree of “enlightenment,” the result being the despotism of the
Bonaparte dynasty. Thus, for Marx, both the developed degree of “enlightenment”
and the degree of development of productive forces were “necessary”. To the extent
that we can draw homologies between “truth,” “enlightenment” and “universalism,”
looking upon these categories as variants on the same general rubric of “necessity,”
as counterposed respectively to non-truth-claims, historical difference, and experi-
ential difference, each of which we can see as variants of the same general rubric of
“contingency,” Ziauddin Sardar’s discussion of Fanon’s complicated and dialectical
relationship to universalism parallels my analysis about Tagore’s, James’ and Fanon’s
relationship with the category of necessity (Fanon 2008). Sardar identifies that there
are two (apparently) distinct tendencies in Fanon, in that Fanon both “wants to
transcend his ethnic perspectives and affiliation and wage his anti-colonial struggle
20Marx, Karl. ’Letter to Vera Zasulich’. (Originally written by Marx in 1881.) Marx/Engels
Collected Works. Volume 24, International Publishers : New York. p. 346.
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in the name of universal human values”, and at the same time “roundly denounces
this universalism.” He points out that the usual way to explain this would be to treat
it as a contradiction, and then to explain this contradiction either in terms of Fanon’s
personal history, that is, as Fanon’s changing life experiences leading to changes of
his opinions, or as purely rhetorical and strategic gestures performed in the interest
of mobilizing opinion or generating solidarity. (This second explanation, we may
note, is somewhat similar to reading Fanon as if Fanon were writing performatively,
as, we mentioned, was suggested by Sekyi-Otu.) Sardar, however, points out that
it may make more sense to read Fanon’s orientation to universalism not as contra-
dictory, but as constituting a “unified position,” which, in the light of our earlier
discussion, I suggest, we should characterize as a dialectical unity. Sardar points out
that Fanon’s man – universal person – is universal in an actional sense, that is, his
universalism is a universalism that is built through ongoing struggle. This universal-
ism, Sardar seems to imply, is neither static nor teleologically defined. Neither does
it “emerge from the dominant discourse,” nor can it be “seen as a grand narrative
that privileges a particular culture and its representatives.” This universalism steers
clear, therefore, of any “single, monolithic notion of what it means to be human,”
but, rather, fashions and refashions this notion perpetually on the basis of an on-
going praxis. On the other hand, it is not relativistic in the postmodernist sense of
constant repetition, deference and ambiguity, because it is rooted in the category of
the human as a privileged, and necessary, category. Theater involves a playing out
of the relationship between necessity and contingency which is not unlike this idea of
self-refashioning and self-renewing contingent particulars constituting a reality that
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comes to be seen as authoritative. Each performance of a play, as performers tend
to be well aware, is different, even when all performances of the play follow the
same script. Nevertheless, the play, even if thus constituted by contingent and in-
dividuated performances, comes to acquire a singular, unitary character. By way of
analogy with how Gilles Deleuze, writing on Nietzsche, describes creativity through
the figure of dance (Deleuze, 55), one can, perhaps, think of a play as a Nietzschean
active power actualized through the liberation that occurs when there are no longer
contingent selves that act within a time distributed into a before and an after, but,
rather, when there are acts that are true for all time – that is, acts that are univer-
sal. May it not be unreasonable to expect, then, that in plays more than in other
prose genres, awareness of the underlying contingencies that constitute the outward
appearance of necessity may be rendered more visible? In other words, can it be that
contingencies become more expressible in plays than they usually are in other prose
genres – genres in which necessity commands more authority? Bakhtin considered
the novel to possess elements of the carnivalesque, and regarded it as a genre which
was expressive of the plural and the polyglossic. To be polyglossic and multivocal is
also to be expressive of contingency. To the extent that the carnival involves play-
acting, then, we might expect the form of the play to be, for like reasons, expressive
of contingency, and, mutatis mutandis, perhaps also to allow more expressive possi-
bility for thoughts and ideas that privilege contingency over necessity. I would like
to turn now to a remarkable passage in James’ play The Black Jacobins which does
not seem to have any equivalent in the ‘history’ version of The Black Jacobins. In
this passage, which is set in 1800, Toussaint is giving Colonel Vincent, a French of-
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ficer, the news that he (Toussaint) is dismissing the French general, Hdouville, from
San Doming (James 1992a, 89). When Vincent protests that the new constitution
adopted in San Domingo is “despotic”, Toussaint states that “the matter is settled”,
and that while “the constitution swears allegiance to France,” “we govern ourselves.”
Toussaint further says to Vincent, “You think the constitution is despotic? Consti-
tutions are what they turn out to be.” Yet, in the same conversation, Toussaint also
tells Vincent, apparently without any irony, “we do not seek independence. We are
not ready for it. France will be elder brother, guide and mentor.” The Toussaint
of the play The Black Jacobins, thus, shows his awareness of the contingency of the
specific processes which go into the making of such seemingly authoritative docu-
ments such as constitutions, and of the paradoxes that can therefore underly their
seeming unitary authority – such as the contradiction between “we govern ourselves”
and “we do not seek independence”. It is, then, by keeping in mind the essential
dialectical relationship between necessity and contingency that we can appreciate
why what appear to be contradictions can actually be non-contradictions. Putting
a historical figure such as Toussaint on the stage in a play and making him speak
forces, in addition, a decision on the part of the playwright to confront the question
of the extent of the character’s own reflexive awareness of the dialectic quality of this
relationship. In his play, James has Toussaint speak in the rhetorical figure that best
encapsulates dialectical inversion: the chiasmus. The chiasmic monologue uttered
by Toussaint, at the moment of his self-recognition, formally echoes Toussaint’s own
awareness, expressed in the content of his speech, of the dialectical paradox in which
he is trapped: “By law I was a slave, but I was free. Now by law I am free, but I am
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a slave. I am worse; I am a master of slaves.” (James 1992a, 97). The chiasmus is a
figure of impossibility, a disruption from which no recovery is possible – unless, that
is, the “necessary” subject is re-imagined as constituted by a network of contigent
difference. Z̆izek’s dialectical explanation of the paradox of identity is helpful in this
context: “Identity itself,” Z̆izek observes, is “a name for a certain radical impossi-
bility” (Z̆izek 1991, 37), and the subject thus compelled to rethink identity “bears
an indelible mark of failure” (Z̆izek 1991, 110). Identity becomes authoritarian,
Z̆izek observes, “the moment we overlook, in a kind of illusory perspective, that it is
nothing but the inscription of pure difference . . .” (Z̆izek 1991, 91). The tragic ele-
ment in James’ Toussaint or the “King”-figures in Tagore’s plays becomes salient in
performance, as they acknowledge their awareness of this failure on their part as the
chiasmic relation between necessity and contingency confront them and is recognized
and articulated by them. It is not a coincidence that this recognition is articulated,
in both James’ play The Black Jacobins and in Tagore’s play Raktakarabi, in terms of
a tacit acknowledgement of the inadequacy of purely intellectual knowledge and an
implicit affirmation of the affective dimension of life. Toussaint’s acknowledgment of
his unfree condition comes in course of his conversation with Mme Bullet, the white
woman whom James makes the object of Toussaint’s romantic affections. Likewise,
in Raktakarabi, the king confesses to Nandini (the young woman who is the only per-
son with whom the king has something approaching a normal human relationship)
his immense fatigue – the result of his inability to sleep on account of the fear of
sleeping (Tagore 1961b, 671-72).
The king declares that his logic compels him to acquire anything that he can lay
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his hands upon – among them, knowledge – and to destroy anything that cannot
thus be acquired: a logic recognizable as a logic of accumulation in which anything
that cannot be commodified and accumulated is turned into an externality to be be
written off and wasted. Trapped in this logic, the king is aware that he himself has
become a prisoner of it. In a phrase that echoes Toussaint’s recognition that the
exigencies of governing as head of state have made of him a slave to circumstances,
the king in Raktakarabi makes a fascinating double entendre on the phrase “my
prison” towards the end of the play when the king’s insurgent subjects have arisen
in a mass uprising, and the king steps out to join with them, that is, to commit to
a struggle which is against himself:
The King: What have you set out to do?
Fagulal: To break the prison door. Even if we die, we won’t turn back.
The King: Why should you turn back? I too am on the way to break it.
. . .
Fagulal: But, King, did you understand correctly? It is your prison that
we have set out to break.
The King: Yes, my prison. Both you and I will have to break it down. It
is not something you alone will be able to do. [my translation] (Tagore
1961b, 690-91).
The prison, for the king, is “my prison” both in the sense that he is factually the
owner of it and the sense that he himself feels imprisoned by it. It is tempting to
read this apparent paradox, experienced by both Toussaint and Raktakarabi’s King,
rather superficially as a dialectic of the subjective and the objective that pivots on
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alienation. It is indeed true that both the King in Raktakarabi and Toussaint as
depicted by James are profoundly alienated. This alienation of the King is made
manifest in Raktakarabi by the literally impenetrable barrier that the King has put
between himself and the external world, so that he is merely heard and never seen.
Toussaint’s alienation, too, is rendered poignantly in James’ play when Dessalines
remarks of Toussaint that he [Toussaint] “stands in the way. He will never give the
signal the people are waiting for” (James 1992a, 104). I posit, however, that a
richer dialectic is at play in these instances than merely an alienation-based dialec-
tic of the subjective and the objective. This richer dialectic is not one of exchange
merely between the objective and subjective dimensions, but rather between the
very constitutions of these dimensions. Moishe Postone, in his reinterpretive work on
Marx, makes a homologous argument with regard to subjective forms and objective
attributes. Postone argues that in Marx’s theory of alienation, both the “universal,
objective, lawlike dimension” and the subjective, “particular” dimension “are con-
stituted by structured forms of practice, and, in turn, shape practice and thought in
their image” (Postone 1993, 224). It follows from this, Postone suggests, that the
fullest possible realization of a general human freedom would involve overcoming not
only overt and explicit forms of domination, but “structures of abstract domination”
as well (Postone 1993, 127). These structures of abstract domination have to do,
Postone argues, with productive processes in society, as well as, “more generally”,
with “the subsumption of individuals under large-scale social units” (Postone 1993,
264). Both James in the play The Black Jacobins, and Tagore in his plays such
as Achalayatan, Muktadhara and Raktakarabi, show themselves to be unusually sen-
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sitive to how forms of social organization, rather than overt forms of domination,
constitute true impediments to human freedom. In the play The Black Jacobins,
for instance, James has Toussaint remark to Vincent, a colonel in the French army,
that he “intends to take one thousand soldiers, go to Africa, and free hundreds of
thousands in the black slave trade there and bring them here [to Haiti], to be free
and French” (James 1992a, 90), and he refers to “my plantation at Ennery” (James
1992a, 101). While the “overt” form of government changed from slavery to repub-
licanism, Toussaint mimics, without self-awareness and without a sense of irony, the
same colonial/slaveholding mode of social organization as the erstwhile French rulers.
James has Dessalines, a more astute and canny observer than Toussaint, recognizing
that “the arms of the army [led by Toussaint] are being used against the people”
(James 1992a, 101). In his prose history The Black Jacobins James, in fact, ex-
plains the reasons behind why Toussaint had instituted the plan to continue to have
Africans transported to Haiti and work in the plantations. However, in that genre
of writing, James’ explanation takes on the quality of necessity, as if a determinate
logic guided Toussaint inevitably to this decision. In the play, however, the contin-
gent nature of the decision is rendered much more salient by the presence, in each of
these instances, of an interlocutor who has a viewpoint about the unfolding events
quite distinct from Toussaint’s: Vincent in the first instance and Dessalines in the
second. The presence, on stage, of other voices holding other, different, views than
Toussaint’s renders suspect the supposed inevitability of his logic. The plurivocality
made possible by the juxtaposition, in space, that is within the space of the theater,
of different subjects holding different views signals a different argument about his-
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tory – to use Hayden White’s terms, an argument that is less mechanistic and more
contextualist (White 1973). In a manner homologous to this narratological shift
from the mechanistic to the contextualist as we move from the prose of the historical
text of The Black Jacobins to the play The Black Jacobins, the poetics – to borrow
White’s terms again – also shifts: the poetics of the history as narrated in the form
of a play inclines to irony or perhaps even catachresis, whereas in the historical text
written in prose, the poetics of the text inclines to a metonymic articulation: that
of the story of the San Domingo revolution as an exemplar of a historical universal.
The contextualist and catachresistic quality of a narrative in the form of a play can
also find expression in the multimodality that the form of the play makes possible:
sight and sound are present before the audience of the play in concrete, actualized
and immediate form – as sight and sound rather than their verbal narration. Within
the short space of a few lines of Tagore’s Raktakarabi, for example, the audience sees
“a woman wearing a saree the color of rice-plants” (Tagore 1961b, 675). (Nandini,
who is described elsewhere in the play as having brought a dash of color to the grey
world of the mining town) and hears a “shattering sound” like “a column collapsing
on itself” (Tagore 1961b, 675). (the sound made by the King in his inchoate rage
at himself). We see contrast (between the colorful Nandini and the grey world of
single-minded extractive accumulation in the mining town) made visible, and also
hear contradiction (as in the King’s selfcontradictory logic) made audible. Contrast
and dissonance, present performatively before the viewer, emphasize the plurivocal
immediacy of the contingent and the particular as opposed to the abstraction of the
necessary and the universal, present to the reader only on the pages of the printed
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page. Perhaps the play by Tagore that is the most celebratory of contingency is
Taser Desh [The Country of Cards]. The play is an apparently light-hearted romp,
but it rewards a close reading that looks underneath its surface frivolity. This play,
as is usual in Tagore’s parable-like plays, begins in an un-identified kingdom in some
unspecified antiquity, with two characters identified as “The Prince” and the “The
Merchant’s Son” conversing with each other. The Prince articulates his restlessness
and expresses his desire to set sail on a voyage of discovery, while “The Merchant’s
Son,” who comes across as staid, solid and less adventure-inclined, tries to talk the
Prince out of his foolhardy plan. Eventually, the Prince prevails and they set sail, but
suffer a shipwreck along the way, and are washed up to the shore of an unknown coun-
try inhabited by two-dimensional cards out of a card-pack, who take their marching
orders from a strict set of codes that structure their lives in terms of meaningless
sets of ritual. Xenophobic to the extreme, the card-humans do not take kindly to
the Prince and the Merchant’s Son who have so suddenly appeared on their shores,
because the latter do not seem to obey any rules and do as they please. One by one,
however,the Prince and his friend win converts among the card-humans, who start
rebelling giving up their ritual-laden lifestyles for the new-fangled freedom of which
the Prince and his friend are harbingers, with the women among the card-humans
being the first to rebel. The card-queen and the card-king, the two people in the
kingdom most invested in preserving the old order, eventually themselves succumb
to the onslaught of freedom, although they are the last to do so. They renounce the
rules, with the card-queen leading and the card-king following, and everyone em-
braces freedom in the end. However straightforward a parable it might appear to be,
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the play raises several interesting questions. The conjuncture of the the names “The
Prince” and “The Merchant’s Son” invokes an alliance of political and commercial
power, suggesting, perhaps, that the play can be read as an allegory of the arrival
of the British in India. Ananda Lal, in his essay ’Tagore as Dramatist’, endorses
this interpretation, suggesting that Taser Desh merely “poked fun at the fossilized
conservatism and orthodoxy of . . . Hinduism” (Lal 1987c, 25). Such an inter-
pretation, though, suggests an Orientalist orientation to the play that seems quite
incompatible with Tagore’s sensibility. However, what if we read the play as an alle-
gory about India bringing her emancipatory potential to the West, with rule-based,
instrumental rationality represented by the rule-following card characters? What if
one way to read this play is in fact to read it as constructing a subversive genealogy
for modernity and its freedoms, in which India, in a role reversal, is posited as free-ing
the West? Tagore’s essay ’Brihottoro Bharat’ [’Greater India’] invokes “India’s gift
across the oceans” in connection with an elaboration of what Tagore thinks India’s
contribution to the world might be:
India has not left behind any legal documents in any iron safe certifying
where India is true [satya]. . . . What is at the root of truly giving to
the other is to feel the other as self. To learn the richness of the truth
of India, it is necessary to go to the far fields of India’s gift across the
oceans (Tagore 1961a, 353).
This passage might seem on superficial reading to be almost a caricature of the
“naive and specious spirituality or Easternness” which, as Amit Chaudhuri points
out, Tagore’s Western readers came to associate with him, (Chaudhuri 2006). How-
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ever, the essay makes clear that Tagore was thinking here about what he believed to
be an emancipatory role historically played by Indian maritime influence in South-
East Asia. Referring to the temples at Borobudur and Angkor Vat, Tagore discerns
a liberatory Indian influence that, he thinks, sparked a creative revolution: “There
is no glory in inclining people towards imitation. However, there is nothing more
worthy than freeing [muktidan kora] the slumbering power of human beings” (Tagore
1961a, 353). On the evidence of this essay, it is not an unlikely conjecture that the
play Taser Desh can in fact be productively read as a story of what Tagore sees as
India’s contribution to an emancipatory Reason which stands in a relationship of
antagonism to a purely instrumental Reason that has been further fetishized into
mere ritual. Elsewhere, Tagore makes an argument about both the form and con-
tent of theater, comparing European theater with Indian theater as described in the
classical Sanskrit aesthetic treatise on the theater, the Natyashastra of Bharata –
an argument which, I believe, supports this interpretation. In the course of this
comparison, which occurs in his 1902 essay Rangamancha [‘The Stage’], Tagore de-
cries what he perceives as the illusionism of European theater, suggesting that “the
illusion created by pictorial scenes” in European drama assumes that the spectator
suffers from “an utter poverty of the imagination” and is therefore in need of con-
crete visual illusions: “the European wants his truth concrete . . . he must be deluded
by having these imaginings to be exact imitations of actual beings.” He criticizes
the theaters created in India for following the Western model on the basis of their
supposed lack of both universality (“[t]he theaters that we have set up in imitation
of the West are too elaborate to be brought to the door of all and sundry”, because
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their “creative richness” has been “overshadowed by the wealth of the capitalist”)
and freedom (the “Hindu spectator” and the “Hindu artist” must “regain their free-
dom by making a clean sweep of the costly rubbish that has accumulated round
about and is clogging the stage”) (Lal 1987b, 29-30). Thus, Tagore mobilizes uni-
versality and freedom, the two very qualities that are supposed to form the core of
Enlightenment values, as contributions that Indian theater possessed and can pre-
sumably contribute to Western theater. By inserting India in this fashion into the
history of thought, Tagore makes a gesture – of the kind that Dipesh Chakrabarty
would characterize as “provincializing Europe” – that seeks to locate the sources of
colonial and postcolonial modernity in loci other than the European Enlightenment
(Chakrabarty 2000). Chakrabarty has argued that the self-constitution as writers,
on the part of Tagore and other writers of the “long Bengali nineteenth century”,
was informed by an active engagement with the European (and particularly English)
romantic tradition (Chakrabarty 2004, 656). The romantic sense of standing for the
emancipatory potential in Enlightenment reason against the instrumental aspect of
Enlightenment reason was, thus, fundamental to their project. In one of his essays,
Chakrabarty has argued that Bengali poetry acts as a “romantic archive,” but it is
one which becomes active only occasionally:
Bengali poetry thus, I suggest, acts as the place where a collective mem-
ory of a . . . romantic sense of the political . . . is archived. But,
in likening this historical process of transmission of sentiments to the
process of archiving, I do not mean to say that this archive is simply
there in any objective sense for us to make use of it. . . . Bengalis on
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both sides of the national divide unwittingly make a political archive of
their romantic legacy only in the process of their involvement in actual
political struggles . . . . It is only during “mass” political struggles .
. . that the legacy of the romantic moment of our fraught nationalism,
mediated by a long line of Bengali poets, may come back to haunt our
own political sentiments (Chakrabarty 2004, 681).
Chakrabarty, then, sees poetry as constituting a resource for Bengalis for those con-
tingent moments in history when the logic of necessity that usually underlies the
ordinary succession of events is challenged by the contingency of humans engaged
in struggle to disrupt and alter the flow of that logic. It is not surprising that it is
poetry that would come to constitute this resource, because poetry is the most non-
linear among genres and the most disruptive to the logos of an orderly progression.
“Poetry,” as Alain Badiou writes, “is the stellar assumption [l’assomption stellaire]
of that pure undecidable, against a background of nothingness, that is an action of
which one can only know whether it has taken place inasmuch as one bets upon its
truth.” (Badiou 2005). However, while actual political struggle is carried out in the
field of events, Tagore’s attempt to construct an alternative genealogy for modernity
that would sidestep Orientalist logic by creating an affiliation for India with Enlight-
enment rationality amounted to a struggle in the field of ideas. I would argue that
the dramatic was an effective arena for Tagore in which to mobilize resources for
that “struggle,” for the reason that Tagore preferred to conceptualize life in terms
of the expression “jiban leela” [“life play”]. Chakrabarty writes that “there was, in .
. . his [Tagore’s] own philosophy, based on the Upanishads, . . . a transcendental
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or cosmic sense of leela or play, which functions as an ultimate critique of reason
and which thus interrupts – without making it irrelevant – the specifically political”
(Chakrabarty 2000, 167). While Chakrabarty locates Tagore’s investment in the
concept of “leela” in his poetry/song, and frames in terms of a prose-versus-poetry
distinction Tagore’s mobilization and privileging of this concept as the answer to in-
strumentalized rationality, with prose standing for the instrumentality of the urban
life of the colonial subject and poetry standing for the enchanted and enchanting
resource that enables the subject to “cope with the city” (Chakrabarty 2000, 170).
While Chakrabarty makes no mention of Tagore’s plays in the context of this dis-
cussion, his plays, I suggest, proved to be the perfect arena in which to prosecute
the struggle. Not only is a play literally (as in the English word “play” even though
not in the Bengali word for drama or theater) a kind of leela, there is also something
particularly playful in Tagore’s plays, given the intimacy of the circumstances of their
writing and staging – Tagore wrote many them for performance by a narrow circle
of his students and friends at his school, Shantiniketan, with himself usually partic-
ipating as both director and actor. Moreover, prose and poetry commingle in these
plays, as sections of prose dialog are often interrupted by songs (poems set to music
by Tagore himself) that the characters sing. Thus, a struggle of ideas displaced to
leela prosecuted between prose and poetry was likely to have found their most artic-
ulate expression in these plays, where prose and poetry both literally occur. These
plays by Tagore occupy a peculiar no-man’s land between the naturalistic and the
non-naturalistic: while in these plays characters converse perfectly in prose in terms
of everyday logic, and events unfold in natural and logical sequence, following an
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impeccable logic of necessity, the non-naturalistic spectacle of characters bursting
into song and speaking through sung poetry also introduces into these plays an ele-
ment of radical contingency. The peculiarity that these plays are also not specifically
localizable or situatable in place or time also adds to this sense of the illogic of contin-
gency constantly interrupting the logic of necessity in these plays. The disenchanted
world of prose and the enchanted and enchanting world of poetry thus meet each
other halfway in these plays, making them the perfect vehicle for Tagore’s project
to problematize universalist modernity not by calling into question its universality
but by reconfiguring its logic of necessity through the contingency of an alternate
genealogy and an alternate set of affiliations.
James had similarly created an alternate genealogy for universal history by putting
the Haitian revolution at the center of the modern history in The Black Jacobins,
the most striking example of his reconfigurative enterprise. However, a close reading
of other texts by him shows this reconfigurative impulse at work in other contexts,
too. An interesting example of this is James’ short essay, ’Carnival,’ on the topic
of the Trinidadian annual rite of carnival, which he published in The Nation on
February 21, 1959. In this essay, we see James implicitly decentering, in the case of
Trinidad, the Weberian idea of protestantism and the “iron cage” of rationalization
from the genealogy of the work ethic. Instead, he posits an alternative genealogy
in which it is “self-activity of the masses of the people” lies at the origin of the
“incredibly energetic” performances on display at carnival time – a quality that,
James is convinced, can be displaced to other contexts such as social labor: “once
the people are convinced that the effort that they are being called upon to make
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is worth making, . . . the energy, creativity and the capacity for independent
organisation which they show in Carnival will very easily be transferred . . . [to
a] “national mobilisation” (James 1992b, 287-88). Even though it is self-activity
which James identifies as the force behind the Carnival, a dialectic of contingency and
necessity is, he seems to suggest, also at work, so that self-activity turns into self-
organization. Instead of merely being anarchic and voluntaristic, the self-activity
of the people leads to “immense organisation and self-discipline.” (James 1992b,
287). A self-organizing complex system emerges from this autopoietic activity of the
masses even in the absence of any topdown directive: “all sections of the population,
without any inculcation from above, without any educational instruction” makes the
Carnival possible (James 1992b, 286).
In a 1963 essay on a seemingly quite different topic, ’Lenin and the Vanguard Party’,
James traces a dialectic of necessity and contingency constituting a self-organizing
system which is somewhat similar, although, unlike the Carnival, the argument this
time is in the realm of the political. In this essay, James talks about the “cyclonic
intervention” into the overthrow of Tsarism and the abolition of landlordism of “the
proletariat and the peasantry”, who “rapidly organized themselves into Soviets.”
Lenin, James says, had the insight to realize that “to carry out any program at all
power had to go to the Soviets” (James 1992e, 328). James then disputes that Lenin
had imposed any top-down authoritarian control: “to believe that . . . Leninism
would under the circumstances advocate or preach the theory of the vanguard party
is to continue slander of Leninism.” In another essay, ’Lenin and the Problem,’
written in the following year (1964), James also points out that Lenin recognized the
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historically imposed limits on the capabilities of the Russian proletariat of the time,
and admitted that certain tasks remained beyond its capability: “[Lenin] always
believed and often said that any serious and notable change . . . came from the
proletariat or from the masses, . . . [but] in the face of the threatening catastrophe
[in 1920] of all he had worked for, he faced the fact that what was required the
proletariat could not do” (James 1992e, 328). The logic of necessity, then, may
prevent the actualization of a contingent demand or desideratum when the dialectic
cannot accommodate it.
In the last paragraph of ’Lenin and the Vanguard Party’, James ends with an un-
expected comparison between Shakespeare and Lenin: “Who should govern, what
he should aim at, what philosophy of society he should adopt, what should be a
political leader’s personal philosophy in a time of revolution,. . . on all this and the
exposition of it, Shakespeare stands second to none . . . . He is surprisingly close
to Lenin” (James 1992e, 344). Workers’ and peasants’ power in the Russian revo-
lution, for James, is a self-organizing power that constituted itself into the Soviets,
a process which, by “opening out immense new opportunities for the immense new
responsibilities placed on the proletariat” and Lenin, in this reading, becomes for
James the master dialectician able to read the mutually reinforcing interplay of the
contingent revolutionary will of the masses with the necessary logic of the “tasks the
revolution and only the revolution could accomplish” (James 1992e, 328). “Lenin”,
for James, thus seems to become the trope that affords a privileged locus of insight
into the political at a time of revolutionary change – just like Shakespeare. It is not
a coincidence, perhaps, that by comparing Lenin with Shakespeare, James implicitly
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privileges the theater as the site of the clearest possible expression of this dialectic
of necessity and contingency.
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Chapter 4
Dialectics and the future of the
past
The question that I want to pose in this chapter is: if we read Tagore and James
as writers who think dialectically, is there a dialectic that is common to both of
them? And if so, what may such a dialectic be like? I will argue in this chapter
that a dialectic that both Tagore and James share is a dialectic without a telos, and,
further, that this dialectic works itself out in the form of the trope of prolepsis –
hermeneutics with such a dialectic is like constructing a present from various possible
futures of the past. Alain Badiou and Slavoj Z̆iz̆ek will help us in the explication
of this problematic, which we will develop in this chapter. In ‘Towards Dialectical
Criticism,’ the concluding chapter of Fredric Jameson’s Marxism and Form, Jameson
broaches the possibility of a new Hegelian hermeneutic that can transcend Marxist
hermeneutics as commonly understood. This dialectic is predicated on the concept of
“inner form,” and traces its origin by way of Goethe and Wilhelm von Humboldt. As
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Jameson defines it, inner form is the hermeneutic concept of the text as an ordered
sequence of levels, with the text grounded in social reality:
. . . [W]e must reformulate our notion of inner form after the more com-
plex model of a hierarchy of motivations, in which the various elements
of the work are ordered at various levels from the surface, and serve so
to speak as pretexts each for the existence of a deeper one, so that in the
long run everything in the work exists in order to bring to expression that
deepest level of the work which is the concrete itself (Jameson 1974).
While this formulation seems undoubtedly teleological, it is nevertheless a peculiar
kind of teleology. What the expression of this logic reveals is not some yet-unreached
end-point or telos, but the kernel of concrete social reality which is at the core of
the process of unfolding. The dialectic of this hermeneutic that Jameson imagines
works its way backward instead of forward. It is as if we were working our way
backward, like a biologist, to discover the genetic structure of an organism from
studying its biological development, except that the kernel here is a social, rather
than an individual, reality – behind the phenomenal form of the text there is a social
content.
This hermeneutic, then, does not admit of the free expressivity of conatus that the
Spinoza-tinged reading of Marx by Antonio Negri asks us to privilege by downplaying
structural relations for the sake of emphasizing the free play of productive forces.
A hypothetical Negrian hermeneutic would perhaps consist of merely tracing the
highly contingent (in this view) processes through which content shapes itself into
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new forms and re-dissolves into new content, with form and content losing their
categorial distinction, being as they are (in this view) part of the one and the same
substance. We also looked at the idea (albeit only as it pertained to content, not
form) of the Beckettian notion of “failing better” (a phrase that Z̆iz̆ek has elevated
almost to the status of a slogan), in which, too, successive interventions do not add up
to a teleology of totality, but, rather, each intervention represents a possible “future
history” of the past.
Contrary to common misunderstanding, neither Hegel nor Marx subscribed to the
popularly understood, somewhat reductive, dialectical schema of thesis-antithesis-
synthesis – which owes itself more to Fichte rather than to either Hegel or Marx.
Hegel’s dialectic, which Marx drew upon for his own purposes, is notoriously difficult
and obscure, and yet we find that no less a practical thinker as Lenin delved into
it for guidance on the eve of his participation in the tumultuous events of the 1917
revolution. Lenin, living in Switzerland after the revolution of 1905, embarked upon a
prolonged and sustained study of Hegel and the dialectical method. What motivated
Lenin to return to dialectics was his intention to combat the dominance of neo-
Kantianism in European universities, and, through them, its influence on socialism
as expressed in the influence of Eduard Bernstein of the Second International; Lenin’s
reading of Hegel goes beyond a critique of positivist epistemology and attacks the
normative component of neo-Kantianism by reading real norms into the physical
world. To thus read norms into the physical world is a proleptic act, in the same
way that Jameson’s assertion that “everything in the work exists in order to bring
to expression that deepest level of the work which is the concrete itself,” is, itself,
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the description of a prolepsis.
In Marx’s labor theory of value, we can discern the dialectical working out of a
very similar prolepsis, where real norms, in the shape of exchange value, which
is normative, are ultimately a dialectical expression of the ultimate source of all
value, or “inner form” of value, namely the use value of the worker’s labor-power
as exerted in the physical world. Marx develops another instance of this idea of
expression in ‘The Method of Political Economy’ section of the Grundrisse, where
he remarks:
Bourgeois society is the most developed and the most complex historic
organization of production. The categories which express its relations,
the comprehension of its structure, thereby also allows insights into the
structure and the relations of production of all the vanished social for-
mations out of whose ruins and elements it built itself up, whose partly
still unconquered remnants are carried along within it, whose mere nu-
ances have developed explicit significance within it, etc. Human anatomy
contains a key to the anatomy of the ape. . . . The so-called historical
presentation of development is founded, as a rule, on the fact that the
latest form regards the previous ones as steps leading up to itself, and,
since it is only rarely and only under quite specific conditions able to
criticize itself . . . . (Marx 1973, 105).
Can we not, in this remarkable passage, too, discern the hints of a prolepsis? Marx
here describes “the historical presentation of development” as “so-called” and states
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that “the latest form” merely regards “the previous ones as steps leading up to it-
self.” The later form “conceives of” the previous forms “one-sidedly,” Marx says
here – that is, it conceives of them mistakenly (or at least incompletely) when it
does so in a determinate, teleological, “leading-up-toitself” way. We can perhaps
think of this view of history as a critique of what we would, today, call developmen-
talism or stagism. This critique starts to resemble the process of the construction
of future histories of the past through successive instances of “failing better” rather
than any determinate telelogy. In his essay “Dialectical Materialism,” James talks
(in a way that sounds rather deterministic) about “the inevitability of socialism”
(James 1992c). But if we read the essay closely, we discover in it the presence of
a different, non-teleological notion of the dialectic. In the essay, James approvingly
quotes Lenin’s remark:
it is precisely the revolutionary periods that are distinguished for their
greater breadth, greater wealth, greater intelligence, greater and more
systematic activity, greater audacity and vividness of historical creative-
ness...
James comments about this passage: “this is creative reason”. Thus, James privileges
activity over structuring relations, or in other words, he privileges productive forces
over structure – in a way that might well remind us of Negri. In another passage
in the same essay, James again denies the certainty of teleological ends to activity
when he writes, “men seek not intellectual certainty. The quest is the mass quest for
universality in action and in life.” Activity, then, is itself a quest rather than a means
to an end. Dave Renton has argued that “it would have seemed clear to James and
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his allies” that Hegel’s dialectical method provided Lenin, during the period before
the October Revolution, with the wherewithal to escape isolation and resignation
to a deterministically viewed inevitability of inaction, and to focus on the creative
possibility of a dialectical leap (Renton 2007, 106). Renton points specifically to
an insight that Lenin obtained (and recorded in his notebook) as having influenced
James when the latter was writing his Notes on Dialectics:
In reading [Hegel’s] On Quality in the Doctrine of Being, Lenin writes in
very large writing LEAP. LEAP. LEAP. LEAP. LEAP. ... Hegel is bored
to tears at people who keep looking for signs and “the mere magnitudinal”
as proof ... Lenin did not fasten on this for nothing. He said, “Turn
the Imperialist War into Civil War.” . . . He didn’t have to wait to
see anything. That was there. It would LEAP up. [capitalized in the
original.] (Renton 2002, 140).
For both James and for Tagore, a dialectic of form and content marks a turn to
the form of a theatrical play: this is a creative leap afforded by dialectical thought.
Halfway through writing his non-fiction, historical, account of the slave rebellion in
San Domingo, titled The Black Jacobins, James wrote a play about the same subject
(also titled The Black Jacobins). Tagore, during the latter half of his life, started
experimenting with the play form. How can we explain this turn towards the per-
formative on the part of both Tagore and James? Jameson, citing Adorno on music
as a point of reference, has argued that the “profound vocation of the work of art
in a commodity society” is precisely to “not be a commodity, not to be consumed”
(Jameson 1974, 395). To the extent that writing is also a mode of production, the
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text intended for “consumption” only in performance has use value but does not
have exchange value. And to the extent that use consists of activity, the activity of
performance, the consecrating of a text as meant for performance alone, enacts 21
what Jameson has described as “the struggle between” art “and the commodity form
itself”.22 It is perhaps not too difficult to imagine that, by writing about the histori-
cally very first form of commodified production (plantation slavery) and by stressing
the resistance to that form of production as a self-organized resistance directed by
the slaves’ own agency as expressed through their actions, James found a performa-
tive modality, that of the theater, to be a necessary supplement to the literary prose
in which he was writing his historical account of this rebellion. The modality of the
theatrical account and that of the narrative account together constitute two tiers,
or registers, of communication. Likewise, the diglossia in the discourse of Toussaint
L’Ouverture (noted by James in The Black Jacobins) operates almost similarly. The
literary French of Toussaint’s public pronouncements and proclamations, composed
with the help of his aides, and his own native Creole tongue (a non-written lan-
guage which, therefore, existed only within a space of performance) which he used to
communicate with other insurgent slaves, constituted a two-tiered mode of linguistic
production. Given that Toussaint seems to represent James’ own aspirational alter
ego, that is, the kind of revolutionary James himself wanted to be, it is also signifi-
cant that Toussaint’s dual modality of linguistic register (one performative and the
21Dave Renton, whose new biography of James is subtitled Cricket’s Philosopher King, has made
an interesting argument that James’ lifelong attraction for sport, especially cricket, originated from
the fact that cricket had a message of “potential militancy”. One could also point out that sport,
like theater, is performative.
22Jameson, Fredric. Marxism and Form: Twentieth-century Dialectical Theories of Literature.
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974. p. 395.
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other, less so) should echo James’ own employment of a dual modality of generic
form – a play (performative) and a history (less so) – in narrating the story of Tou-
ssaint. In addition, perhaps, we can think of the opposition between exchange value
and use value, which parallels the opposition, in the socio-historical plane, between
commodified production and self-activity. It may not be too much of a stretch to
map this opposition, although perhaps somewhat loosely, to the opposition between
two different registers of language and style, that we just discussed. All these three
oppositions can perhaps be comprehended within the terms of a common dialecti-
cal framework. In the case of Tagore’s plays, a very similar argument also applies:
Tagore wrote his plays for performance, with himself and his students at Shantinike-
tan as both actors and audience. His plays were, thus, a form of self-activity, in
a way that his other writings (with the exception of his poetry23 ), intended for an
audience beyond his immediate circle, were not. Tagore’s plays (and, to some extent,
his poems), then, exist entirely in a performative space constituted by the pure use
value of self-activity, in a way that his other writings, intended definitively for the
consumption by an audience beyond his immediate circle, were not. While James, as
a student of Hegel’s writings and as a revolutionary Marxist, was keenly interested in
dialectics, Tagore does not seem to have evinced much interest in Hegel’s or in Marx’s
philosophical writings at all. (As we have noted earlier, Tagore’s interest in Marxism
was expressed only peripherally, in the admiring essays of Russia-r Chithi [‘Letters
from Russia’] written during his tour of the Soviet Union in the 1920s.) However, a
reading of Tagore’s writings as a social and literary critic shows that that his prac-
23Tagore’s poems (many of which were also songs) were also often written with this performative
aspect in mind, and were sung by his students at Shantiniketan.
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tice of criticism was dialectical in spirit. His essay ’Batayaniker Patra’ [’Letter from
a Window-Dweller’], published in 1919, and later included in his volume of essays
Kalantar [Transition] provides an intriguing example of this practice. In Section 4 of
this long essay, Tagore sets out to discuss the Mangal-kavya [Mangal-poetry] litera-
ture of Bengal, composed during the Middle Ages, which consists of long narrative
poems extolling the lesser-known goddesses Manasa, Chandi and others, who are
conceived as manifestations of the primal goddess-figure Shakti. The paradigmatic
form of these narratives consists of the humiliation and the displacement of the god
Shiva – and protagonists in the narratives that initially worship Shiva – by the ruth-
less cunning of the goddess-figure. The conventional socio-historical reading of the
Mangal-kavyas is that they are a literary allegory of the progressive “indigenization”
of society. In the paradigmatic Mangal-kavya story, Shiva, a Vedic god, is displaced
by a local, indigenous goddess of a distinctly non-Aryan and non-Vedic origin. How-
ever, in this essay, Tagore reads these poems in an entirely novel way. Situating
his reading on a metaphysical plane and yet grounding it in socio-historical mate-
riality, Tagore performs a reading that is recognizably dialectical. Observing that
these poems were written at a time when, in Bengal, Buddhism had declined, no
centralized power existed, and predatory invasions were rife, Tagore considers these
poems as having been written in a society in which structures of power and stability
were breaking down. Establishing an equation between Shiva and the Buddha by
identifying both as benign, unworldly “outsider” figures, he reads the supplanting of
Shiva in these poems by the various goddess-figures as re-enacting the substitution
of stable, predictable ordered life by the unpredictability of an anarchic social and
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political condition marked by interventions of irrational violence and terror. Then,
in a dialectical move that shifts the terrain from the socio-historical particular to
the ontological universal, Tagore draws a parallel between the terror perpetrated by
colonialism and imperialism, on the one hand, and the terror that he diagnoses as
having been at the heart of the pitiful acceptance of the malevolent power of the
goddess-figures with which the Mangal poems typically conclude. The literary, thus,
for Tagore, is not a mere reflection of the sociohistoric, but consists of a dialecti-
cal working out of connections in a processual way, based on universal categories
such as power and terror. In a striking metaphor that concludes the essay, Tagore
evinces a dialectician’s understanding that the unfolding of history not only occurs
in response to externalities, but can also be read as an expression of its own inner,
systemic forces:
When the hold of a ship fills up with water, it is then that the buffets of
water from the outside on the ship become unbearable. The water that is
inside is not visible, nor is its movement that fierce; it works by its weight,
not by blows delivered from the outside. One can feel content to blame
the blows landed by waves from the outside, but unless one wants to die,
one needs to recognize that the real death is lurking in all that water that
is there inside the hold of the ship, not the water that is outside, and it
is that water that needs to be bailed out. . . [my translation] (Tagore
1961a, 289).
Tagore, thus, conceives of history as the unfolding of a dialectic. It is a dialectic which
does not lead to a determinate end but works itself out over time in an open-ended
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way. The terrified capitulation – he uses the metaphor of bowing one’s head – to
the raw power of disorder that he identifies as the socio-historic moment bound with
the literary moment of the Mangal-kavyas, recurs again, he says, in the moment
of colonialism. These capitulations, Tagore asserts, constitute points of failure of
human agency, at which the deficit of purposive human agency leads to an eclipse
of freedom. Tagore, thus, looks at history in the form of an open-ended dialectic in
which human agency not only has a place but is, in fact, central. The deepest level,
the “concrete itself” (Jameson 1974, 319). that is at the core of this dialectical
process, is open to human agency and intervention; human activity can “bail it out,”
opening up the dialectic to the possibility – though by no means the certainty – of
freedom: the possibility to fail better.
If it does make sense to read Tagore as a dialectical thinker thinking in terms of an
open-ended dialectic, it is pertinent to ask how we should characterize this dialectic.
Is this dialectic idealist or materialist? In another long essay, ‘Satyer Ahvan’ [’The
Call of Truth’], from the same collection of essays, Kalantar, Tagore seems to take
a stance which, on a superficial reading, seems closer to an idealist position than a
materialist one. He writes:
Independence (self-rule) is not founded only on self-sufficiency of clothing.
Its true foundation is in our minds, the mind that, by its multiple powers
[bahudha-shakti] and its confidence in its own power, can create self-rule.
[my translation] (Tagore 1961a, 302).
107
While such an emphasis on “mind” might initially suggest a rather simplistic vol-
untarist position, in which the locus of human agency is situated squarely in the
“mind” rather than in a dialectical give-and-take with the world and its materiality,
the mention of “multiple powers” already begins to suggest that something differ-
ent is afoot – that multiple, distinct moments are likely to be implicated as sites
for the action of these multiple powers. Agency, thus, already starts to acquire a
complex, dialectical character in this passage. The subsequent lines foreground this
even more:
In no country [desh] has this creation of independence come to an end; in
all countries, a state of unfreedom has persisted in some section [angsha]
or the other, at the behest of greed or fantasy. But the cause of that
unfreedom is in the mind of men. ...In our country, too, it will be on the
basis of the efflorescence of the mind that self-rule will be able to stand.
No external action [bahya kriya] and no external effect [bahya phal] is
needed for this – knowledge and science [gnan-bignan] is what is needed.
[my translation]
Contrary to the impression that a superficial reading of this passage might convey
to the effect that the working out of this dialectic is purely interiorized or even
solipsistic, the reference to “knowledge and science” establishes a relationship of
cognitive interplay with the materiality of the world in which this dialectic of freedom
is embedded. Tagore conceives of the journey to freedom as the expression of a
freedom already encoded in the (collective) mind of men, and he conceives of its
realization as an efflorescence, that is, an expression, of that encoding. What we
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have here, then, is the working out of a dialectic.
A few paragraphs later in this essay, the dialectical logic of Tagore’s thinking becomes
even clearer. We see the movement in Tagore’s thought from the particular to the
universal, and from local causality to a dispersed and dialectical causality:
The inauguration of India today is a part [anga] of the inauguration of
the entire world. The trumpets of a world war have opened the gates
of a new era. In the Mahabharata, we have read that the era just prior
to that of self-revelation is the era of living-concealed [agnata-bas]. For
some time now, in spite of it becoming clear that all the people in the
world have become very intimately connected to each other, this fact had
remained concealed. This was occurring outside, but had not entered our
minds. Then, when all the people of the world became agitated by the
sudden blow of war, this fact could no longer remain hidden... it then
became understood that this trembling was neither localized in time nor
localized in space, but had a cause that spanned the entire world. [my
translation] (Tagore 1961a, 304).
What role does Tagore see for human agency in this dialectic? In subsequent lines,
he uses the phrase “world-oriented disposition” [vishwa-mukhi brtti] to denote such
agency. He writes:
. . . [F]rom now on, the thoughts that each nation [desh] must think
would have to have a world-encompassing field [kshetra]... a great cog-
nitive transformation is occurring in Man, his mind is passing from the
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narrow to fullness [bhuma].24
This cognitive transformation, then, for Tagore, represents both the cunning of Rea-
son achieving its movement towards self-realization and self-discovery, but through a
process that is ineluctably mediated by the awareness of a worldencompassing field
of alterity or otherness that is materially cognized, and as a structural part of which
the self comes to recognize itself in a dialectical trajectory. The openness of this
dialectic derives from its awareness of, and embeddedness in, the otherness of the
world.
James’ understanding of the dialectic of history is by and large similar. In The Black
Jacobins, the moment of rupture (which we can perhaps call the moment of kalantar,
or epochal transition, to use the title of Tagore’s collection of essays) is the French
Revolution – much as the Second World War is for Tagore in the passage we looked
at. In James’ reading of history, it is the onset of the events of the French Revolution
that makes the slaves in San Domingo aware that they are a part of a world-historical
process. As intellectuals from the colonized world this is where Tagore and James
evince a remarkable similarity with each other in their writings in spite of not having
been familiar with each other’s work.
24Tagore here uses the term bhuma, a Sanskrit word which occurs in the Chhandogya Upanishad,
where Narada asks Sanatkumara, “What do the great rishis say of this Infinite?” Sanatkumara
replies to Narada: “So I say once again that bhuma, the fullness, is bliss. How can you enter into
this bhuma unless you know what bhuma is? You must, therefore, know what fullness is ...Where
one sees nothing except one’s own self, where one hears nothing except one’s own self, where one
understands nothing except one’s own self, that is bhuma; and where one sees something outside
oneself, where one hears something outside oneself, where one understands or thinks something
outside oneself, that is the finite.”
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As a writer, James was always interested in, and looking for, connection and inte-
gration. Frank Rosengarten notes that “[o]ne of James’ finest achievements in The
Black Jacobins is the mastery with which he connects events in Europe, especially in
France, with the course of revolutionary developments in Haiti (Rosengarten 2008,
231).
This search for connection and pattern is intimately related, I suggest, to his ten-
dency to think dialectically. It is probably not a coincidence, for example, that James
embraces the dialectical tradition in Greek philosophy: Rosengarten believes that
“James found in Aristotle a confirmation of his own tendency to seek order, pattern,
meaning and direction in all phenomena” (Rosengarten 2008, 191). Interestingly
enough, in Notes on Dialectics: Hegel, Marx, Lenin James adopts a colloquial and
informal writing style, expressing very complicated ideas in an accessible way. Rosen-
garten attributes James’ stylistic choice in this book to James’ express wish that the
book be approachable by ordinary workers. (James used to have Johnny Zupan, a
self-educated worker belonging to James’ political group, the Johnson-Forest ten-
dency, read the drafts of the book in order to help James find a language suitable
for ordinary workers (Rosengarten 2008, 75).) So here again, then, much like the
Toussaint L’Ouverture of The Black Jacobins who speaks Creole to his fellow liber-
ated slaves and yet reads French classics in the original, we find James himself to
be adept with two different stylistic registers: that of high philosophy, in which he
grapples with Hegel, and the everyday life-world of ordinary workers whom he hopes
to reach.
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James’ interpretation and understanding of dialectics leads him, I will show, to some-
thing approaching the proleptic trope which I have called, after Z̆iz̆ek“failing better.”
In Notes on Dialectics, James singles out Lenin as the leading political thinker who
had imbibed Hegel’s dialectical method and who was, therefore, well-positioned to
both understand Marxism fully and deeply, and to interpret unfolding events in terms
of their place within the dialectics of history. The paradigmatic example of this, for
James, is Lenin’s correct diagnosis of the political situation in 1914, when the Second
International led by Eduard Bernstein and Karl Kautsky ended up with the social-
democratic leaders of individual European countries backing their own respective
countries’ nationalistic ambitions rather than forge a common working-class unity
across nation-states. In a striking turn of phrase, James, in describing the situation,
talks about “Thinking Reason” “now looking back [emphasis added] and sharpening
the contradictions” between the social-democratic labor aristocracy and “the real
masses.” Lenin, James avers, was able to perceive Reason’s “looking back” in this
manner because of his mastery of dialectics; not only that, Lenin, he believes, was
also able to look forward as a result of the same mastery: “In another article, one
of his finest, he [Lenin] said that ... where it [this contradiction] had not appeared
yet, it was going to appear [emphasis added]” (James 1948, 1980, 115). Lenin,
in other words, was proleptically reconstructing alternative futures for the past – in
this case, the very recent past. In this dialectical understanding of history of which,
James believes, Lenin had a complete mastery, not only was there room, however, for
spontaneity and human agency, but spontaneity was in fact, James seems to believe,
absolutely central to it. James writes:
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Each stage of the concept, organization, therefore has as its opposite the
corresponding stage of its opposite, spontaneity, (and all this is the result
of vast objective forces.). That was the essence of leninism. Each con-
cept had the concept of its opposite within itself. And the Communist
International did not aim at the organization that the Second Interna-
tional aimed at. It was organization for spontaneity, i.e. For the socialist
revolution (James 1948, 1980, 117).
James then continues, suggesting that organization, one pole of the dialectic, now
needs to be overcome and must cede its place to spontaneity:
That we have seen as Actuality. Organization, as we have known it,
has served its purpose. It was a purpose reflecting the proletariat in
bourgeois society. The new organization, the new organism, will begin
with spontaneity, i.e. free creative activity, as its necessity (James 1948,
1980, 118).
Interestingly, in his interpretation of dialectics, James stresses that there does not
exist any inconsistency between necessity and spontaneity. In a characteristically
(for this book) staccato and colloquial set of sentences, he states earlier in the book
(in connection with Hegel’s Doctrine of Essence):
That is something vital. Self-movement. Spontaneous activity. We shall
meet them again. You wait. This is what we must hold on to, grasp,
“unveil, purify”... This movement, activity, spontaneous, internally nec-
essary [emphasis added] (James 1948, 1980, 101).
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Structure (internal necessity) and agency (spontaneity), in this formulation, are thus
seen to be a dialectical unity. It is this emphasis on the unity of opposites of structure
and agency that affords James a way to stress (as we have already seen him do) the
“autonomous” role of black people in the revolutionary movement, and to find the
protagonists of the Haitian revolution in The Black Jacobins as autonomous colonial
subjects making history on their own as well as playing their part in the unfolding
of history as part of a narrative inextricably linked to the French revolution in the
metropole. We noticed a very similar dynamic at work in Tagore, who, too, identified
internal processes as the cause of systemic change and yet was protective of the idea
of the importance of the autonomy of the human subject. We see this emphasis on
the dialectical quality of internal dynamics and interconections, repeated elsewhere
in James’ writing. For example, here is James writing on the Martinican poet Aimé
Césaire:
He has made a union of the African sphere of existence with existence in
the western world; The past of mankind and the future of mankind are
historically and logically linked; No longer from external stimulus but
from their own self-generated and independent being and motion will
Africa and Africans move towards an integrated humanity (James 1992g,
304).
One of James’ close associates in the Johnson-Forest tendency (and later also in the
Facing Reality group), Grace Lee Boggs, however, severely criticizes James for what
she believes is an example of James’ failure to think dialectically. In a 2005 interview
Boggs remarks:
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I remember how he [James] would declaim passages like, “The proletariat
is revolutionary or it is nothing.” What is the meaning of the word “is” in
that sentence? It’s like defining what is real by your definitions. . . . It’s
that kind of circular thinking that was very much in the thinking of CLR
and to some degree in Marx. . . . It’s simplistic thinking. . . But that’s
not the way the world is. The world is changing all the time. That’s
the first principle of dialectics. . . . CLR always criticized the fixed
notions of everybody else, especially Trotsky, but never questioned his
own fixed notions in regards to Marxism. . . . While the working class
was constantly changing, CLR was still holding fast to Marx’s idea of
the working class organized and disciplined by the process of production
itself (Boggs 2005).
How are we to read this “failure” of James? Did he indeed become a prisoner of
the dialectic, consigning himself to a tautological misprision of fixed, unchanging
method? Instead of focusing on the word “is” in this sentence, however, what if
we focus on the word “revolutionary” instead? We would perhaps then begin to
see that James is not, in fact, constricting the notion of “proletariat” into a too-
tightly-fitting conceptual box. If we understand “revolution” in a Negrian sense,
that is as Spinozian “striving” or conatus – the striving of strength to exist toward
more and more communitarian configurations of life” (Negri 1999, 322-23). – the
non-tautological truth of the assertion that “the proletariat is revolutionary or it is
nothing” becomes evident. Given that the proletariat is engaged in production, and
it being the case that production is by its very nature social, the proletariat cannot
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but be revolutionary (in the above sense of “revolution”) – unless, that is, it ceases
to exist. In this way, then, reading James in a Negrian mode helps provide us with
an understanding of how one of the apparently “fixed” categories in his dialectical
method, when applied to thinking about revolution, are in fact not “fixed” or “un-
changing”. does, However, even if we read James in such a way, his conceptualization
of the “proletariat” still seems a prior, fixed category. However, if we turn our at-
tention to a rather remarkable observation by James in his book Facing Reality, tha
the task of the revolutionary is not to lead but to “recognize and record,” – in other
words, the same tasks as that of the writer. Loren Goldner, writing about James’
Johnson-Forest Tendency years, remarks:
His view was at antipodes from the formulations of the early Lenin in
What Is To Be Done? (1903), according to which revolutionary intellec-
tuals bring class consciousness to workers, the latter being incapable of
going beyond trade-union consciousness without such an intervention. .
. .James argued later that Lenin himself had “recognized and recorded”
the Russian soviets of 1905, and that the task of revolutionaries in the
present was similarly to recognize forms of struggle and organization,and
to provide a press in which the tensions of the present could be argued
out among different currents of workers.25
It is not too much of a stretch to argue that this task of recording and recognizing
(and the task of providing the workers with the means of recording and recognizing)
25Goldner, Loren. ‘Introduction to the Johnson-Forest Tendency and the Background to “Facing
Reality”.’ Preface to the German translation of ’Facing Reality 45 Years Later’. April 2004. Web.
4 Sept. 2010. http://home.earthlink.net/~lrgoldner/johnson.html
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is, in fact, nothing but the task of writing and of literature. Thinking about it
in this way enables us to understand how the new and the unexpected can make
their appearance beyond a conceptually closed world of categories. Tony Bennett
suggests, following the Russian formalist Viktor Shklovsky, that literature “creates
a ‘vision’ of the object instead of serving as a means for knowing it.” Literature
does not “organize the world conceptually”; instead, it does its exact opposite: it
“disorganizes the forms through which the world is customarily perceived, opening
up a kind of chink through which the world displays to view new and unexpected
aspects” (Bennett 2003, 20). I am suggesting that this opening up of (perceptual
and conceptual) forms by the literary, by the act of recognizing and recording, is
precisely what keeps categories that are implicated in the dialectical understanding of
the world, fluid and mutable, so that the dialectic leads into an unpredictable, open-
ended, future teeming with newness. To the extent that it is the acts of recognizing
and recording – acts that look towards the past – that are involved in this production
of the future, this work of creating alternative futures for the past has a proleptic
quality.
Tagore comes close to expressing a similar view of the work that poetry [kabya] does
in an essay titled ‘Kabyer Abastha Paribartan’ [‘Change of State of Poetry’], included
in his 1894 collection of essays bearing, simply, the title ‘Samalochana’ [‘Criticism’],
suggest, is a similar view of the work that poetry [kabya] does. Tagore seems to
suggest in this essay that poetry makes the world new by disorganizing it in the
imagination. He first describes what he believes to be a tendency that exists in the
world of nature for hierarchies to proliferate over time. Over time, the material world
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becomes more and more structured, Tagore writes, as the primordial mass of matter
condenses into galaxies and then into planetary systems, and finally into the world of
living forms. For the latter, too, the same tendency for ever increasing structuration
operates: there is “division of labor [shramabibhag] and the world is “more clarified,
more developed” (Tagore 1961a, 326). This, then, is a stagist, determinate ontogeny
in which forms become ever more structured and differentiated. In the essay, Tagore
then translates this schema of ever-increasing order and structure into the sphere
of the literary, pointing out an analogy: poetic forms, he writes, undergo a similar
evolution in historical time, starting with the compendious, amorphous quality of the
epic poem and progressing to the strongly marked individuation and differentiation
of individual lyric poems. He then draws an analogy between this tendency towards
ever more defined forms and ever increasing light dispelling the chaotic formless-
ness of darkness. In a stunning reversal, he then challenges this comforting vision,
pointing out that light cannot, however, ultimately accomplish anything other than
“making the darkness more visible.” The apparent increase in structure, order and
organization of the world is illusory, as each new form only highlights the endless
variations of it that could possibly exist, and will exist in the future – as if the forms
already apprehended (and the capacity that already exists to apprehend them) only
throw into sharper relief the vastness of all that remains unknown. Poetry, Tagore
says, is paradigmatic of this disorganization because it “arouses [udrek kore] in the
mind a multiplicity of feelings [bhab]” (Tagore 1961a, 327). For Tagore, then, po-
etry, thus, disorganizes (the word he uses is bishrinkhal; literally: “unchains”) our
developmentalist complacency by bringing us inklings of many possible futures. The
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present, in such a view, would no longer be a given, but rather become a work in
progress – actively forged, woven or constructed with the elements borrowed from an
infinity of possible futures.
Such a process consists of the act of selecting and naming. We have seen previously
that a reading informed by Negri’s emphasis on the Spinozian conatus, the striving,
productive aspect of life, led to insightful (even if, in the final instance, not fully
adequate) readings of Tagore. For all its inadequacy, the usefulness of a Negrian
reading for our purposes may be that it could help us, in reading, to “unfix” the
fixity of categories that James may have overly and unnecessarily reified. To carry
out such a reading, one must be attuned to the contingency that actually underlies
the processes of naming and selection. Badiou’s explanation that ontology begins
with the “pure uttering of an arbitrary proper name [emphasis added]”26 helps us
to further see the contingency that underlies this process of naming and selection.
For Badiou ontological categories, then, are, in a fundamental sense, arbitrary and
hence unfixed. This inherent arbitrariness of categories, for Badiou, seems to be an
explanation of how, in his ontology, the new can arise. Badiou, however, opposes
the notion of any negativity in the act, and hence, unlike as in Hegel, the negative is
not the source of the new for him, ever. Z̆iz̆ek has pointed out how this opposition,
on the part of Badiou, to the notion of the act as negative in any way, leads to
an inconsistency when Badiou does in fact locate the historical significance of failed
revolutions, such as the Cultural Revolution in China, in the “negative gesture of
signaling the end of the party-state.” The negative, thus, in spite of Badiou’s profes-
26Badiou, Alain. Étre et Evenement. Paris: Seuil, 1988. p. 72.
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sion to the contrary, does in fact carry out a significant work in Badiou’s ontology,
insofar as, by signifying the end of something, they cannot but also signify the be-
ginning of something else. Z̆iz̆ek’s writing suggests, however, that this deficiency in
Badiou’s logic can however be redressed if negation is admitted into Badiou’s notion
of the act in the form of a Hegelian “positing of presuppositions”: “the hard work of
liberation retroactively forms its own presupposition,” because the utopian dreams
themselves must be (re)constructed, in addition to changing reality to realize those
utopian dreams. We can thus rethink Badiou’s notion of the act in a way in which
negativity does indeed play a role: the dreams that go into the making of the act
must themselves constantly be negated in order for the act to be taking place. Z̆iz̆ek
writes:
It is only this reference to what happens after the revolution, to the
“morning after”, that allows us to distinguish between pathetic libertar-
ian outbursts and true revolutionary upheavals: the former “lose their
energy” when one has to start the prosaic work of social reconstruction.
In contrast, recall the immense creativity of the [French Revolution and
the Bolshevik Revolution], with the enthusiastic urge to invent new rules
for quotidian existence. . . (Z̆iz̆ek 2008, 196).
Z̆iz̆ek hypothesizes, further, that “an Event is necessarily missed the first time, so
that true fidelity is only possible in the form of resurrection” (Z̆iz̆ek 2008, 387).
A corollary to this is that emancipatory struggles will always have a proleptic ele-
ment:
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“[H]istory is a series of possible outcomes, possibility has priority over
actuality, there is a surplus in it beyond its actualization, the spark that
persists underground, so that the very immediate failure of emancipatory
attempts signals to those who harbor future revolutionary aspirations
that they should be repeatedmore radically, more comprehensively (Z̆iz̆ek
2008, 394).
So, not surprisingly, for Z̆iz̆ek, the “specifically communist form of patience” is “not
just patient waiting for the movement when radical change will explode in a man-
ner reminiscent of what systems theory calls an “emergent property”; it is also the
patience of losing the battles in order to win the final fight” (Z̆iz̆ek 2008, 392).
A novel reading of Tagore’s play Achalayatan [‘The Unmoving Volume’] is possible
in the light of this quasi-proleptic account of emancipatory struggles, As I had sum-
marized in a preceding chapter, the play narrates the story of a tightly sealed edifice
(the “unmoving volume” of the title) and its denizens, who have given themselves
over to a desiccated life dedicated to the following of meaningless ritualistic practices
and live in terror of violating any of the myriad of draconian and senseless laws that
govern their daily existence. Moreover, they live in the hope that the founder of
the institution (referred to in the play simply as Guru), who had left the building
many years ago, would return one day. The sole exception to the rule-followers in
the building is the rebellious young man, Panchak (the brother of Mahapanchak, the
chief discipline-enforcer in the building) who subverts the building’s iron discipline at
every opportunity, and is the only person in the building who is skeptical that Guru
would have preferred them to live under such a regime of meaningless rule-following
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drudgery. Their obsessive dedication to blind rule-following is in order to ensure
that they continue to enjoy what they assume will indubitably be Guru’s approval if
and when he returns. They have convinced themselves that this blind rulefollowing
mode is exactly how Guru would wish them to live. When Guru finally arrives, he
breaks down the wall of the building with a thunderous assault and presents himself
to the surprised and bewildered denizenry of the building. He turns out to have been
Dadathakur, an elderly man who lived outside the building with social outcasts and
had been friendly to Panchak, encouraging him in his subversive activities all along.
Guru and the astonished inhabitants then have the following conversation:
Mahapanchak: Upadhyay, is this Guru?
Updhayay: That is what I am hearing.
Mahapanchak: Are you our Guru?
Dadathakur: Yes. You will not recognize me. But I am indeed your
Guru.
Mahapanchak: You are Guru? Then why do you come dressed as our
enemy?
Dadathakur: But such is the dress of the Guru. So that you will do battle
with me. The battle will be the Guru’s welcome. [my translation]
Does not Panchak, losing his battles endlessly against the oppressive order, and who
hasd been waiting patiently for Guru, embody what Z̆iz̆ek, as we saw earlier, calls
“communist patience”? Unable to recognize Guru in his earlier interactions with
him (whom he had “missed the first time”), just as, as we saw, for Z̆iz̆ek “an event is
necessarily missed the first time.” Again, in a Z̆iz̆ekian twist, Panchak is faithful to
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Guru on the latter’s second coming in warrior mode, that is, on his “resurrection.”
The play ends with Guru leading the rabble of outcasts whom Panchak and he used
to consort with in his days as Dadathakur, in now rebuilding the destroyed building.
We had, in an earlier chapter, conceptualized this as a metaphorical iteration in
the endless cycle of constitutive power turning itself into constituted power – to
be undone again at a future time and to be built up again. While such a reading
is consistent with a Negri-inspired conceptualization, a different reading of the end
of the play is also possible. Here, again, Z̆iz̆ek proves to be helpful. Z̆iz̆ek has
remarthat “contemporary philosophers as different as” Badiou and Negri “share the
premise that the era of party-state politics in which the ultimate aim is to take
control of the state apparatus is over – from now on, politics should subtract itself
from the domain of the state. . .” (Z̆iz̆ek 2008, 406). Badiou had suggested that the
party-state model of revolution is passé, and that a new form of politics, the politics
of subtraction, is now needed, in which politics will be “at a distance from the state:”
“[a subtraction] is no longer dependent on the dominant laws of the political reality of
a situation. . . .We need an “originary subtraction” capable of creating a new space of
independence and autonomy from the dominant laws of the situation (Del Lucchese
and Smith 2008, 653). Z̆iz̆ek, however, disagreeing with Badiou, suggests that it
is the prosaic work of social reconstruction” which starts on the “morning after”,
“imposing on social reality a new lasting order,” which is the “properly ‘terroristic’
dimension of every authentic democratic explosion (Z̆iz̆ek 2008, 419). Politics, in
this view, should take over the state and use state power to impose a new order
on social reality, rather than “subtract itself from the domain of the state.” It is
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possible to read the end of Achalayatan in this way, as an affirmation of state power
– as an act, not of a refoundation that is merely contingent and subject to endless
cycles of de-constitution and re-constitution, but of a refoundation meant to last.
Guru/Dadathakur’s exhortation, at the end of the play, to “erect a sky-piercing white
tower in the light of the sky” hints precisely at such an unapologetic appropriation
and deployment of the power of state apparatus and state symbols.
Now that we have looked at one of Tagore’s plays in the light of the political thought
that follows from Badiou’s ontology (and Z̆iz̆ek’s critique of the same), it is illu-
minating to look at the differences between Tagore’s novels and his plays. In The
Illegitimacy of Nationalism: Rabindranath Tagore and the Politics of Self, Ashis
Nandy has remarked that “[Several of] Tagore’s novels deal with the fragility and
resilience of political authority and the birth, survival, and death of moral dissent
(Nandy 1998, 47). Interestingly, Nandy comments that, in Tagore’s novels, the new
political “authority” of militant, neo-conservative nationalism, consisting of “politi-
cal morality and scientized violence borrowed from modern Europe,” which replaces
the parental authority of Hindu social orthodoxy (which Nandy describes as being
constituted by conventionality and collaboration) is “internalized” and comes to form
“part of the hero’s fractured self.” “This victory of nationalism,” Nandy asserts, “is
ultimately a victory of the West over Indian civilization (Nandy 1998, 48-49). Nandy
points out that some of the protagonists in Tagore’s novels, such as, notably, Gora in
Gora and Ela in Char Adhyay [Four Chapters] then succeed in taking a further step,
overcoming “the contesting ideologies of conventionality, collaboration and defensive
neo-conservatism.” I would like to suggest that an effective way to understand this
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process is to consider it as a dialectical process – as the negation of the negation. The
ideology of collaborative and servile conventionality which constitutes the ground of
the colonial condition is, first, negated by militant, neo-conservative nationalism.
Then, while some protagonists, such as Sandip in Ghare Baire, persist permanently
at this stage, in a state, so to speak, of arrested development, others such as Gora
(in Gora) and Ela (in Char Adhyay) are able to progress, beyond the initial negation,
to “negate the negation” itself.
Z̆iz̆ek’s diagnosis of the trajectory of the revolution in China up to the Cultural
Revolution provides a useful conceptual analogy to understand this process and its
pitfalls. Z̆iz̆ek draws our attention to Mao’s “consistent rejection of the ‘negation of
the negation’ as a universal dialectical law” (Z̆iz̆ek 2008, 187). Z̆iz̆ek points out that
Mao had written:
Engels talked about the three categories, but as for me I don’t believe in
two of those categories. (The unity of opposites is the most basic law,
the transformation of quality and quantity into one another is the unity
of opposites quality and quantity, and the negation of the negation does
not exist at all.) . . . There is no such thing as the negation of the
negation (Z̆iz̆ek 2008, 188).
Z̆iz̆ek argues that “this notion of dialectics provides the basic matrix of Mao’s poli-
tics” (Z̆iz̆ek 2008, 191). He then diagnoses the Cultural Revolution as having been
“‘negative” not only in the sense of clearing the space and opening up the way for
a new beginning, but as negative in itself – negative as an index of its importance
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in generating the New.” Mao was unable, Z̆iz̆ek says, “to transpose revolutionary
negativity into a truly new positive order” (Z̆iz̆ek 2008, 194). The Cultural Revo-
lution “miserably failed,” according to Z̆iz̆ek, to create new forms of life at a social
level. Such a deficiency is precisely the same kind of failing, albeit at an individ-
ual level, of Atin (in Tagore’s novel Char Adhyay) and of Sandip (in Tagore’s novel
Ghare Baire), both of whom, in spite of having negated, through nationalist political
militancy, the collaborationist conventionality habitual of the colonized, then fail, af-
terwards, to negate the confining straitjacket of nationalist militancy – and, thereby,
are unable to fashion a new mode of life? Evidently, there is a potential danger
here in analogizing social processes of transformation, such as the failure of the Cul-
tural Revolution in China, to processes of individual transformation. Nevertheless,
the fundamental mechanism is similar in both the social and the individual cases:
the transformation (whether self-transformation or societal transformation) achieved
through the negation of negation involves, in both cases, what Z̆iz̆ek has described
elsewhere as the “enacted utopia”, the self-referential and unmediated “short circuit
between the present and the future” (Z̆iz̆ek 2002a, 559).
However, it is startling that, in the works of Tagore, it is only the protagonists in
his novels, but not in his plays, who seem to suffer particularly from this inability
to take the final step in self-fashioning – the step that involves negating the nega-
tion. What are we to make of this? When protagonists in Tagore’s plays, such as
the prince Abhijit in the play Muktadhara and Panchak in the play Achalayatan,
rebel, they do in fact rebel quite in the manner of Gora’s rebellion against “hol-
low paternal authority” representing “social orthodoxy,” as Nandy has characterized
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Gora’s transformation (Nandy 1998, 48). (Abhijit and Panchak rebel, respectively,
against the father/King and the tyrannical older brother.) Through their alliance
with, respectively, the king’s oppressed subjects and the outcast sonpangshus, Ab-
hijit and Panchak do not face the stymied impasse that arrests Atin’s and Sandip’s
ethico-political development in Tagore’s novels Char Adhyay and Ghare Baire. Nor
do Abhijit and Panchak suffer the contretemps of a Gora in the novel Gora, who had
to pass though a long, uncertain and tortuous purgatory of self-doubt before he was
finally able to discover and embrace his new identity.
It is worth speculating here whether generic form plays a role in explaining this
difference. Is it significant that it is the protagonists in Tagore’s plays who are able
to make such a quick transition to the new while the protagonists of Tagore’s novels
are unable to? A play is, by its very nature, a collective effort – and this would
have been all the more so for Tagore, who wrote, staged, and acted in the plays
along with his students at Shantiniketan in an intensely collaborative process. The
experience of staging and performing a play is, by necessity, a highly interactive and
interactive experience. Bakhtin pointed out that the novel form is the site for a
dialogized heteroglossia. Plays, on the other hand, actually perform intersubjective
heteroglossia – while the novel form merely represents it. Can it be, then, that the
generic form of the play, especially the kind of highly collaboratively staged play
that Tagore was involved in writing and directing, afforded a different means, that
facilitated the representation of a different kind of intellectual development? Going
back to the passage from Marx’s Grundrisse with which we began this chapter,
perhaps we can think of the play form as a particular mode of “organization of
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[cultural] production.” If so, then perhaps “the comprehension of its structure” (to
borrow this phrase from the passage from Grundrisse, that is, of the structure of
this form, affords insights into the structure and the relations of production of “[the]
social formations out of whose ruins and elements it built itself up.”
If our intuition is correct, what is it about the play form that provides these enabling
affordances? Alain Badiou suggests a direction in which to think about this question.
Badiou, in connection with a discussion of Pirandello’s plays, states that he believes
that, although “fiction” has “real power,” it is also true that ”fiction is a form”
(Badiou 2007, 51). A form, however, can admit of plural possibilities of substantive
content. The specific example that Badiou gives is that of stage directions, which
open the door to polysemy because they always have an element of ambiguity. Badiou
then states: “One will therefore conclude that every force is only localizable, or
effective, through a form that nevertheless cannot decide upon meaning.” For this
reason, Badiou believes, in fiction “the energy of the real” “precisely presents itself
as a mask” (Badiou 2007, 51). It seems reasonable that, since the play form allows
for an additional degree of freedom in the shape of the actor’s physical body and
its movements, this maskedness, which renders meaning indeterminate, will be more
pronounced in connection with plays than in connection with novels.
Let us pause here and recapitulate some fundamental terms in Badiou’s philosophy.
For Badiou, a truth is “something that takes place,” and truths are materially pro-
duced in specific situations (Hallward 2003, xxv). Badiou follows Lacan in believing
that “all access to the real is of the order of an encounter” (Badiou 1993b, 47).
Every “singular truth has its origin in an event” (Badiou 1993a, 113-33). People
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who affirm an uncertain event by maintaining fidelity to it make the truth persis-
tent, and in doing so constitute themselves as subjects in the name of the event, by
inventing something new – provided that it is an invention with which everyone can,
in principle, identify (Hallward 2003, xxvi). A generic truth attests to the primacy
of the Same over the Other. Such a truth privileges being of the same situation or
presentation (Hallward 2003, xxix). The generic is obtained via the purification of
the specific (Hallward 2003, xxxi). The real is an encounter with the generic as such
(Hallward 2003, xxx). Finally, freedom is not a condition but “an activity that we
must labor to sustain.” (Hallward 2003, xxxii).
We will enlist these ideas from Badiou in our reading of James’ treatment of the
revolution in San Domingo in The Black Jacobins. At work since his arrival in
England in 1932 on a book about the San Domingo revolution, James decided in
1936, while he was halfway through his work, to produce a play, titled Toussaint
L’Ouverture (later republished bearing the same title, The Black Jacobins, as his
historical account of the same events) (Grimshaw 1992, 5). The writing of the play
allowed James to explore a particular problematic that writing an account of the
revolution in prose did not, or at least not in the same way: the presentation of a
charismatic personality –namely, Toussaint L’Ouverture, in flesh and blood, before a
live audience. The challenge that he had set himself was “to translate the economic
and political forces into living human beings, so that one gets interested in them
for what they are as people” (James 1992f, 140). James’ challenge in this play was
two-fold: to represent the revolutionary slaves of San Domingo both as actors upon
the stage of history invested with their historical agency, that is, as people, and
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as constituent (as well as constitutive) parts of social-historical structures beyond
individual agency, that is, as (economic and political) forces.
In the play, James depicts Toussaint as committing the fatal mistake of innocently
trusting in the promise of the European Enlightenment to guarantee freedom to the
slaves of San Domingo. James shows how Toussaint is at pains to reassure Colonel
Vincent, a French officer, that, rather than seeking independence, he would prefer
to speak with the French commissioner that he navely expects to be shortly sent to
the island by Napoleon Bonaparte. Tellingly, Toussaint considers Napoleon to be an
equal: “General Bonaparte is the first man in France and General L’Ouverture is
the first man in San Domingo,” he declares in Act II, Scene 2 (James 1992a, 89).
Toussaint, in other words, denies difference and sees himself not as the Other of
Bonaparte but as a multiple of the Same. If we think in terms of the conceptual
framework furnished by Badiou, then we can say that, in James’ telling, Toussaint
considers the San Domingo revolution that he has headed as part of a generic event
in which the revolution in metropolitan France and the revolution in San Domingo
will be multiples of the Same. Likewise, Toussaint makes the following astonishing
statement: “[I]f this Constitution functions satisfactorily, soldiers, go to Africa, and
free hundreds of thousands in the black slave there and bring them here, to be free
and French”(James 1992a, 90). Here, Toussaint can be said, in Badiouan terms,
to be affirming the French Revolution by maintaining his fidelity to it; he is, thus,
constituting himself as a revolutionary subject.
Yet, while this Badiouan matrix of categories is quite useful in interpreting James’
reading of Toussaint’s project, it proves, in the end, to be deficient if we are to make
130
sense of Toussaint’s eventual failure. As Z̆iz̆ek points out, within Badiou’s notion
of evental politics, there is no place for a “part-of-no-part,” that is, for an “element
which, although part of the system, does not have a proper place within it” (Z̆iz̆ek
2008, 398). Emancipatory politics, Z̆iz̆ek says, has to intervene from this excessive
(“supernumerary”) element which cannot be accounted for in terms of the situation
even though it is part of the situation. The revolutionary subjectivity of Toussaint
is, itself, precisely such an element, which could not have existed if not for the French
revolution in the metropole – but is, nevertheless, excessive and supernumerary in
relation to it. The figure of Toussaint as a leader of rebellious slaves in the periphery
cannot but announce itself as a supernumerary “excess” to the metropolitan narrative
of the French revolution. Intervention from this supernumerary position would, of
necessity, have been a negative task. Toussaint, operating from this supernumerary
position, would have needed to counterpose himself against the French revolution.
Toussaint’s revolution needed to have become, not a multiple of the Same, but a
repetition with a Difference – a revolution which, instead of positing revolution as
“generic” (in Badiou’s sense of the word), would have needed to have differentiated
the revolution in San Domingo from the revolution in the metropole. However, such
a critique of Toussaint is simply not possible from within the ontology constituted
by Badiouan categories, since Badiou disavows negativity and difference.
Instead, what should prove to be adequate, even indispensable, to developing a sat-
isfactory critique, in fact, the dialectic. As Z̆iz̆ek argues, “an event can be accounted
for by the tension between the multiplicity of Being and the World,” as it can be
generated by the excess of Being over World (Z̆iz̆ek 2008, 397). San Domingo and
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Paris were not the same. It had been Toussaint’s mistake to think that the revolu-
tion made by black slaves of San Domingo and the revolution made by Jacobins of
Paris were ontologically parts of the same generic identity. Rather than constitute
the generic repetition of the Same, the slaves of San Domingo (the black Jacobins)
and the revolutionary metropolitans (the Jacobins of France) actually constituted
a differentiated multiplicity of Being. Even the phrase “Black Jacobins” in the ti-
tle of the play, with the adjective qualifying the noun, speaks to this differentiated
multiplicity rather than to a generic Same. What would have been implicated in a
successful revolution27 is, precisely, the negation of France (followed, indispensably,
by a negation of the negation, completing the dialectic) – and these two alone could
have led the revolution to a true universality as opposed to a sterile repetition of the
Same. However, such a critique is impossible to undertake from within a Badiouan
ontology, because of Badiou’s disavowal of negation. Such a critique, indeed, can
only be accomplished in terms of the dialectic.
In Brecht and Critical Theory: Dialectics and Contemporary Aesthetics, Sean Carney
suggests that the “dialectical structure of identity itself” is “the tenuous, dialectical
tension between repetition and difference, between suffocating sameness and the ter-
rifyingly new” (Carney 2005, 159). Such a formulation is useful in making sense of
what happened in San Domingo. Toussaint, according to James’ account, tried to
enact in San Domingo a repetition of the Jacobin-led revolution, but difference inter-
27And here by “revolution” I of course also mean the indispensable revolution-in-thought that
would have been the necessary condition of possibility for success, if we are to take seriously Z̆iz̆ek’s
invocation of Marcuse’s assertion, which I have referred to earlier: namely that freedom is merely
the condition of possibility of liberation, since “[i]f we only change reality in order to realize our
dreams, and do not change these dreams themselves, sooner or later we regress back to the old
reality.
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vened in the form of a surplus, the excess of Being over World. “Men make history,”
Marx had remarked, describing the classical, paradigmatic structure-agency dialectic
associated with the marxist vision of history, in The Eighteenth Brumaire:
. . . [b]ut they do not make it under circumstances of their own choosing,
but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the
past. The tradition of all dead generations weighs like a nightmare on
the brains of the living. And . . . they seem to be occupied with
revolutionizing themselves and things, creating something that did not
exist before. . . .”
What Marx is describing here – “the tradition of all dead generations” – is precisely
the supplement to what happened at San Domingo: Marx is describing the excess
of World over Being. Remembering that a nightmare is itself a dream, we can recall
here, once again, Marcuse’s warning about the danger in “not changing the dreams
themselves” – and is not a nightmare the dream that has failed to change? The slaves
in San Domingo, in James’ telling, were enacting the supplement to Marx’s dialectical
formula above: they were trying to re-create what they thought had already come
into existence – namely, forge a self-identity based on the absolute equality that the
French revolution had announced (but had not actually created). The dream they
dreamed was, then, not a nightmare from the past, but a proleptic dream from the
future. The figure of the slave from San Domingo stands before us, then, like that
of an “exile from a future time,” to borrow a turn of phrase from the mid-twentieth-
century American communist poet Sol Funaroff:
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I am that exile
From a future time,
From shores of freedom
I may never know. . . .28
Or, to put it more prosaically, although the history that James narrates in The
Black Jacobins concerns San Domingo in the 1790s and 1800s, it does continue to
hold lessons for us today. James had viewed the labor-intensive, regimented life of
plantation slavery as the one form of life within pre-capitalism which did indeed
prefigure, albeit in a rudimentary way, the mode of production of factory labor.
If the dialectic is indispensable to understanding the failure of the San Domingo
revolution, then, inversely, it follows that it might well be indispensable to the success
of revolution today – even in our own time.
28From the poem ‘The BellBouy’ by Sol Funaroff. In Wald, Alan. Exiles from a Future Time:




A dialectical lesson for our times?
Dialectics re-conceptualizes our customary attitude towards reality by enriching, if
not replacing, with the notions of “process” and “relation” the notion of an object
that can be isolated as if it existed independently. Bertell Ollman, in his study of
Marx’s dialectics, describes “process” as encompassing both ”history and possible
futures,” and he recursively interprets “relation” as that “which contains, as part
of what it is, its ties with other relations”.29 The dialectical perspective enables us
to appreciate that, rather than located in a particular place and time and situated
within a certain set of conditions, we are always already parts of processes in which
the non-logic of radical contingency, which enables us to envision possible futures,
cohabits non-contradictorily with the logic of necessity. This latter logic keeps us
grounded and and reminds us that political paths to possible futures do have to
originate from an inescapably determinate here and now – that material conditions
29Ollman, Bertell. Dance of the Dialectic: Steps in Marx’s Method, Chapter 1. University of
Illinois Press: Urbana. 2003. p. 13.
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are not of one’s choosing. It is through reading the prose writings of Tagore and
James that I have, in this project, explored this dialectic between necessity and
contingency. Writing, especially prose, has a narrative logic that, in formal terms,
privileges the logic of necessity over the non-logic of contingency. I have aimed to
show, however, that it is striking how an openness towards contingency nevertheless
is a subterranean presence even when it is not overt. I have tried to show, in par-
ticular, how the openness towards contingency seeps out through the form of texts,
taking the work that Tagore and James did for the theater as a particularly salient
example.
This openness to contingency that colonial and postcolonial thinkers like Tagore and
James articulate is wedded, dialectically, to a notion of historical necessity, express-
ing itself in the urgency and necessity of an emancipatory politics. This kind of
openness to contingency, thus, leaves open to imagining and to questioning where
emancipatory politics leads to, and refuses to posit a prefigured and totalizing solu-
tion as the end-point of emancipation. However, in spite of the refusal of Tagore’s
and James’ dialectics to commit to a determinate telos, it would be incorrect to
try to enlist this openness to contingency by reading either of them as “a prema-
ture post-structuralist”30 – as, for example, Homi Bhabha has attempted to do in
his reading of Fanon, interpreting Fanon’s dichotomy of black skin and white mask
as oscillatory, consisting of “a doubling, dissembling image of being in at least two
places at once.”31 While an oscillation of this kind implies a repetition, the creation
30Parry, Benita. ’Problems in Current Theories of Colonial Discourse.’ Oxford Literary Review
9.1-2, 27-58. 1987. p. 31.
31Bhabha, Homi. The Location of Culture. Routledge. 1994. p. 117.
136
of the new is usually not a part of it. What is attractive about the dialectic between
necessity and contingency that we find in Tagore and James, on the other hand,
is precisely the possibility that it suggests for the emergence of the new. However,
the kind of newness whose possibility is suggested by this dialectic is not quite the
newness implied by pure contingency; instead, necessity, alongside contingency, is an
integral and constitutive part of this dialectic. It may be useful to think about what
this dialectic is not, in order to help us better understand what it is. Derrida, writing
about the moment of “decision as such”, remarks that it is the “finite moment of
urgency and precipitation,” which is ”not . . . the consequence or the effect” of
another “theoretical or historical moment, of this reflection or deliberation”; instead,
the moment of decision stands outside of temporal logic altogether, marking an inter-
ruption of the juridico- or ethnico- or politico-cognitive deliberation that precedes it.”
32 Similarly, Hannah Arendt, in her reflections on how new beginnings are created,
focuses on the idea of the free act, which breaks free of structural determination with
“an inherent tendency to force open all limitations and cut across all boundaries”
– “an unconnected, new event breaking into the continuous sequence of historical
time.”33 For Arendt, revolutions are ”occurrences that interrupt routine processes
and routine procedures,” and as such they are precisely the moments at which new
beginnings become possible.34 By definition, these moments of the emergence of the
new are charged, for Arendt, with the arbitrary and the contingent. These moments,
32Derrida, Jacques. “Force of Law: The ‘Mystical Foundations of Authority”’. Deconstruction
and the Possibility of Justice. [Ed.] Drucilla Cornell, Michel Rosenfeld, and David Gray Carlson.
New York: Routledge. 1992. p. 26.
33Arendt, Hannah. The Human Condition. University of Chicago Press: Chicago. 1958. p. 190.
34Arendt, Hannah. On Revolution. Penguin Books: New York. 1963. p. 172-173.
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for her, are constituted by pure contingency in which the bounds imposed of necessity
are completely obliterated and newness enters the world. The dialectic of necessity
and contingency that I have described in the context of Tagore’s and James’ work,
however, is of a different kind. The newness that this dialectic brings into the world
is produced not only by contingency but also by necessity.
I would like to suggest that this has concrete and practical consequences in terms
of how an understanding of, and engagement with, this dialectic makes us address
political questions of our own time and place. That, I think, is the payoff for reading
Tagore and James politically in the way that I have attempted to do in this project.
In particular, I believe that the dialectic of necessity and contingency that this polit-
ical reading uncovers, has important consequences for how one orients oneself to the
question of reform and revolution. Socialists have often found themselves divided
into the two rather mutually suspicious camps of reformists and self-styled “revolu-
tionaries”. (The former term, of course, is pejorative; it is how, typically, the latter
tend to describe the former, and it has an air of derision.) To keep in mind that
there is a dialectic between necessity and contingency, however, enables us to step
beyond this dichotomy. It also allows for recognizing points of commonality that
can be built upon to create a broad-based emancipatory politics. There is a reason
why an appreciation of this dialectic is particularly timely. The last two decades
have seen popular movements, especially in Latin America, seemingly demonstrate
that significant, even revolutionary, change does seem achievable by electoral means,
when the potential of (as well as the limitations inherent in) electoral mechanisms
are properly recognized, and as long as an attempt is made to expand their participa-
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tory aspects. This has been the case, recently, in Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador, for
example: these countries have witnessed initiatives to rewrite their social contracts
– at least to some extent. These calls have typically taken the form of the demand
for a constituent assembly that would rewrite the constitution of the country.
At the turn of the twentieth century, the international socialist movement was en-
gaged in a highly charged debate about the prospects of change and the means of
achieving them. Rosa Luxemburg, in her polemical pamphlet ‘Reform or Revolution,’
published in 1900, criticized reformism as a political strategy that could lead only to
the marginalization of the working-class if revolution were to be abandoned as the
final goal. “Reform measures,” Luxemburg wrote, “are not an application of “social
control,” that is, the control of society working freely in its own labor process. They
are forms of control applied by the class organization of Capital to the production
of Capital. The so-called social reforms are enacted in the interests of Capital.”35
However, while this may have been true in the early 1900s, with limited franchise and
absence of women’s suffrage, now – a hundred years later – at the beginning of the
twenty-first century, a rethinking may be in order. It has, in fact, been possible, in
the last few years, for left-leaning politicians like an Evo Morales in Bolivia, a Hugo
Chávez in Venezuela, or a Rafael Correa in Ecuador, to actually come to power by
electoral means, and to actually continue to be in power without being summarily
overthrown – unlike what happened to left-leaning socialists in the mid-twentieth
century. Of course, without grassroots-level political movements with a large mass
base preparing the ground, first, for an electoral victory for left-leaning parties, and,
35Luxemburg, Rosa. Reform or Revolution. New York: Pathfinder Press, 1973. [Originally
published in 1900.]
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subsequently, for continuing to defend such a victory on a sustained basis, such an
ascendancy to state power by leftists would never have been possible. But when and
where these conditions do indeed exist today, it seems to be at least possible for
the struggle for an emancipatory politics to be led today by socialists actually hold-
ing state power who have arrived at the helm of the bourgeois state by ’reformist’
electoral means. This is certainly a situation quite different from the accumulated
experience of liberationists for most of the last century. While the “actually existing
socialisms” of the twentieth century had emerged out of a revolutionary tradition,
what made the idea of taking power electorally seem like a more desirable approach
is the fact that most of those “actually existing socialisms” of the last century had
tended to be authoritarian. It is undeniable that the horrors that took place under
the régimes that followed successful socialist revolutions in Russia and in China have
had the effect of automatically rendering suspect any calls for an emancipatory pol-
itics of violent revolutionary change today. Moreover, socialism, in places like China
or Vietnam, has arguably turned out to have been an effective preparation for the
restoration of capitalism – an irony that Z̆iz̆ek has pointed out.
Of course, it is true that much of the tyranny and authoritarian rule that occurred in
Russia or China followed directly from the extraordinary situations of isolation that
these fledgling socialist states endured, encircled as they were, metaphorically when
not literally, by the capitalist world-system. For instance, the threat of invasion by
capitalist powers following the 1917 revolution and civil war forced the Soviet Union
into a policy of war communism, with civil liberties abrogated and power centralized,
thus arguably paving the way for authoritarian rule to eventually become permanent.
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Although it was imperialism, then, that may have been indirectly responsible, to
a large extent, for the consolidation of authoritarianism in the Soviet Union, it is
nevertheless true that a socialist revolution carried out entirely by extraparliamentary
means today will be discredited in the minds of people all over the world because
socialism has come to be associated with Soviet authoritarianism. In fact, at the
present time, even a revolution which succeeds as a result of a popular insurgency
may be reluctant to claim its success in leading the revolution as the sole basis for its
legitimacy. For instance, in 2006 a long-term armed Maoist insurgency was finally
successful in forcing out the undemocratic monarchical rule then in existence in
Nepal, but the Maoists, who enjoyed significant popular support, then nevertheless
called for a constituent assembly, participated in interim elections, and agreed to
power-sharing with the parliamentary left in Nepal during the interim period even
as the arduous task of rewriting the constitution was embarked upon. Rather than
the abyss of contingency that a revolution entails, the Nepali Maoists chose, instead,
the so-called “reformist” process of constitution-making. They did not quite negate
or erase their revolutionary commitment, however, and in fact did not surrender
their weapons, choosing to hold on to the weapons in case a revolutionary situation,
with all its attendant contingencies, were to arise again. Framed within the terms
of our discussion, we might say that they embraced a logic in which both necessity
and contingency had a place.
What, then, about the concerns articulated by Rosa Luxemburg? Given that capital
still does continue to rule over the planet with an iron grip, does not the danger of
“reformist” socialist movements becoming co-opted by Capital still remain a potent
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peril? When struggles are carried out within existing electoral systems, is it not,
indeed, all too easy for socialists to be co-opted by, or to capitulate to, the hegemonic
rule of capital? In addition, there is a second danger: while it is true that the threat
of environmental catastrophe and the chaos and instability unleashed in the world
market have started making people question the logic of capitalism more than they
have in years, in times of economic crisis or instability such as the present, following
a “reformist” path might exacerbate the danger that strongman-style populism (or
even fascism), rather than genuine socialism, can become a tempting alternative for
those disillusioned by capitalism. Given these problems, what can be done so that,
within the terms of a dialectical logic of necessity and contingency, mapped on to
a homologous logic of reform and revolution, these potentially problematic fallouts
can be guarded against? I will suggest three possible ways in which the dialectic of
necessity and contingency may provide an answer to this conundrum: with regard to
the question of how to relate to bourgeois democracy, with regard the the question
of how to recuperate, and affiliate with, progressive traditions from the past, and
with regard to the question of leadership in movements.
Bourgeois democracy is, of course, heavily weighted towards the rule of Capital, in
spite of the occasional openings provided as a result of the expansion of suffrage
that has occurred in many places over the last century. Because bourgeois democ-
racy considers political equality to be distinct from economic equality, socialists have
had to constantly keep pointing out – even as they have participated in bourgeois
democracy – that such political equality as exists in bourgeois democracy is merely
a formal, and not a substantial, equality. Such a type of participation – in which
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socialists criticize the very thing that they are, in fact, participating in – is sure to
raise accusations of opportunism and hypocrisy. Is there a justification for critiquing
some aspects of bourgeois democracy when it suits the critic to criticize them, even
while the critic makes use of other aspects of bourgeois democracy – when it suits
the critic’s purpose to make such use? The facile answer that merely states that
one must think dialectically will not be sufficient – it is necessary to be more spe-
cific in answer to this question. The specific element of necessity in the answer to
this necessary question framed in terms of a dialectic of necessity and contingency
can, perhaps, be formulated as the answer to a different question: “What advances
the class struggle?” The specificities of the answer will be contingent on material
circumstances, but the question itself will not: the question itself remains necessary
and determinate, in the sense that it needs to be asked constantly, even though
the answer will vary. In certain situations, bourgeois legalism does, indeed, favor
the masses over elites and oligarchies – and in such situations one could support
bourgeois-legalistic arguments as long as they expand the franchise and amplify the
possibility for human emancipation. In other situations, however, bourgeois legalism
may run quite contrary to workers’ interests – and in those circumstances one should
not feel inhibited by bourgeois legalism. Thus, socialists may choose to use bourgeois
legalism in an entirely “opportunistic” way – but in the positive sense of the word
“opportunistic”: that is, seizing every opportunity that contingently presents itself,
with the openness to such contingency being itself a necessary precondition. The
point, then, is to fetishize neither contingency nor necessity.
In this context, the dialectic of necessity and contingency that we can discern in
143
Tagore provides us with a useful model. Amartya Sen has remarked on Tagore’s
deep aversion to any commitment “that could not be modified by contemporary rea-
son.”36 Referring to Tagore’s parable-like short story ‘Kartar Bhoot’ [’The Ghost
of the Leader’] – a parable that is thematically very reminiscent of his play Acha-
layatan, which I have discussed in earlier chapters – Sen reads the parable as an
expression of Tagore’s impatience with the iron grip of custom. In the story, as the
respected leader of an imagined land consents to stay on as a ghost after his death in
order to keep on instructing his followers as to what to do. As a result, his followers
find that their lives are becoming full of meaningless rituals that make their lives
non-responsive to the world around them. Ultimately, they request the ghost of the
leader to relieve them of his domination, whereupon he informs them that he exists
only in their minds: they had succeeded in constructing a fetish. It is important
to note here that Tagore is not advocating a mindless iconoclasm or a disavowal
of tradition. Nor is Tagore an antifoundationalist – as we have seen, in essays like
‘Manusher Dharma’ [‘The Religion of Man’] he does clearly subscribe to founda-
tional cultural narratives that he considers to be constitutive of all humanity. The
necessary component of the dialectic consists precisely in the necessity of constantly
expanding human freedom, and an integral part of that project is responsiveness to
the contingencies of the world. Thus, the necessity to be contingent is mandated
by necessity itself. In a letter written in August, 1944 to Constance Webb, C.L.R.
James, writing about poettry, expresses a similar view, pointing out the dialectical
interplay between poetic utterance as specific and contingent emotional responses to
36Sen, Amartya. ’Tagore and his India’, The New York Review of Books, June 26, 1997.
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life and as an emancipatory “conception of the world” which does not “guide” in
any teleological sense but simply constitutes poetic utterance as an inaugurative and
integrative force:
. . . [T]he poet reacts to life emotionally – and without that, though he
were the wisest man in the world, he could not write a line of verse. But
the more humanity develops the more the emotional response depends
upon a conception of the world which does not so much as guide the
poetry, but releases and expands the personality, integrates it, opens
horizons . . . (James 1992f, 140).
As we have seen in connection with our discussion of Tagore’s play Raktakarabi,
Tagore heuristically and selectively used images culled from the past to create emo-
tional resonance. In this sense, Tagore’s practice echoes James’ view. Amita Sen
notes that, on one occasion when Gandhi visited Tagore’s school at Santiniketan,
Gandhi wrote in an young woman’s autograph book: “Never make a promise in
haste. Having once made it fulfill it at the cost of your life.” The entry, according
to Sen, perturbed Tagore, leading him to write in the same book a short poem in
Bengali stating that no one can be made “a prisoner forever with a chain of clay,”
concluding in English: “Fling away your promise if it is found to be wrong.”37 Walter
Benjamin, we can recall, had suggested that potentials stored in the past are sugges-
tive of possible futures. Benjamin believed that in every epoch the attempt has be
made anew to redeem elements from the past from the conformism which threatens
to overwhelm it – thus redeeming one of the many possible promises that the past
37Sen, Amita. Anando Sharbokaje. Tagore Research Institute: Calcutta, 1996. p. 132.
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had made to the future.38 What Tagore seems to be suggesting can be read as a
supplement to Benjamin’s idea: Tagore is stating that when we contingently discover
that a promise is no longer promising, there is no reason to continue to be faithful
any longer to the necessity imposed by that promise. We can also recall that, in The-
sis X of the Theses on the Concept of History, Benjamin says that his “observations
are intended to extricate the political worldlings [das politische Weltkind] from the
snares [aus den Netzen] in which the traitors have entangled them.” Michael Lowy
has pointed out that, in his French translation of the Theses, Benjamin did not actu-
ally speak of “snares” or “nets,” but substituted the word “promises” [promesses].39
Accepting this idea that no appeal to any universal moral principle can possibly
make sense, whether as a rhetorical or as a political strategy. Thus, if one takes
this idea seriously, then acts of condemnation or endorsement would not arise out of
any pre-existing universal or transcendental moral principle, but would be, instead,
contingent products of the social relations in which such acts are embedded. That
they are contingent and situational, rather than transcendental, allows for flexibility
of strategy without moral compromise: no inconsistency would be involved in siding
with, or against, “reformist” approaches as and when the situation so demands; nor
in allying oneself with selected elements of history and tradition from the past, which
could, from the vantage point of the present, be given a progressive interpretation –
even if anachronistically so. Interestingly, in a letter written in 1953, James remarks
38Benjamin, Walter. ’On The Concept of History’. in Walter Benjamin: Selected Writings, Vol.
4, 1938- 1940, ed. Howard Eiland and Michael W Jennings. Bellknap Press of Harvard University
Press: Cambridge, MA. 2003.
39Lowy, Michael. Fire Alarm: Reading Walter Benjamin’s ’On the Concept of History’. Verso:
London. 2005. pp. 69-70.
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that this, precisely, is what he sees Shakespeare as having done in King Lear, in
which Shakespeare was drawing from an old story about Lear and, anachronistically,
turning it a story about liberal humanitarianism:
I say that Lear speaks with the vision of centuries to come. What do
Lear’s ravings amount to? Remember that he repeats them in Act IV
and that Shakespeare, to make doubly sure, says them, all over again in
the sub-plot of Gloucester. It is, I repeat, the screed of liberal humani-
tarianism. . . . Man is an “unaccommodated man.”40
We can recall that just as James reads Shakespeare as anachronistically investing
Lear with “the vision of centuries to come,” so too did he himself, in The Black
Jacobins, see in the slaves of San Domingo a close precursor of the modern proletariat,
and interpret the slave incursion as the prefiguring of a modern mass movement:
. . .[W]orking and living together in gangs of hundreds on the huge sug-
arfactories which covered the North Plain, they were closer to a modern
proletariat than any group of workers in existence at the time, and the
rising was, therefore, a thoroughly prepared and organized mass move-
ment.41
This endorsement of and enthusiasm for “opportunistic” reinterpretation of contin-
gently produced moments from cultural tradition within the framework of a necessary
narrative of human emancipation that we can discern in James and Tagore has an
40James, C.L.R. ’Letters to Literary Critics’, 9 March 1953. In The C.L.R. James Reader. [Ed.]
Anna Grimshaw. Blackwell: Oxford. 1992. p. 239.
41James. C.L.R. The Black Jacobins: Toussaint L’Ouverture and the San Domingo Revolution.
London: Penguin. 2001. [originally published in 1938.] p. 69.
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affinity with a current in left thought that sees culture as vitally important to the
emancipatory project and emphasizes the recuperation of cultural symbols towards
progressive ends. We may want to think of this tendency in James and Tagore in
relation to the Peruvian Marxist José Carlos Mariátegui in Latin America as well
as to the tradition of Liberation Theology in that continent. Mariátegui, as well
as the liberation theologists understood the importance of culture in building mass
movements, and realized that it was important to connect the socialist movement
that they were interested in building with those elements from local history and tra-
dition that could be retrospectively interpreted in a progressive way. In the 1920s,
Mariátegui, in Peru, attempted something very similar by thinking of the nonhierar-
chical structure of the pre-Columbian ayllu – the indigenous peasant commune that
was the social and political unit of Inca life – as a prototype or model for socialist
organization.42 The proponents of Liberation Theology in Latin America, such as
Ernesto Cardenal of Nicaragua, sought to do this by re-interpreting the Bible as a
socialist text, in which the “Kingdom of Heaven” became the metaphor of a just
society that is to be built in the here and now, that is, in the “Kingdom of Earth”
itself.43 By aligning emancipatory ideas with a cultural tradition that the people
are intimately familiar with, the liberation theologists tried to make liberation a life
practice, daily lived, rather than an abstract academic idea that needs to be appre-
hended intellectually instead of affectively. We can also see this in Fidel Castro’s
42Mariátegui, José Carlos.Siete ensayos de interpretación de la realidad peruana [Seven Essays
of Interpretation of the Peruvian Reality]. Mexico: Ediciones Era, 1979. [Originally published in
1928.]
43Cardenal, Ernesto. The Gospel in Solentiname [El Evangelio en Solentiname]. (Trans.) Donald
D. Walsh. Maryknoll, Orbis Books: N.Y. 1976.
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use of the figure of the Cuban national hero José Mart́ı (who died in 1898 fighting
the Spanish), whom Castro described as “the intellectual author of the Cuban rev-
olution [of 1959].” Rather than seeking to create a “new man” who represents a
sharp rupture with the past, and springs forth from the abyss of freedom created
by revolution, an effort to build upon existing, “necessary” traditions may simply
be more practical and useful. James and Tagore, thus, allow us to escape both the
Scylla of rigid and mechanistic determinism and the Charybdis of pure voluntarism
or spontaneism. When read in this way, James and Tagore remind us of Marx’s
belief that the new society of the future develops from within the shell of the old.
Marx wrote in an 1843 letter to his friend Arnold Ruge:
We develop new principles for the world out of the world’s own principles.
We do not say to the world: Cease your struggles, they are foolish; we
will give you the true slogan of struggle. We merely show the world what
it is really fighting for.44
Finally, I would suggest that the dialectic of necessity and contingency offers signifi-
cant lessons with regard to questions of hierarchy and leadership in mass movements.
The initial success of the Bolshevik revolution had convinced many socialists all over
the world that a “vanguard party” directing workers’ struggle was the appropriate
vehicle for the revolutionary project. The lessons of Lenin’s 1902 pamphlet, What is
to be Done?, with its astringent attacks on a näıve belief in the efficacy of merely a
“spontaneous upsurge of the masses” were absorbed by revolution-minded socialists
44Marx, Karl. ‘Letters from the Deutsch-Franzsische Jahrbcher’. Collected Works of Karl Marx
and Frederick Engels, Vol. 3. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975. [Originally published in Deutsch-
Franzsiche Jahrbcher, 1844.]
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the world over as the indispensable paradigm for successful organization. Overlooked
in that lesson was the fact that Lenin, writing as he was at a specific historical con-
juncture, almost certainly did not intend what he wrote in this pamphlet to take
on the aspect of a universally applicable principle. The actual principles that Lenin
himself followed in his party-building activities confirm this – as has recently been
well documented by the historian Lars Lih.45
The notion that a vanguard of revolutionaries who somehow know better than the
masses is going to make revolutions, is both dangerous and undemocratic and can
easily lead to authoritarianism along a slippery slope. The idea of a “vanguard”,
in fact, is itself contradictory in a non-dialectical way because, on the one hand, it
suggests an idea of a deterministic telos – the vanguard supposedly knows where the
revolution should be headed – and on the other hand it suggests an idea of pure
contingency as, in this envisioning, all agency is imagined to rest with the vanguard,
the pure contingency of whose actions supposedly determine the course of revolution.
A dialectic of necessity and contingency, on the other hand, helps emphasize that
agency must necessarily rest with historically defined large-scale forces and cannot
possibly be vested in a small and self-appointed revolutionary vanguard.
In his Third Thesis on Feuerbach, Marx pondered the question of leadership, reflect-
ing on how the process of emancipation may work. How may a certain section of a
people initiate the process of emancipatory change that would affect everyone, with-
out the initiators imposing their will on the people? Marx suggests that this must
45Lih, Lars T., Lenin Rediscovered: What Is to Be Done? in Context. Chicago: Haymarket
Books, 2008.
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involve a dialectical, transformative process in which, rather than think of leaders
and followers as belonging to ontologically separate categories such as subject and
object, with leaders leading the followers, one should think in terms of educating the
educators themselves:
The materialist doctrine concerning the changing of circumstances and
upbringing forgets that circumstances are changed by men and that it
is essential to educate the educator himself. . . . The coincidence of the
changing of circumstances and of human activity or self-changing can be
conceived and rationally understood only as revolutionary practice.46
This dialectical idea of social transformation both dependent on and inducing indi-
vidual transformation is closely related to the idea we discussed earlier of building the
new up from elements of the already existing. It, too, can be understood in terms
of the dialectic of necessity and contingency. Marx is suggesting in the passage
above that the revolutionary practice of engaging with concrete, existing struggles
is a necessary force with which contingent changes in self and society are dialec-
tically interrelated. Toussaint’s alienation from the masses, as we have seen, was
diagnosed by James to be the key to understanding why he failed. James’ diagnosis
appears to be that Toussaint had succumbed to a kind of voluntarism, failing to put
the brilliant and spectacular, but nevertheless isolated, genius of his leadership in
a dialectical relationship with the masses, whose political instinct, James suggests,
collectively surpassed even Toussaint’s in astuteness: by anticipating that Napoleon
46Marx, Karl. ‘Theses on Feuerbach’, Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Vol. 1.
Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1969. [Originally written in 1845; first published as an appendix to
Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy in 1888.]
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was planning to restore slavery, “[o]nce more the masses had shown greater polit-
icalunderstanding than their leaders.”47 Similarly, we saw in Tagore’s Raktakarabi
that the King was able to find the liberation he was looking for only when he was
finally able to join with the masses and take part in the people’s insurrection.
All three of these issues – the question of relating to “reformist” as opposed to “rev-
olutionary” projects, the question of how one relates to tradition, and the question
of leadership, have to do, in one way or another, with a larger question: whether
universal history is possible, and if so, what the contours and content of a universal
history might be. Universal history is traditionally understood as a view of history
that privileges homogenized commonalities rather than difference. The temporality
of any supposed universal history has been understood to be that of “empty, ho-
mogeneous time”, to use Walter Benjamin’s phrase. We would ordinarily assume
that necessity, rather than contingency – determinate structure rather than non-
determinate and teleologically unpredictabile agency – is the correlative of universal
history. Susan Buck-Morss, however, has recently advocated for a novel view of uni-
versal history which breaks with this assumption, and with which my argument is
sympathetic. Buck-Morss writes:
. . . [H]uman universality emerges in the point of rupture. It is in
the discontinuities of history that people whose culture has been strained
to the breaking point give expression to a humanity that goes beyond
cultural limits. . . . A person’s nonidentity with the collective allows
47James. C.L.R. The Black Jacobins: Toussaint L’Ouverture and the San Domingo Revolution.
London: Penguin. 2001. [originally published in 1938.] p. 274.
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for subterranean solidarities that have a chance of appealing to universal,
moral sentiment. . . . It is not through culture, but through the threat
of culture’s betrayal that consciousness of a common humanity comes to
be.48
This argument suggests that it is not in necessity but rather in contingency that
the univeralist impulse is properly located. To the extent that a logic of necessity
compels a view of history as a mechanistic and stagist conception of unfolding in
time, contingency provides the possibility of disaffiliation and departure – the lines
of flight, as to use a term used by Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari49 – from that
determinate narrative. In this conception of universal history by Buck-Morss, in a
dialectical way, it is the contingencies with afford the possibility of ”subterranean
solidarities” with the universal. There is, however, in this passage by Buck-Morss
a certain ambiguity about the ontolgical status of the universal. On the one hand,
when Buck-Morss talks about appeals to “universal, moral sentiment,” she appears to
have in mind a pre-existent, non-dialectical universality that is always already there,
such that contingent subterranean solidarities simply become a matter of undergoing
disaffiliation and seeking affiliation from the universality already in place. On the
other hand, when Buck-Morss also speaks of universality as emergent - it emerges
at the point of rupture and, therefore, is being constituted by the contingencies
themselves – she seems to hint at a dialectic of the necessary and the contingent not
unlike the one I have been developing, in which the universal is a necessary presence
48Buck-Morss, Susan. Hegel, Haiti and Universal History. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh
Press. 2009. p. 133.
49Deleuze, Gilles and Flix Guattari. A Thousand Plateaus. (Trans.) Brian Massumi. London
and New York: Continuum, 2004. p. 9.
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but is itself constantly being produced and constituted by contingency. A passage
from Walter Benjamin’s ‘Paralipomena to “On the Concept of History”’ about the
notion of “revolutionary chance” may be worth recalling in this context:
In reality, there is not a moment that would not carry with it its revolu-
tionary chance – provided only that it is defined in a specific way, namely
as the chance for a completely new resolution of a completely new problem
[emphasis added]. For the revolutionary thinker, the peculiar revolution-
ary chance offered by every historical moment gets its warrant from the
political situation. But it is equally grounded [emphasis added], for this
thinker, in the right of entry which the historical moment enjoys vis-a-vis
a quite distinct chamber of the past, one which up to that point has been
closed and locked. The entrance into this chamber coincides in a strict
sense with political action, and it is by means of such entry that political
action, however destructive, reveals itself as messianic.50
The passage illustrates Benjamin’s “messianic” understanding of the dialectical re-
lationship between necessity and chance, in that the “warrant” of “revolutionary
chance” is not only grounded equally between necessity (“the past”) and contin-
gency (the “specific” quality of chance and its its radical novelty as not only a “new
resolution” but also a “new resolution of a completely new problem”), but is also
constantly being produced (“there is not a moment” that would not carry it with
itself) as a result of the interplay between the situational and its grounding in that
50Benjamin, Walter, ‘Paralipomena to “On the Concept of History”’, in Walter Benjamin: Se-
lected Writings, vol. 4, 1938-1940, edited by Howard Eiland and Michael W Jennings. Bellknap
Press of Harvard University Press: Cambridge, MA. 2003. pp. 401-403.
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particular specificity (hitherto unknown) of the past that chance has discovered and
unlocked. The “necessary” element of this dialectic is, thus, not pre-known even if
it is pre-existent. It has to be discovered (at each moment) through revolutionary
practice. Likewise, the “contingent” element of this dialectic, too, is not simply
the relativistic contingency implicated in the free play of signifiers as in Derridean
poststructuralism51 but, instead, stands in a grounded and definitive (even if not
determinate) relationship to some necessary element (“chamber”) from the past. We
can now see now this Benjaminian dialectic is very similar to the dialectic of ne-
cessity and contingency in terms of which I have been reading James and Tagore.
This dialectic of necessity and contingency is an emergent dialectic in that the rela-
tionship between necessity and contingency is not fixed but is, instead, always being
produced situationally. Unlike the Derridean understanding of the world as a text
with meanings relationally constituted as a decentered system of differences, this
dialectic has a center, namely revolutionary practice – which, though situational, is
nevertheless grounded in the past on the basis of an underlying organizing principle:
human freedom.
Buck-Morss points out that Haiti “stands at the vanguard of the history of moder-
nity”: it does so
. . .[I]n its early experience of impoverished dependence on the global
economy, in its early struggle against Western policies of genocide, and
in its postcolonial, hierarchical articulation of social elites. The Haitian
51Derrida, Jacques. ‘Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences’. Writing
and Difference. (Trans.) Alan Bass. London: Routledge, p. 279.
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experience was not a modern phenomenon too, but first. Haiti’s founding
fathers used a discourse of nationalist unity ideologically to push the freed
slaves back into conditions of plantation labor and production for export,
a specifically modern political strategy that is hardly outdated.52
We have already noted how James had viewed plantation-slavery in Haiti as a close
approximation of the capitalist factory-system. James in fact had also argued that
slave life in San Domingo actually was “in its essence a modern life.”53 It is not
difficult to see that James was trying to decenter the narrative of modernity. “What
we as Marxists have to see,” he writes, “is the tremendous role played by Negroes
in the transformation of Western civilization from feudalism to capitalism.”54 For
James, the revolution in San Domingo seemed to prefigure or anticipate the Bolshevik
revolution: he describes the insurgent slaves as “revolutionaries through and through,
those bold men . . . own brothers of the Vyborg workers in Petrograd,”55 and it is
difficult not to see in James’ depictions of the figures of the charismatic Toussaint,
the ruthless Dessalines and the “dashing soldier” Moöise, “the most popular soldier in
the army,” who “indiscreetly made [criticisms] of Toussaint’s policy”56, prefigurative
portrayals of Lenin, Stalin and Trotsky respectively. James also makes an explicit
52Buck-Morss, Susan. Hegel, Haiti and Universal History. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh
Press. 2009. p. 138.
53James. C.L.R. The Black Jacobins: Toussaint L’Ouverture and the San Domingo Revolution.
New York: Vintage Books. 1963 [originally published in 1938.] p. 392.
54James, C.L.R. ‘Revolution and the Negro’. C.L.R. James and Revolutionary Marxism: Selected
Writings of C.L.R. James 1939-1949. (Trans.) Scott McLemee and Paul Le Blanc. New Jersey:
Humanities Press. 1994. p. 77.
55James. C.L.R. The Black Jacobins: Toussaint L’Ouverture and the San Domingo Revolution.
London: Penguin. 2001. [originally published in 1938.] p. 224.
56James. C.L.R. The Black Jacobins: Toussaint L’Ouverture and the San Domingo Revolution.
London: Penguin. 2001. [originally published in 1938.] p. 209.
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comparison between the Haitian revolution and the Cuban revolution in the appendix
to The Black Jacobins titled ‘From Toussaint L’Ouverture to Fidel Castro’ that he
appended to the 1963 re-edition of the book.57 James remarks in this appendix:
“[Both] Toussaint L’Ouverture and Fidel Castro led a revolutionary people.”58
Buck-Morss has argued that “the world-historical contribution of the Saint-Domingue
slaves,” in fact, went much further beyond merely anticipating or pre-figuring: she
makes the bold claim that the idea which the insurgent slaves collectively expressed
“went far beyond existing European Enlightenment thought – and is, indeed, far from
realized under today’s conditions of a global economy . . . .”59 Buck-Morss draws
attention to the fact that the Haitian Constitution of 1804 “declared all citizens
as ‘black’ irrespective of color or race”, cautioning the reader that this declaration
of universality was the expression of a desideratum rather than an ideal realizable
in that conjuncture of time and place: “the constitution was imagining a unity
that did not yet exist.”60 Buck-Morss finds this imaginative quality – “empathic
imagination,” as she calls it61 – in the Constitution of 1804 to be a moral triumph,
57James. C.L.R. The Black Jacobins: Toussaint L’Ouverture and the San Domingo Revolution.
London: Penguin. 2001. [originally published in 1938.] p. 308.
58Fidel Castro’s celebrated speech at his trial after his abortive attack on the Moncada barracks
in Batista’s Cuba in 1953, in which he invoked the French declaration of the Rights of Man, sounds
almost as if it could have come out of Toussaint’s mouth: “Is it or is it not legitimate to struggle
against this regime? . . . The famous French Declaration of the Rights of Man willed this principle
to the coming generations: ’When the government violates the rights of the people, insurrection is
for them the most sacred of rights and the most imperative of duties.”’ [Castro, Fidel. History Will
Absolve Me: The Moncada Trial Defence Speech, New York: Center for Cuban Studies. [Speech
originally delivered at Santiago de Cuba, October 16th, 1953.]
59Buck-Morss, Susan. Hegel, Haiti and Universal History. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh
Press. 2009. p. 147.
60Buck-Morss, Susan. Hegel, Haiti and Universal History. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh
Press. 2009. p. 145.
61Buck-Morss, Susan. Hegel, Haiti and Universal History. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh
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because it imagined a universal humanity inclusively rather than through the means
of excluding antithetical others. However, she is careful to mention that “the events
in the Haitian Revolution” cannot be fitted to any single narrative.62 James shares
this view of the imaginative universality of the Haitian Revolution, as, in the 1963
appendix to The Black Jacobins, ‘From Toussaint L’Ouverture to Fidel Castro’, he
approvingly quoted Aimé Césaire:
mais l’oeuvre de l’homme vient seulement de commencer. . .
et aucune race ne possède le monopole de la beauté, de l’intelligence, de
la force
et il est place pour tout au rendez-vous de la conquête . . . 64
[ but the work of man is only just beginning. . .
and no race possesses the monopoly of beauty, of intelligence, of force,
and there is a place for all at the rendezvous of victory. . .]65
James then glosses these lines, remarking that “Here is the centre of Césaire’s poem.
. . . Negritude is what one race brings to the common rendezvous where all will strive
for the new world of the poet’s vision.”66
Amit Chaudhuri has made a claim about Tagore’s vision of universality which is
Press. 2009. p. 144.
62Interestingly, Buck-Morss points out that “Haitian elites were the first in history to embrace
the word ‘black’ as their political identity.”63
64Césaire, Aimé. ’Le Cahier d’un retour au pays natal.’ In: The Collected Poetry. Trans. and
introduced by Clayton Eshleman and Annette Smith. California: University of California Press.
1984. p. 76.
65James’ translation. In: James. C.L.R. The Black Jacobins: Toussaint L’Ouverture and the
San Domingo Revolution. London: Penguin. 2001. [originally published in 1938.] p. 313.
66James. C.L.R. The Black Jacobins: Toussaint L’Ouverture and the San Domingo Revolution.
London: Penguin. 2001. [originally published in 1938.] p. 314.
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strikingly similar to the vision of Haitian universality that James seems to tacitly
endorse at the end of The Black Jacobins. Chaudhuri writes:
[Dipesh] Chakrabarty, in an essay on Tagore, distinguishes the poet’s
“critical eye,” which he finds in his stories, and which negotiates his-
tory and society, from the sensibility or gaze found in the poetry, which
he describes as the “adoring eye”: romantic, transcendent, bucolic. A
“division of labour” is at work here, and this is how Chakrabarty puts it:
“At the same time – as he employed his prosaic writings to
document social problems, Tagore put his poetic compositions
(not always in verse) and songs to a completely different use.
These created and deployed images of the same category – the
Bengali village – but this time as a land of arcadian and pas-
toral beauty overflowing with the sentiments that defined what
Tagore would increasingly – from the 1880s on – call “the Ben-
gali heart.”
This is true; and yet, . . . the conception of nature Tagore theorised
in his essays is arcadian – and indispensable to his politics. . . . [F]or
Tagore, nature is the site of civilisation, refinement and certain ideals
of the Enlightenment, such as living in harmony with the world: and
it’s a specifically Indian location for these things. Tagore, audaciously,
does not so much present a critique of the Western Enlightenment and
humanism, and the idea of “civilisation” itself, as snatch them away from
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their expected location and give them another source and lineage, in India
and its antiquity; cheekily, he implies this lineage might be the more
authentic one.67
Both Tagore and James, then, in their own ways, posit a universality. They do not
question or challenge the idea of universalism itself, nor is it their project to pick
a quarrel with the western, Enlightenment notion of universality or to show up the
latter’s deficiencies. Instead, by supplying different genealogies for this universality
and linking it to different traditions (Haiti in the case of the James of The Black
Jacobins and India in the case of Tagore), their projects make universalism more
universal. What I have tried to show is that the dialectic of necessity and contingency
that I have attempted to trace in the writing of both, is central to their projects,
as the conjunctural, contingent specificity of Haiti or India stands in a dialectical
relationship with the necessary logic of universalism.
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